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ABSTRACT 
WOODROW HARTZOG: Taken in Context:  
An Examination of Judicial Determinations Regarding  
Implied Obligations of Confidentiality 
(under the direction of Cathy Packer, Ph.D.) 
 
 
This study explores how courts analyze claims of implied obligations of 
confidentiality. Individuals must regularly disclose information that, if misused, could 
subject them to harm, particularly on the Internet. Yet American courts lack a clear and 
consistent methodology for protecting self-disclosed information. Traditional privacy 
remedies often do not cover self-disclosed information. A more promising yet 
underdeveloped concept is the law of implied confidentiality. Implied confidentiality is a 
flexible and powerful concept, yet there is no widely adopted methodology to guide 
courts in determining which actions, language, or designs imply an obligation of 
confidentiality.  
This dissertation utilizes Helen Nissenbaum‘s theory of privacy as contextual 
integrity as a framework for analyzing factors important to courts in disputes involving 
implied obligations of confidentiality. The theory of privacy as contextual integrity is the 
theory that privacy violations occur when the context in which information is disclosed is 
not respected. According to Nissenbaum, privacy and confidentiality are defined by the 
informational norms within a given context.  Nissenbaum identified four factors relevant 
to informational norms: 1) context, 2) the nature of the information, 3) actors, and 4) 
terms of disclosure.  
 iv 
The 132 cases analyzed in this dissertation revealed that all four of Nissenbaum‘s 
factors were important to courts in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. 
Contextual integrity seems to be a good theory for analyzing both offline and online 
implied obligations of confidentiality, though the cases supported the collapse of 
Nissenbaum‘s four factors into two: context and terms.  
This dissertation proposes a framework based on the case analysis to help courts 
ascertain the two most important considerations in implied obligations of confidentiality 
– party perception and party inequality. Courts presented with claims of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality should ask: 1) What was the context surrounding the 
disclosure? 2) What was the nature of the information? 3) Who were the actors and what 
was their relationship to each other? and 4) What were the internal and external terms of 
disclosure? This dissertation concludes that the concept of implied obligations of 
confidentiality is promising as an alternative to traditional privacy remedies, but in need 
of a unifying framework.  
 
  
 v 
 
 
 
 
 
For my wife Jennifer, 
with love, respect, and gratitude 
 
 
 
 
  
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The completion of this dissertation has been a team effort. I must first thank my 
wife, Jennifer, for her steadfast support and love throughout this process. Without it, this 
journey would have never begun. Thanks to my son, William, for being so understanding 
when I had to work. I would also like to thank my parents, Rickey and Debbie Hartzog, 
who always challenged me to be better, try harder, and go farther than I ever thought I 
could. 
With them at the top of the list is Dr. Cathy Packer, my adviser, mentor, and 
friend. I have never witnessed such a dedication to a project that was not one‘s own. 
From the very beginning, she deftly and consistently guided me around every potential 
pitfall. She also tirelessly worked with me to refine this dissertation from a rough and 
general idea into something I am very proud of. I am extremely thankful to have had the 
opportunity to work with such an exemplary educator and academic who has such care 
for her charges. 
I‘m very grateful to the members of my committee: Dr. Ruth Walden, for helping 
ensure clarity and sound methodology and for guiding my entrance into graduate study; 
Paul Jones, for challenging me to think beyond the immediate dilemma and to connect 
the dots; Anne Klinefelter, for encouraging me to untangle the many dilemmas in privacy 
law; and Caroline Brown, for ensuring that my thoughts on contract law were both sound 
and based in reality. 
 vii 
I‘m also grateful for a support system that exceeded anything I could have 
hoped for; my cohort, including Kelly Davis, Yeuseung Kim, Temple Northup, 
Sheetal Patel, Dave Remund, Autumn Shafer, Brooke Weberling, and Bart 
Wojdynski, for steadfast friendship and inspiration; my wonderful office mates 
Dean Mundy and Laurie Phillips for their friendship and attentive ears; the Law 
Dawgs, including Derigan Silver and Erin Coyle, for always making me feel 
welcome; Fred Stutzman, for showing me the meaning of collaboration and 
research development; the Park family for their generous support of the Roy H. 
Park Fellowships; Ryan Calo and the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford 
Law School, for helping me explore the ideas in this dissertation; Dr. Daniel 
Riffe, for always having time for a question; and Dean Smith, for sage advice and 
constant encouragement. 
Finally, I would like to thank Daniel Solove, who many years ago saw 
potential in an enthusiastic but very undeveloped student. His support and 
encouragement have been invaluable and were instrumental in my decision to 
begin this journey. His guidance has been an excellent example of how to be a 
teacher and mentor.  
 viii 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. vi 
CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1 
The Law of Confidentiality ........................................................................................... 12 
Contextual Integrity: A Conceptual Framework .......................................................... 22 
Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 28 
Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 64 
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 65 
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 66 
Chapter Outline ............................................................................................................. 67 
CHAPTER II ..................................................................................................................... 69 
Relationship Between the Parties ................................................................................. 74 
Custom .......................................................................................................................... 88 
Negotiation .................................................................................................................... 95 
Timing of the Disclosure .............................................................................................. 99 
Purpose of the Disclosure ........................................................................................... 100 
Solicitation .................................................................................................................. 103 
Public Policy ............................................................................................................... 104 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 107 
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................. 110 
 ix 
Secret Information ...................................................................................................... 114 
Highly Personal Information ...................................................................................... 118 
Proprietary or Useful Information .............................................................................. 123 
Information Exposing Discloser or Subject to Physical Harm ................................... 125 
Information that is Likely to Be Shared ...................................................................... 130 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 132 
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................. 133 
Vulnerability or Sophistication ................................................................................... 136 
Resources .................................................................................................................... 142 
Bad-faith ..................................................................................................................... 144 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 148 
CHAPTER V .................................................................................................................. 150 
Confidentiality Indicators ........................................................................................... 155 
External Terms ............................................................................................................ 170 
Conflicting Terms ....................................................................................................... 175 
Explicitness ................................................................................................................. 185 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 191 
CHAPTER VI ................................................................................................................. 193 
Findings ...................................................................................................................... 194 
Themes From the Case Law ....................................................................................... 203 
A Decision-Making Framework for Implied Obligations of Confidentiality ............. 213 
Suggestions for Future Research ................................................................................ 231 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 234 
 x 
References ....................................................................................................................... 240 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND THE INTERNET 
 
On October 3, 2005, Cynthia Moreno vented her frustrations online.  As a self-
described ―nerdy girl‖ and student at the University of California at Berkeley, Moreno 
was happy to be free of high school classmates in Coalinga, California, who shot spit 
wads in her hair, taunted her for being chubby, and pulled chairs out from under her.
1
  
When she returned for a high school football game in the fall of 2005, she was reminded 
of her former misery and dislike for her hometown.   
In an attempt to share her frustration with a close group of friends, she wrote ―An 
ode to Coalinga‖ and posted it on the journal section of her personal profile on the social 
network site myspace.com.
2
 She began the Ode with ―the older I get, the more I realize 
how much I despise Coalinga‖ and then made a number of extremely derogatory 
comments about Coalinga and its residents.
3
 After six days, Moreno removed the Ode 
from her online journal.
4
 
                                                 
1
 John Ellis, Coalinga grad loses MySpace rant lawsuit, THE FRESNO BEE (Oct. 12, 2010, 2:07 pm), 
http://www.fresnobee.com/2010/09/20/2085862/ex-student-loses-myspace-rant.html#storylink=mirelated. 
2
 Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
3
 Id. Moreno said that 
I don‘t care much for Coalinga, or the people that reside there or the friends I used to 
have while being there. In comparison to my college friends, they are nothing, were 
nothing, and remain nothing.  In a nutshell, their histories and reputations are so 
denigrating and their focuses are set on such superficial and unimportant things that 
breaking out if it for an instant scares them….Who the hell wouldn‘t want to get out of 
Coalinga to come to a school like CAL…and experience everything I have thus far?  
 2 
Roger Campbell, the principal of Coalinga High School, read the Ode before it 
was removed and forwarded it to the local newspaper, the Coalinga Record, which 
published the Ode in the newspaper‘s letters-to-the-editor section with only a scant 
reference to the original context in which the Ode appeared.
5
  According to the California 
Court of Appeal: ―The community reacted violently to the publication of the Ode. 
[Moreno and her family] received death threats and a shot was fired at the family home, 
forcing the family to move out of Coalinga.‖ 6 These losses required the Moreno family 
to close its 20-year-old family business.
7
  Moreno filed suit against Campbell alleging 
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Moreno‘s claim for a right of privacy in self-disclosed information, like similar 
claims of many other Internet users, was unsuccessful.  The California Court of Appeal 
found that because Moreno had disclosed the information online, she had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Ode.  The court stated: ―Here, Cynthia publicized her 
opinions about Coalinga by posting the Ode on myspace.com, a hugely popular internet 
site. Cynthia's affirmative act made her article available to any person with a computer 
                                                                                                                                                 
That‘s right *******…envy me, because that‘s all you can do….literally, that is all you 
can do….talk nonsense **** because you are nothing….So glad to be out of that damn 
town! 
An Ode to Coalinga, THE COALINGA RECORD, 
http://media.fresnobee.com/smedia/2010/09/15/11/OdeToCoalinga.source.prod_affiliate.8.pdf (last 
accessed January 30, 2011). 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. at 1129. 
7
 Id. 
 3 
and thus opened it to the public eye.  Under these circumstances, no reasonable person 
would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published material.‖8   
Moreno‘s vague claim of ―privacy‖ was relatively easy for the court to dismiss 
because the information had been self-disclosed to other people and thus was not private.  
Moreno‘s disclosure was not uncommon; the most likely publisher of personal 
information in the Internet age is the person herself.
9
  The pervasiveness of 
electronically-mediated communication, such as social media, has transformed many 
Internet users into their own worst enemies.  This problem with online disclosure is why 
the law of confidentiality and the context in which information is disclosed might be 
increasingly important to Internet users. Implied obligations of confidentiality can protect 
people revealing harmful information when explicit promises of confidentiality were not 
obtained. 
Yet the concept of implied obligations of confidentiality has strengths and 
weaknesses that are not limited to its application to the Internet. Indeed, ―offline‖ or 
general implied confidentiality is doctrinally unorganized, conceptually underdeveloped, 
and bereft of a unifying theory. In order to understand how implied obligations of 
confidentiality exist online, it is important to understand the more general tension 
between the disclosure and protection of information. Before the concept of implied 
confidentiality can be successfully applied online, its general application in offline 
disputes must be clear. 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 1130. 
9
 Daniel Solove, The Slow Demise of Defamation and Privacy Torts, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2010, 
11:14 am), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/the-slow-demise-of-defama_b_758570.html; 
Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and Blurry-Edged Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315 (2009); 
James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1197 (2009). 
 4 
It is a fact of modern life that individuals must disclose information that, if 
misused, could subject them to harm.  Michael Harvey stated that ―[i]n the course of a 
lifetime, an individual necessarily shares with others information that she would like to 
keep private.‖10  Harvey gave as examples revealing one‘s sexual orientation to a 
potential lover, seeking advice from a friend concerning an abortion, and asking parents 
for a loan for psychotherapy.
11
  Support groups like alcoholics anonymous or dating 
services like match.com are social by design but also involve the disclosure of sensitive 
information.  Harvey also noted that ―sometimes individuals may find it necessary to 
reveal personal information to institutions.  This information is thereafter [stored] in files 
or databases ranging from police reports indicating that the individual has been raped, to 
medical records reflecting her cosmetic surgery, to lists showing that she was a member 
of an AIDS patient therapy group.‖12  These disclosures are valuable to the individual, 
but once revealed, personal information is subject to misuse.   
Professor Lior Strahilevitz also has discussed the misuse of personal information.  
He argued that ―no one among us has guarded that embarrassing information with 
maximum diligence…. We all tell someone about our medical ailments.  Virtually 
everyone feels the need to unburden himself by confessing embarrassing acts to 
another.‖13  The sharing of intimate information with confidants is necessary for 
                                                 
10
 G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2385, 2385 (1992). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. 
13
 Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 924 (2005). 
 5 
emotional support and positively linked with strength of friendship.
14
  Some privacy 
theorists have suggested that intimate relationships would be impossible without an 
insistence on privacy.
15
  Strahilevitz summarized, ―We are, in short, constantly disclosing 
embarrassing information about ourselves to third parties, yet we often harbor strong 
subjective expectations of privacy when doing so.‖16 
The rampant self-disclosure of personal information concomitant with an 
expectation of privacy is a problem because courts have struggled to determine whether 
and to what degree self-disclosed information is private.
17
  Strahilevitz stated, ―Despite 
the centrality of this issue, the American courts lack a coherent, consistent methodology 
for determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
particular fact that has been shared with one or more persons.‖18 
The number of privacy suits filed in the United States is declining sharply.
19
  
However, it is unlikely this statistic reflects fewer perceived invasions of privacy.
20
  
Indeed, most evidence seems to suggest a rise in threats to privacy.
21
  The Federal Trade 
                                                 
14
 Irwin Altman, et al., Dialectic Conceptions in Social Psychology:  An Application to Social Penetration 
and Privacy Regulation, 14 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 107 (1981).  Altman‘s ―social 
penetration theory‖ posits, among other things, that the development of intimate relationships is dependent 
on the amount and degree of reciprocal self-disclosure.   
15
 Strahilevitz, supra note 13, at 923-24 (citations omitted).  
16
 Id. at 924. 
17
 Id. at 920-21. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Ed Finkel, Libel-less, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 1, 2010, 2:50 a.m.), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/libel-less/ 
20
 Daniel Solove, The Slow Demise of Defamation and Privacy Torts, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2010, 
11:14 a.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/the-slow-demise-of-defama_b_758570.html; 
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2007).  
21
 See, e.g., Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1466 (2000); DANIEL 
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 42 (2004); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT (2009) (hereinafter 
 6 
Commission and Congress have both made privacy an important agenda item.
22
  The 
media have reported countless recent privacy harms.
23
  One reason the number of privacy 
suits might be declining is because the traditional legal remedies for violations of privacy 
have been largely ineffective in protecting privacy online.
24
  The privacy torts, once 
thought to adequately address most privacy harms, have proven to be too inflexible or 
limited to adapt to changing notions of privacy.
25
  Privacy protection legislation is a 
patchwork of statutes that can be easily circumvented by online user agreements that few 
read and even fewer fully understand.
26
   
                                                                                                                                                 
referred to as ―Context‖); Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in the Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 
WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004) (hereinafter referred to as ―Integrity‖). 
22
 Katie Kaye, Online Privacy: What to Expect in 2011, CLICKZ (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/1934456/online-privacy-expect-2011; Eliza Krigman, Boucher Moving 
Forward On Privacy Legislation, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Sept. 29, 2010, 11:09 AM), 
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/09/boucher-moving-forward-on-priv.php).  
23
 Jeffery Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1; see generally, 
POGO WAS RIGHT (January 8, 2011), http://www.pogowasright.org/ (aggregating privacy stories from 
around the world); Kashmir Hill, THE NOT-SO-PRIVATE-PARTS (January 8, 2011), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/kashmirhill/. 
24
 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 21 , Nissenbaum, supra note 21; Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: 
Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
887 (2006); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a 
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000); Patricia Sanchez Abril, A 
(My)Space of One‟s Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J.TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 77 
(2007); Strahilevitz, supra note 13. 
25
 Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prossers Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887 (2010); 
Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 112-14 (2000) (discussing the hesitancy with which courts have applied tort 
of public disclosure); Volokh, supra note 24, at 1057-58 (explaining that parties who contract to maintain 
confidentiality have a reasonable expectation of privacy); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a 
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis‟s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 311-20 
(1983). 
26
 Jonathan K. Sobel, et. al., The Evolution of Data Protection as a Privacy Concern, and the Contract Law 
Dynamics Underlying It, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 56 (Anupam Chander et al. eds. 
2008). 
 7 
Not all legal protections of personal information require a determination that an 
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Confidentiality, or ―the state of 
having the dissemination of certain information restricted,‖27 focuses not on the nature of 
the information as public or private, but rather the nature of the relationship or agreement 
between parties.  Even if self-disclosed information is not ―private,‖ it could be disclosed 
in confidence.   
A number of scholars have looked to the law of confidentiality for more effective 
remedies for privacy harms than the much-maligned privacy torts.
28
   Neil Richards and 
Daniel Solove argued, ―Warren and Brandeis rejected confidentiality as too restrictive 
and narrow a basis for protecting privacy, but they did not envision just how flexibly the 
concept could be used.‖29  Susan Gilles observed that the privacy torts have ―had a far 
from happy life.‖30  She noted that, given the bleak future of the privacy torts, ―some 
have advocated that American courts take a second look at breach of confidence and 
assess its ability to protect privacy….‖31 
                                                 
27
 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, CONFIDENTIALITY (9th ed. 2009). 
28
 See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 24; Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982); Harvey, supra note 10; Zimmerman, supra note 25; Randall P. Bezanson, 
The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 
1174 (1992); Scott L. Fast, Breach of Employee Confidentiality: Moving Toward a Common-Law Tort 
Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1125 (2000); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 
(1998); Sharon Sandeen, Relative Privacy:  What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 697 (2006). 
29
 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy‟s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 
GEO. L.J. 124, 173 (2007). 
30
 Susan Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (1995). 
31
 Id. (citing Zimmerman, supra note 25 (stating ―More thought should also be given to increasing the use 
of legal sanctions for the violation of special confidential relationships, in order to give individuals greater 
control over the dissemination of personal information.‖); Bezanson, supra note 28, at 1174 (stating ―I 
suggest that the privacy tort may be formally interred, and that we look to the concept of breach of 
 8 
From a doctrinal perspective, the law of confidentiality offers many benefits that 
are absent from the common law privacy torts and current privacy statutes.  Under the 
law of confidentiality, courts can largely avoid the difficult question of whether 
information was private or offensive, and focus instead on whether a trust was breached.  
Additionally, the law of confidentiality is less constitutionally suspect than the disclosure 
tort, which has significant First Amendment limitations.
32
  The Supreme Court ruled in 
Cohen v. Cowles Media that the First Amendment does not bar an action for breach of a 
promise of confidentiality.
33
 
Although scholars have suggested that implied contracts of confidentiality or 
implied confidential relationships could serve as meaningful protections for harms related 
to the disclosure of sensitive information,
34
 this area remains underdeveloped, 
particularly with respect to online communication.  No scholarship has thoroughly 
analyzed the various factors relied upon by courts when analyzing implied agreements of 
confidentiality.     
This void has seemingly resulted in an assumption that courts will know an 
implied obligation of confidentiality when they see it.  This assumption is not helpful for 
those seeking to enforce obligations of confidentiality, particularly in a new environment 
such as the Internet. Consider Cynthia Moreno‘s self-disclosed online post intended for a 
small group of friends.  The court seemingly failed to consider whether the information 
                                                                                                                                                 
confidence to provide legally enforceable protection from dissemination of identified types of personal 
information.‖)). 
32
 See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 25; Singleton, supra note 25; Volokh, supra note 24; Gelman, supra 
note 9. 
33
 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991). 
34
 McClurg, supra note 24; Volokh, supra note 24; Richards & Solove, supra note 29, at 156-58, 180. 
 9 
disclosed was subject to an implied obligation of confidentiality.  Although Campbell 
never promised confidentiality to Moreno and Moreno did not utilize MySpace‘s privacy 
settings, a number of contextual factors hint at the confidential nature of the Ode, 
including the nature of the situation, the nature of the information in relation to the 
situation, the roles of the recipients of the information, and the implied terms regarding 
further dissemination under which the information was disclosed.  According to 
Moreno‘s opening brief, ―[E]ven when the ode was online, it did not identify Cynthia by 
her full name, and could only be read by those who wanted to view her journal; prior 
entries have produced little response, primarily from personal acquaintances.‖35  A few 
days after the Ode was first published, Moreno reportedly took ―prompt, affirmative steps 
to conceal the Ode, removing it from the online journal and extracting a promise from the 
Record‘s editor that it would not be published.‖36 
Additionally, the MySpace terms of use prohibit ―using or distributing any 
information obtained from the MySpace Services in order to harass, abuse, or harm 
another person or entity, or attempting to do the same.‖37  Thus, by accessing the Ode 
subject to these terms, Campbell was potentially legally bound to confidence via an 
agreement with MySpace. Although the Ode might not ultimately be confidential, a 
potential claim for implied obligations of confidentiality was unexplored by Moreno and 
the court in this case.   
                                                 
35
 Appellant‘s Opening Brief at 13, Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 2008 WL 
2959318. 
36
 Id. at 18.  According to the plaintiffs, the Ode was no longer online when Campbell disclosed it to the 
local newspaper.  Appellants Reply Brief at 8, Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 2008 
WL 5011945. 
37
 Terms of Use, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms#ixzz12AolEv1N 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
 10 
Other courts have found contextual factors relevant to privacy-related disputes.  
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey found it significant that an 
online community claiming privacy in its content restricted access using privacy settings.  
The court found that ―[t]his group is entirely private, and can only be joined by 
invitation,‖ and the fact that full access to the community was granted only upon 
accepting an invitation created a reasonable expectation of privacy for invited users.
38
 
Such reasonable expectations that information will not be disseminated lie at the heart of 
confidentiality law. 
 Obligations of confidentiality don‘t have to be explicit.  They can be implicit parts 
of confidential relationships or created through implied agreements of confidentiality.  
These obligations can be inferred from customs, norms, and other indicia of 
confidentiality beyond explicit confidentiality agreements.  Yet no research has examined 
which contexts, if any, are important to courts when inferring obligations of 
confidentiality online or offline. Given the uncertainty surrounding privacy in the digital 
era, understanding how implied obligations of confidentiality are formed is more 
important than ever. 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to examine implied confidentiality 
disputes to determine precisely what courts consider important in the creation of implied 
obligations of confidentiality. This research examines court cases to determine the role 
that factors such as context, actors, nature of the information, and terms of disclosure 
play in creating judicially-recognized obligations of confidentiality.  This dissertation 
examines both online and offline cases in order to fully analyze factors important in 
                                                 
38
 Pitetrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, 2008 WL 6085437 at *6 (D.N.J.). 
 11 
implied confidentiality.  By clarifying and organizing the body of case law, the concept 
of implied obligations confidentiality can be consistently applied in numerous contexts, 
including where it is most needed – the Internet 
A second purpose of this research is to contribute to the existing scholarship on 
Helen Nissenbaum‘s theory of privacy as contextual integrity.  The theory of privacy as 
contextual integrity is the theory that privacy violations occur when the context in which 
information is disclosed is not respected when one person shares another‘s personal 
information.  This application of Nissenbaum‘s theory  both helps illuminate the way 
courts have dealt with questions of context in deciding online privacy and breach of 
confidentiality disputes and explores the usefulness of the theory for the study of implied 
obligations of confidentiality.   This dissertation demonstrates which context-relative 
informational norms are significant enough to rise to the level of a legal obligation of 
confidentiality. It helps validate Nissenbaum‘s theory in this area by demonstrating 
courts‘ implicit, if inconsistent, consideration of context-relative informational norms. 
This is an important research topic because many individuals routinely disclose 
personal information online with the belief that it will remain confidential  and expecting 
they will have some legal recourse should their information be disseminated further.  
However, the traditional privacy remedies are largely ineffective for people whose 
personal information has been self-disclosed. In some contexts, such as on the Internet, 
explicit confidentiality agreements that protect the disclosers of information are rare.  
Individuals need a clarification of their rights, and courts need help navigating these 
largely unorganized legal waters. 
 12 
It should be emphasized that although the Internet has brought this legal issue to 
the forefront, disputes regarding claims of implied obligations of confidentiality have 
challenged courts since the advent of the American common law. Thus, the topic of this 
dissertation is important not just for Internet-related law, but for all disputes involving 
implied obligations of confidentiality.  
THE LAW OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
The law of confidentiality could be an effective remedy for people who disclose 
personal information in confidence but then feel their privacy has been violated. 
Confidentiality has been explored well in the scholarly literature as both a normative and 
legal concept.  Although implied confidentiality has been touched upon by some 
scholars,
39
 it has yet to be well-conceptualized by legal scholars. 
Harvey stated, ―When one person shares information with another, and the 
confidant agrees not to divulge this information to third parties, an expectation of 
confidentiality arises.‖40  Black‟s Law Dictionary defines confidentiality as ―the state of 
having the dissemination of certain information restricted.‖41  Ethicist Sissela Bok 
defined confidentiality as ―the boundaries surrounding shared secrets and the process of 
guarding these boundaries.  While confidentiality protects much that is not in fact secret, 
personal secrets lie at its core.‖42 
Bok theorized that there were four moral rationales for confidentiality: 1) the need 
for individual autonomy over personal information; 2) the need people have for private 
                                                 
39
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relationships and loyalties with friends, family, and organizations; 3) when a promise of 
silence is made, an obligation may exist for contractual reasons; and 4) professional 
confidentiality of doctors, attorneys, priests, and other professionals premised on the 
value to society in protecting the privacy of these relationships.
43
 These justifications are 
reflected in confidentiality law through the recognition of confidentiality agreements and 
confidential relationships. 
Obligations of confidentiality are found in multiple areas of the law including 
contracts for confidentiality,
44
 the still-developing tort of breach of confidentiality,
45
 
evidentiary privileges regarding confidentiality,
46
 procedural protections like protective 
orders to prevent the disclosure of embarrassing personal information in court records,
47
 
and statutes explicitly creating confidential relationships.
48
 This dissertation will focus on 
implied agreements for confidentiality for specific disclosures and implied confidential 
relationships.  In general, courts will impose an obligation of confidentiality when an 
individual or other entity voluntarily assumes, promises, or agrees to confidentiality with 
respect to designated information or enters into a confidential or fiduciary relationship.
49
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 14 
Confidentiality agreements are binding agreements that prohibit the disclosure of 
information.  In an influential article on promises of confidentiality and privacy, Susan 
Gilles found that ―[e]xpress written contracts, binding the signer to hold information 
confidential, have long been used in the commercial area, particularly by employers to 
prevent employees from revealing business secrets.‖50  She found that a ―plaintiff who 
wishes to sue in contract for a breach of confidence must prove a contract exists—that 
there was an offer, acceptance and consideration.  Where the court is faced with a written 
agreement of confidentiality, typically in the employment scenario, these elements rarely 
prove a problem for the plaintiff.‖51 
Of course, confidentiality agreements are not limited to commercial or 
employment contexts.  These contracts are relied upon to protect anonymity, arbitration 
proceedings,
52
 settlement agreements, and trade secrets.
53
  Additionally the contracts are 
used to protect sensitive information such as health information, sexual preference, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of confidentiality tort, which imposes liability for disclosing another person's confidential 
information if in breach of a duty of confidentiality; (2) the breach of an express or 
implied contract of confidentiality; (3) statutory provisions restricting the disclosure of 
confidential information; (4) protective orders preventing the disclosure of confidential 
information obtained during discovery; and (5) trade secret law restricting the disclosure 
of confidential information maintained by businesses. There are also other confidentiality 
rules not involving civil liability, such as criminal prohibitions on divulging certain kinds 
of confidential information, evidentiary privileges restricting testimony about 
confidential data, and statutory protections that limit the release of confidential 
information by certain companies or government agencies. 
Daniel J. Solove & Neil H. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1650, 1669 (2009). 
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intimate feelings, and other similar pieces of personal information.
54
  Even quasi-
contractual promises of confidentiality can be effective.  In the case of Cohen v. Cowles 
Media, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that the use of the equitable doctrine of 
promissory estoppel could be utilized when individuals justifiably rely on a promise to 
their detriment.
55
   
Online user agreements often contain confidentiality clauses.  Employee 
intranets,
56
 online health and financial information sites,
57
 and even social network sites 
obligate users to duties of confidentiality.
58
  Duties of confidentiality may also extend to 
websites that promise to protect users‘ personal information.  These promises can often 
be found in a website‘s privacy policy.59 
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Obligations of confidentiality also can arise from implied agreements and can be 
an implicit part of a fiduciary relationship.  Implied agreements can arise ―in fact‖ and ―in 
law.‖ Andrew McClurg stated, ―Implied contracts that arise in law are also called ‗quasi-
contracts.‘ Implied contracts arising in fact are based on the apparent intention of the 
parties, whereas quasi-contracts are imposed by law without regard to the intentions of 
the parties to create or not create a contract.‖60  In other words, implied confidentiality 
agreements ―in fact‖ arise when individuals actually objectively agree to confidentiality, 
but the understanding is implied in lieu of an explicit agreement.  Implied confidentiality 
agreements in law are actually not ―agreements‖ between the parties at all, but rather an 
imposition of confidentiality by the state in order to do justice as a matter of public 
policy.
61
   
This dissertation examines the role of context in both implied-in-fact and implied-
in-law agreements, though that distinction is blurry at times. Because implied-in-fact 
contracts draw heavily from context, these agreements are a greater focus of analysis than 
implied-in-law agreements, which draw from a legal sense of fairness.  Like McClurg‘s 
research, this dissertation analyzes confidential agreements that are ―founded upon a 
meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, [are] inferred, as 
a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in light of the surrounding circumstances, 
their tacit understanding.‖62  Of course, a plaintiff wishing to recover under a breach of 
implied contract of confidentiality theory must still prove the essential elements of a 
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contract – offer, acceptance, and consideration.63  Gilles found that where courts are 
faced with written agreements of confidentiality, the elements of contract formation 
rarely prove a problem for the plaintiff.
64
  However, confidentiality agreements need not 
be in writing to be enforceable.   
Alan Garfield noted that ―even when parties do not explicitly contract for a 
promise of silence, courts will sometimes imply such a promise, especially when there is 
a pre-existing contractual relationship.‖65  Garfield found that ―this type of implication 
most often occurs when a party reveals personal information to a professional, 
particularly if the ethical code of the profession mandates that the professional respect the 
client‘s privacy.‖66  Garfield noted courts are willing to infer a promise of confidentiality 
as a component of the contractual relationship involving professionals such as doctors, 
psychologists, and bankers.
67
  Garfield warned that ―[o]utside of these special 
relationships, it is far from clear that a court would be willing to imply a promise of 
confidentiality.‖68 
Gilles found that ―American courts have also reacted favorably to claims that an 
existing contract contains an implied guarantee of confidentiality.  Here there is no doubt 
that a contract exists between the parties, but the contract lacks any express term 
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requiring parties to keep the information secret.‖69  Here the nature of the relationship 
between the parties becomes important.  Gilles found that ―[i]n numerous cases, courts 
have held that doctors‘ and psychiatrists‘ contracts with their patients contain an implied 
term requiring that information disclosed by the patient be kept confidential.  Some 
courts have also implied such a pledge of confidentiality into a bank‘s contract with its 
depositor.‖70   
However, courts will infer terms of confidentiality only when such terms are 
apparent from contextual factors such as other ―terms of the agreement, the parties‘ 
conduct, the course of dealing or usage and from consideration of justice.‖71  Courts are 
reluctant to infer confidentiality from oral contracts and informal settings, which often 
lack expectations of confidentiality.  Gilles noted that ―it appears that the further we 
move from the commercial setting, the more difficult it becomes for a breach of 
confidence plaintiff to convince a court that an oral promise of confidentiality constitutes 
an enforceable contract.‖72 
In addition to agreements for confidentiality, an obligation of confidentiality may 
be created by entering into a special kind of confidential relationship known as a 
―fiduciary relationship.‖  The law of equity has traditionally designated certain relations 
as ―fiduciary.‖73  Gilles wrote that ―[w]here such a relation exists, a fiduciary is under a 
duty ‗to act for the benefit of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope 
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of the relation.‘ This duty, often characterized as the ‗duty of loyalty,‘ includes an 
obligation not to reveal information.‖74 
According to Roy Ryden Anderson: 
The essence of a confidential relationship is fiduciary obligation….  
Fiduciary obligation is the highest order of duty imposed by law.  In the 
relationship with the principal, the beneficiary of the relationship, the 
fiduciary must exercise utmost good faith and candor, must disclose all 
relevant information, and must not profit from the relationship without the 
knowledge and permission of the principal.  The fiduciary must make 
every effort to avoid having his own interests in conflict with those of the 
principal, and, when conflict is unavoidable, the fiduciary must place the 
interests of the principal above his own.  These principles are both basic 
and uncompromising.
75
 
 
Like confidentiality agreements, the existence of a confidential relationship is a 
question of fact.
76
 Anderson found that ―confidential relationships have been labeled 
‗fact-based‘ fiduciary relationships to distinguish them from formal [fiduciary 
relationships].‖77  Although professional relationships such as doctor/patient and 
attorney/client relationships are the most common types of confidential relationships, 
courts have found many kinds of relationships to be fiduciary, including friendships, 
business relationships, and familial relationships.
78
   
Gilles wrote that ―[e]quity has never bound itself by any hard and fast definition 
of the phrase ‗confidential relation‘ and has not listed all the necessary elements of such a 
relation, but has reserved discretion to apply the doctrine whenever it believes that a 
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suitable occasion has arisen.‖79  Gillis did identify some factors that courts consider in 
determining whether a confidential relation exits: ―length of time of the reliance, a 
disparity in the positions of the parties, and a close relationship between the parties.  It is 
‗great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrusting of power, and superiority of position‘ 
that evidence a confidential relation.‖80   
The Supreme Court of Texas held that ―[a]n information relationship may give 
rise to a fiduciary duty where one person trusts in and relies on another, whether the 
relation is a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal one.‖81  However, these duties are 
not imposed lightly, and not every relationship involving trust and confidence is a 
fiduciary one.
82
  Anderson identified three limitations on establishing a fact-based 
fiduciary relationship:  
First, the alleged relationship must be found to have existed prior 
to the transaction at issue.  Second, the reliance by the aggrieved 
party that the other would act toward him as a fiduciary must not 
have been subjective.  Third, the alleged confidential relationship 
may not be established solely by private agreement, but must arise 
sui generis from the nature of the relationship.
83
 
 
Thus, while confidential obligations can be created by contract, fiduciary 
relationships require more than a contract. This is another instance where context informs 
confidentiality law.  Additionally, confidentiality agreements and fiduciary relationships 
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can be simultaneously present.  In Snepp v. United States,
84
 the federal government 
successfully sued an ex-employee who published a book about his CIA experience for 
both breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.
85
 
Breach of these confidential relationships sometimes gives rise to liability under 
the breach of confidentiality tort.  This tort, while very developed in England, is limited 
in the United States.
86
  Garfield found that ―[c]ourts impose liability under the tort when a 
person discloses information that he received in confidence.‖87  The tort isn‘t limited to 
professional relationships.  According to Garfield, liability can also occur ―in an informal 
setting if the party receiving the information either explicitly or implicitly agrees to keep 
the information confidential.‖88  Thus, implicit confidentiality agreements have 
contractual and tortious implications. 
Conceptually, confidentiality seems to be a more accurate reflection of modern 
notions of privacy than the maligned ―secrecy paradigm,‖ which holds that only secret or 
unknown information can be deemed ―private.‖89  Humans are social beings who 
routinely disclose information – even very sensitive information – to trusted individuals.  
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Whereas a conception of privacy as secrecy only considers the nature of the information, 
confidentiality looks to the relationship between the parties and the context of disclosure.  
This emphasis on context underlies the theoretical framework for this dissertation: 
confidentiality as contextual integrity. 
CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
Generally, courts look to context when analyzing implied obligations of 
confidentiality.  Yet implied confidentiality is doctrinally unorganized, conceptually 
underdeveloped, and bereft of a unifying theory.  This dissertation adopts the emerging 
theory of privacy as contextual integrity as a framework for analyzing courts‘ treatment 
of online and offline implied obligations of confidentiality.  Because confidentiality is 
generally considered a type of privacy,
90
 this framework for privacy analysis is well-
suited for analyzing questions about the context surrounding promises of confidentiality. 
In short, the theory of privacy as contextual integrity is the theory that privacy 
violations occur when ―context-relative informational norms‖ 91 are not respected when 
sharing information. According to its creator, Helen Nissenbaum, the framework of 
contextual integrity provides that ―finely calibrated systems of social norms, or rules, 
govern the flow of personal information in distinct social contexts (e.g., education, health 
care, and politics).‖92  Nissenbaum stated that these norms ―define and sustain essential 
activities and key relationships and interests, protect people and groups against harm, and 
balance the distribution of power.‖93  Nissenbaum stated that context-relative 
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informational norms are simultaneously reflections of expectations of privacy in certain 
contexts and normative prohibitions on the further dissemination of that information.
 
 
Developed as a model of informational privacy, contextual integrity is defined by 
Nissenbaum as ―compatibility with presiding norms of information appropriateness and 
distribution.‖94  Specifically, Nissenbaum posited: 
[W]hether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a 
function of several variables, including the nature of the situation, or 
context; the nature of the information in relation to that context; the roles 
of agents receiving information; their relationships to information 
subjects; on what terms the information is shared by the subject; and the 
terms of further dissemination.
95
 
 
Nissenbaum has also referred to these variables simply as 1) contexts; 2) actors; 3) 
attributes; and 4) transmission principles.
96
  Nissenbaum posited that context-relative 
informational norms are characterized by these variables, which ―prescribe, for a given 
context, the types of information, the parties who are the subjects of the information as 
well as those who are sending and receiving it, and the principles under which this 
information is transmitted.‖97 
 Nissenbaum defined context as ―structured social settings with characteristics that 
have evolved over time…and are subject to a host of causes and contingences of purpose, 
place, culture, historical accident, and more.‖98  Regarding actors, Nissenbaum posited 
that three roles must be examined: ―senders of information, recipients of information, and 
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information subjects.‖99  The third variable, attributes of information types, which will be 
referred to as ―the nature of the information,‖ was defined by Nissenbaum as ―the nature 
of the information in question: not only who it was about, and to whom and from whom it 
was shared, but what it was about…the ‗kind and degree of knowledge.‘‖100 The final 
variable, transmission principles, which will be referred to as the ―terms of disclosure,‖ 
are constraints on the flow of information from party to party in a context.  According to 
Nissenbaum, the terms of disclosure in informational norms express the conditions under 
which such transfers ought (or ought not) to occur.
101
  These four variables guide the 
analysis in this dissertation regarding when and how courts consider implied obligations 
of confidentiality.   
Technology has made it easy for individuals to violate context-relative 
informational norms. The Internet has removed most meaningful barriers to the 
collection, storage, and dissemination of information. Nissenbaum stated, ―Information 
technologies alarm us when they flout these informational norms—when, in the words of 
the framework, they violate contextual integrity.‖102   
Data-brokerage is a prime example of a potential violation of contextual integrity 
online.  Social media and Web 2.0 websites encourage the disclosure of information 
within a particular context: Facebook users share information with their ―friends;‖ 
Google users search for information by entering terms into a search engine; Match.com 
users create profiles to share with potential intimates.  Yet this information, once shared 
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for its original purpose, is stored by websites and later sold to third parties such as 
commercial data brokers, marketers and other businesses, law enforcement agencies, and 
the federal government.
103
  Once this information is transferred to third parties, it exists in 
a different context – as part of a digital dossier or other aggregated chunk of data – and 
can be used for purposes far removed from the purpose for which the information 
originally was disclosed. Thus, the integrity of the original context, for example, 
disclosure to Facebook friends who know the user, has been violated because that 
information was shared with strangers. 
The central tenet of contextual integrity provides that ―there are no arenas in life 
not governed by norms of information flow….  Almost everything – things that we do, 
events that occur, transactions that take place – happens in a context not only of place but 
of politics, convention, and cultural expectation.‖104  Because Nissenbaum‘s theory 
applies to norms of information flow, it is well suited to frame this research, which 
analyzes when courts should infer obligations that restrict the flow of information by 
looking at context. 
Nissenbaum originally offered her theory of privacy as contextual integrity to 
determine how privacy was breached.  Her theory is  used in this dissertation to frame the 
creation (or lack thereof) of the privacy-related obligations of confidentiality by 
identifying the context-relative information norms considered by courts.  Nissenbaum 
posits ―two types of information norms: norms of appropriateness, and norms of flow or 
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distribution.  Contextual integrity is maintained when both types of norms are upheld, 
and it is violated when either of the norms is violated.‖105 
Nissenbaum has applied contextual integrity to a number of controversial privacy 
questions, including: 
Whether it is morally wrong for Google Maps‘ Street view to include 
images of identifiable individuals (or their possessions) without 
permission, whether the FBI should be allowed to coerce librarians to 
divulge a library‘s lending logs, whether Internet service providers are 
entitled to track customers‘ clickstreams and sell them at will, whether one 
may post a tagged group photograph of others on one‘s Facebook page, 
whether insurance companies violate client privacy when they generate 
massive databases pooled from information about their clients, [and] 
whether the police should be permitted to erect covert license plate 
recognition systems at public intersections….106 
 
Regarding social media and the self-disclosure of information, Nissenbaum asked, 
―[W]hy, if information is already ‗out there‘ in some sense, is it problematic when it is 
‗out there‘ in another place?‖107  According to Nissenbaum, the answer is that ―another 
place‖ is a different context, and that point is critical to an individual‘s expectations of 
privacy. Nissenbaum rejected the idea that social network sites like Facebook were 
devoid of entrenched norms.
108
  Nissenbaum stated, ―Although of course the medium of 
social networking sites, generally, and design characteristics (configurations) of specific 
sites shape the nature of interactions to some degree, these interactions are also governed 
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by norms of respective social contexts and acquire significance from their occurrences 
within them.‖109   
According to Nissenbaum, ―The contexts these sites serve are as variable as the 
available sites themselves, of which there are at least 350 [in 2010], and some of the 
variation is likely to correlate with the particular demographic that specific sites have 
historically served.‖110  The same can be said for all online activity.  The norms of a 
closed social network site like the Online Intergroup of Alcoholics Anonymous are likely 
to differ than those on Facebook.  This dissertation asks whether courts have recognized 
any such distinction.   
Contextual integrity – informational norms that restrict the flow of information in 
certain contexts – can serve as the basis for implied obligations of confidentiality.  If all 
users of an online community realize the norm of the group is to maintain confidentiality, 
even if that it is never explicitly stated, then individuals might be expected to rely on this 
norm when disclosing intimacies.  This reliance can be the basis for courts to find an 
obligation of confidentiality.
111
  Thus context might serve courts better in privacy-related 
disputes than the current analysis engaged in by judges ascertaining reasonable 
expectations of privacy in information. 
Given the ineffectiveness of traditional privacy remedies and the exponential 
growth of self-disclosed information on the Internet, the law of confidentiality has never 
been more relevant.  Yet explicit agreements for confidentiality online are rare.  Websites 
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largely claim to dictate the terms of user privacy in their terms-of-use agreements and 
privacy policies. These terms cannot be negotiated and are drafted to favor websites. 
Additionally, Internet users are limited by website design – they can only interact 
in ways the software code allows.  But obligations of confidentiality are not created only 
by explicit agreements and relationships.  By examining how, if at all, courts consider the 
context, actors, nature of the information, and terms of disclosure, this dissertation 
determines to what extent implied obligations of confidentiality could be a legitimate 
concept in protecting user privacy in the Internet age. 
A contextual approach to implied obligations of confidentiality has gained gradual 
support from scholars.  While the privacy literature is rich with eulogies for the 
traditional privacy remedies because they are ineffective in an online environment, fewer 
suggest confidentiality law as an answer. Furthermore, no literature has squarely 
examined what factors are important to courts that are called upon to recognize an 
obligation of confidentiality.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The question of when confidentiality should be implied has not been well-
developed by scholars.  While courts and scholars have developed general rules for such 
a finding, such as ―whenever a reasonable person would conclude an agreement of 
confidentiality was implied‖ or ―whenever a fiduciary relationship exists,‖ there is little 
analysis beyond these guiding principles.  However, the broader concepts related to the 
law of confidentiality have been well-addressed, and the literature on these subjects is 
relevant for implied confidentiality.  Confidentiality is a hybrid legal concept that often 
utilizes contractual obligations and fiduciary responsibilities to protect an individual‘s 
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privacy.  Thus, the scholarly writing about implied obligations of confidentiality exists 
within the larger body of literature about privacy, contracts, fiduciary relationships, and 
technology.   
The notion that traditional legal remedies for the protection of privacy are 
ineffective in the Internet age seems to dominate privacy law literature.   Privacy scholars 
have suggested modifying the privacy torts,
112
 passing new legislation, altering existing 
statutes,
113
 turning to confidentiality law,
114
 or simply giving up on the concept of privacy 
and embracing our new transparent society.
115
 Of those privacy law scholars who have 
offered confidentiality law as a viable remedy for privacy harms, few have progressed 
past that initial suggestion. This is particularly true for the application of confidentiality 
law to online disputes.   
The same can be said for contract scholars.  While confidentiality agreements are 
well-covered in the contract law literature with respect to their enforceability and 
interpretation, few contract scholars have examined the creation of implied 
confidentiality agreements online.   Nevertheless, contract theories, particularly the 
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empirical view of contract
116
 and the relational theory of contract,
117
 are well-suited for a 
contextual analysis of implied obligations.  The theme throughout the privacy, contract 
law, and fiduciary relationship literature is that privacy law and, specifically, the law of 
confidentiality must respond to the threats wrought by technology. 
Privacy and Confidentiality in the Pre-Digital Age. The scholarly literature 
reveals that most privacy laws are largely a reaction to problems caused by new 
technologies.  However, most scholars have noticeably neglected to include 
confidentiality law in their analysis how of technology has challenged application of 
privacy laws.  The scholarly literature on privacy is important because it helps frame the 
analysis of Nissenbaum‘s four variables that shape informational norms: context, actors, 
nature of the information, and the terms of disclosure.   
While confidentiality itself is lacking a unifying theory, the concept of 
confidentiality is part of a number of conceptualizations of privacy.  Privacy has been the 
subject of great theoretical debate in the scholarly literature.  Prior to mass adoption of 
computers and Internet use, most privacy literature focused heavily on the theoretical 
aspects and conceptualizations of privacy. These conceptualizations of privacy, often 
contoured by the threat to privacy posed by the mass media, included the right to be let 
alone and control over personal information. Of these conceptualizations, control over 
information is the most relevant regarding confidentiality law. 
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In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote ―The Right to Privacy,‖118  
which is the seminal American scholarly piece on privacy. It is, according to some 
scholars, the most influential law review article ever written.
119
  In ―The Right to 
Privacy,” the young attorneys Warren and Brandeis helped structure the conceptual 
landscape of privacy; gave birth to the four privacy torts; and shaped the development of 
statutory, constitutional, and other privacy protections.
120
  Warren and Brandeis‘s 
conceptualization of privacy was the memorable and evocative ―right to be let alone.‖121 
The scholars also arguably stunted the growth of confidentiality law in the United 
States.  Warren and Brandeis explicitly deemed contracts inadequate to protect 
individuals from the new privacy violations wrought by the technology of the late 1800s 
such as the handheld camera. Although the scholars recognized the utility of contracts, 
they asserted that because ―modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the 
perpetration of [privacy harms] without any participation by the injured party, the 
protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader foundation.‖122   
Professors Richards and Solove observed that ―Warren and Brandeis pointed 
American common law in a new direction, toward a more general protection of ‗inviolate 
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personality‘ against invasions by strangers.‖123  Richards and Solove also observed that 
Dean William Prosser ―cemented this change of direction in his 1960 article ‗Privacy‘ 
and in the Second Restatement of Torts, for which he served as a reporter.‖124  The 
professors said that ―Prosser not only established American privacy law as four related 
torts, but also minimized the importance of confidentiality as a concept in American 
law.‖125 
Although ―the right to be let alone‖ became the most commonly accepted concept 
of privacy, a number of pre-Internet scholars conceptualized it differently.  Professor 
Charles Fried theorized that privacy was ―control over knowledge about oneself.‖126  
Fried‘s thesis was that ―privacy is not just one possible means among other to insure 
some other value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most 
fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust.‖127  He argued that ―[p]rivacy is not 
merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without 
privacy they are simply inconceivable.‖128   
This conceptualization is much more aligned with the intrinsic nature of 
confidentiality than the right to be let alone.  That is to say, confidentiality, defined here 
as ―the state of having the dissemination of certain information restricted,‖129 is more 
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effective at furthering respect, love, friendship, and trust than a ―right to be let alone,‖ 
which focuses on secrecy, solitude, and inviolate personality. Indeed, a confidentiality 
agreement could be seen a legal and normative manifestation of ―control over knowledge 
about oneself.‖ 
Several scholars in disciplines other than law have embraced the concept of 
privacy as control over information.  Alan Westin helped popularize the concept of 
privacy as control in his book Privacy and Freedom.
130
  As a general premise, ―Westin‘s 
theory of privacy speaks of ways in which people protect themselves by temporarily 
limiting access to themselves by others.‖131  More specifically, according to Westin: 
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.  Viewed in terms of the relation of the 
individual to social participation, privacy is the voluntary and temporary 
withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical or 
psychological means, either in a state of solitude or small group 
intimacy or, when among large groups, in a condition of anonymity or 
reserve.
132
 
Westin‘s theory focuses on the need for privacy to help individuals emotionally 
adjust to life within a society.  ―He describes privacy both as a dynamic process (i.e., we 
regulate privacy so it is sufficient for serving momentary needs and role requirements) 
and as a non-monotonic function (i.e., people can have too little, sufficient, or too much 
privacy).‖133  Psychologist Irwin Altman also developed one of the most prominent and 
widely accepted theories regarding privacy as control.  In Altman‘s book The 
                                                 
130
 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). 
131
 Stephen Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin's and Altman's Theories of Privacy. 59(2) 
JOUR. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 411, 412 (2003) 
132
 Westin, supra note 130, at 7. 
133
 Margulis, supra note 131, at 412. 
 34 
Environment and Social Behavior,
134
 he posits that privacy is the ―the selective control of 
access to the self.‖135 
Although privacy scholarship before the Internet continually wrestled with the 
challenges presented by technology, the privacy literature was not focused on technology.  
Media defendants were the focus of most of the discussion surrounding the disclosure, 
false light, and intrusion torts.
136
  Advertisers were the most likely infringers of the right 
to publicity.
137
  Thus, threats to privacy were not as pervasive because publication was 
slower and less widespread and mostly done by journalists and corporations.  Predictably, 
the literature was sparse when compared to the literature produced after the digital 
revolution.  The Internet age brought about a dramatic change in the quantity and nature 
of privacy scholarship. 
 Privacy in the Internet Age. Digital communication and the Internet are the 
reasons confidentiality law has an increased significance in the privacy law literature.  
Generally, scholars have found that traditional privacy law remedies are ineffective on 
the Internet.  However, online confidentiality has been analyzed differently by scholars.  
This difference between scholarly accounts of privacy and confidentiality in the Internet 
age underscores the need to further develop a legal conceptualization of confidentiality.   
Professor Neil Richards stated that ―[o]ne of the most interesting developments in 
the legal literature on privacy over the past decade has been the emergence of what I 
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would like to refer to as the ‗Information Privacy Law Project.‘ This term refers to a 
collective effort by a group of scholars to identify a law of ‗information privacy‘ and to 
establish information privacy law as a valid field of scholarly inquiry.‖138  Richards found 
that, generally, ―Information Privacy Law Project‖ scholars ―base their work either 
expressly or implicitly upon a binary distinction between ‗decisional privacy‘ and 
‗information privacy,‘ … approach the problems of privacy from a technological or 
intellectual property background, and have been interested in the technical aspects of 
information regulation in addition to its jurisprudential implications.‖139   
Solove is one of the most prominent scholars in the Information Privacy Law 
Project.
140
  He has had a significant impact on the conceptualization of privacy and its 
relationship with technology.  Solove rejected the conceptualization of privacy as a 
unitary concept with a uniform value that is unvarying across different situations.
141
 
Following philosopher John Dewey‘s view that philosophical inquiry should begin as a 
response to dealing with life‘s problems and difficulties, Solove argued that ―the focal 
point should be on privacy problems‖ not on the fruitless search for what privacy ―is.‖142 
Solove argued that privacy should be determined on the basis of its importance to society, 
                                                 
138
 Neil Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L. J. 1087, 1089 (2006). 
139
 Id. 
140
 See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008) (hereinafter ―UNDERSTANDING‖); Solove, 
supra note 21; Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Daniel Solove, The 
Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L. J. 967 (2003); 
Solove, supra note 90; Richards & Solove, supra note29, at 125; Daniel Solove, "I've Got Nothing to Hide" 
and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007); Daniel Solove, Data Mining 
and the Security-Liberty Debate, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 (2008); Solove & Richards, supra note 49; Solove 
& Richards, supra note 25. 
141
 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 140, at 8. 
142
 Id.  
 36 
not in terms of individual rights.
143
  He stated:  ―When we protect privacy, we protect 
against disruptions to certain activities.  A privacy invasion interferes with the integrity of 
certain activities and even destroys or inhibits some activities.  Instead of attempting to 
locate the common denominator of these activities, we should conceptualize privacy by 
focusing on the specific types of disruption.‖144   
To further this focus on specific types of disruption, Solove proposed a taxonomy 
of privacy – ―a framework for understanding privacy in a pluralistic and contextual 
manner.‖145  His taxonomy was grounded in the different kinds of privacy-infringing 
activities that can be sorted into four principal groups: (1) information collection, (2) 
information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion.
146
  Solove stated 
that the taxonomy was ―an attempt to identify and understand the different kinds of 
socially recognized privacy violations.‖147 
Solove identified breach of confidentiality as one of the recognized privacy 
violations resulting from information dissemination.  In discussing the breach of 
confidentiality tort and its relationship to the disclosure tort, Solove argued that 
―disclosure and breach of confidentiality cause different kinds of injuries. Both involve 
revealing a person‘s secrets, but breaches of confidentiality also violate trust in a specific 
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relationship.  The harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality, then, is not simply that 
information has been disclosed, but that the victim has been betrayed.‖148  
Regarding confidentiality in the digital age, Solove‘s dominant concern was the 
creation of ―digital dossiers‖ – digital collections of detailed data about an individual.149  
Solove stated that ―[d]igital technology enables the preservation of the minutia of our 
everyday comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of who we are and what we 
own,…an electronic collage that covers much of a person‘s life – a life captured in 
records, a digital person composed in the collective computer networks of the world.‖150   
Solove‘s solution was to develop structural legal protections for the  
confidentiality of these dossiers.
151
  He argued, ―If we look at privacy more as an aspect 
of social and legal structure, then we begin to see that certain types of privacy harms are 
systemic and structural in nature, and we need to protect them differently.‖152  He 
proposed an architectural approach to analyzing privacy problems, particularly privacy 
problems inherent in information systems.
153
  He proposed:  ―For problems that are 
architectural, the solutions should also be architectural.  Privacy must be protected by 
reforming the architecture, which involves restructuring our relationships with businesses 
and the government.  In other words, the law should regulate the relationships.‖154  Thus, 
instead of passing a law saying that certain information cannot be shared by businesses, 
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Solove argued that businesses collecting personal information should uniformly owe a 
heightened duty not to harm the individuals from whom they collect personal 
information. 
Regarding obligations of confidentiality concerning digital dossiers, Solove 
proposed ―that the law should hold that companies collecting and using our personal 
information stand in a fiduciary relationship with us.‖155  Solove stated that ―[f]iduciaries 
have a duty to disclose personal interests that could affect their professional judgment as 
well as duty of confidentiality.‖156  Solove asserted that the concept of a fiduciary has not 
been extended far enough to cover important relationships built upon trust.  Although 
fiduciary relationships are recognized by courts, they have been very limited in scope.
157
 
To determine if someone is a fiduciary, a close examination of the relationship 
between parties is required.  Solove observed that courts typically examine a number of 
factors when ascertaining fiduciary obligations, including ―‗[t]he degree of kinship of the 
parties; the disparity in age, health, and mental condition; education and business 
experience between the parties; and the extent to which the allegedly subservient party 
entrusted the handling of…business affairs to the other and reposed faith and confidence 
in [that person or entity].‘‖158  Solove found that most of these factors deal with the 
granting of trust and disparities in power and knowledge, which favor a finding of 
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fiduciary relationships between Internet users and the collectors and users of Internet 
users‘ data.159  Regarding an architectural approach to information privacy online, Solove 
stated: 
If our relationships with the collectors and users of our personal data are 
redefined as fiduciary ones, then this would be the start of a significant 
shift in the way the law understands their obligations to us.  The law 
would require them to treat us in a different way – at a minimum, with 
more care and respect.  By redefining relationships, the law would make a 
significant change to the architecture of the information economy.
160
 
 
Other legal scholars have written extensively on the effect of information 
technology on privacy.
161
  Joel Ridenberg was one of the first to suggest an architectural 
approach to privacy law.
162
  Lawrence Lessig adeptly addressed the possibilities and 
challenges technology poses to promises and preferences of confidentiality for online 
information in his seminal book on technology and law, Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace.
 163
  Regarding privacy, Lessig found that ―[software] code has already upset 
a traditional balance.  It has already changed the control that individuals have over facts 
about their private lives.  The question now is: Could code re-create something of that 
traditional balance?  I argue that it can.‖164   
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Like Solove, Lessig was concerned about the collection and use of self-disclosed 
information on the Internet.
165
  In Lessig‘s view, the ubiquitous collection of self-
disclosed information had a number of negative consequences.  First, he held that the 
aggregation of information robbed users of the benefit of innocence through de-
contextualization of data.  Lessig argued that ―[a]t any given time there are innocent facts 
about you that may appear, in a particular context or to a particular set, guilty.‖166  As an 
example, he points to a photo of an older man out to eat with a beautiful young woman 
who was not his wife.  While it might appear that this man was having an affair, this 
woman was, in fact, his daughter.  Removing context from this picture could make the 
man appear to be an adulterer.   
Lessig explicitly rejected the argument advanced by some scholars, such as David 
Brin, that mutual accountability through complete transparency was a better option than 
protecting privacy.
167
  Brin‘s thesis was that if everyone knew everyone else‘s secrets, 
privacy would not be necessary.
168
  Lessig countered:  ―Brin assumed that this 
counterspying would be useful to hold others ‗accountable.‘ But according to whose 
norms? ‗Accountable‘ is a benign term only so long as we have confidence in the 
community doing the accounting.‖169  According to Lessig: ―When we live in multiple 
communities, accountability becomes a way for one community to impose its view of 
propriety on another.  And because we do not live in a single community; we do not live 
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by a single set of values; and perfect accountability can only undermine this mix of 
values.‖170 
Lessig proposed that code could help prevent privacy harms on the Web.  First, 
code could be used to make personal information harder to find via search engines.
171
  
Additionally, code could be used to control the collection and use of personal information 
by giving Internet users the right to choose how their data will be used.
172
  According to 
Lessig, ―[T]he standard way we have pushed individuals to choose is through text—
through privacy statements that report a site‘s privacy practices and then give the 
consumer the right to opt in or out of those practices.‖173 Lessig noted that most people 
do not have ―the time or patience to read through cumbersome documents describing 
obscure rules for controlling data.‖174  
Lessig argued that ―[w]hat is needed is a way for the machine to negotiate our 
privacy concerns for us, a way to delegate the negotiating process to a smart agent – an 
electronic butler – who, like the butler, knows well what we like and what we do not 
like.‖  Ultimately, Lessig envisioned a kind of quasi-property right in  personal 
information, which individuals could use as a negotiating chip when interacting with 
websites.  While the ―privacy as property‖ approach has its critics,175 it is a popular 
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approach considered by scholars when addressing the privacy problems wrought by 
technology.   
In sum, privacy and confidentiality in the digital age are largely defined by 
technology.  Although digital communication can erode an individual‘s privacy, it can 
also help protect an individual‘s personal information.  In any event, the development of 
privacy law has trailed the development of technology, leading scholars to question the 
effectiveness of many privacy laws. 
The Failure of Traditional Privacy Remedies. The traditional remedy for harms 
resulting from the publication of private information is the tort of public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts, also known as ―the disclosure tort.‖  Scholars have noted the 
ineffectiveness of this tort online.  Some scholars have offered confidentiality law as a 
replacement.  The flaws in the disclosure tort, including a difficulty in deciding when 
expectations of privacy are reasonable and First Amendment concerns, frame the benefits 
of confidentiality law online. 
The disclosure tort was extensively criticized before the Internet.
176
   From its 
inception, the tort was troubled, and its faults became magnified over time.
177
   Joseph 
Elford noted in 1995 that ―[t]he private facts tort is a mess.  It has disappointed those who 
hope it would enhance individual privacy while it has exceeded all estimations of its 
chilling effect on speech.‖178 
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Several scholars claim the disclosure tort was rendered ineffective in 1989 in the 
case Florida Star v. B.J.F.
179
  In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that 
defendants cannot be punished for publishing matters of public significance without the 
claimant proving that punishment is necessary to advance a state interest of the highest 
order.
180
  Andrew McClurg argued that this declaration almost guarantees defeat for 
plaintiffs pursuing claims based on the disclosure tort.
181
  McClurg actually found that 
―[f]or the most part, the privacy torts as defined in the Second Restatement have 
functioned inadequately and fared poorly in the courts.‖182  Eugene Volokh criticized the 
tort‘s distinction between speech on matters of public significance and speech on matters 
of private concern as ―theoretically unsound; it is precedentially largely unsupported; 
[and] in the few circumstances in which it has been endorsed, it has proven 
unworkable….‖183 
However, the increased threat to privacy resulting from the technological 
destruction of any meaningful barriers to surveillance and publishing has rendered the 
disclosure tort nearly inert.  Patricia Sanchez Abril hypothesized that the problem with 
the disclosure tort‘s online application was its focus on secrecy.184  She stated that 
―[a]ttempts to apply traditional public disclosure jurisprudence to online social 
networking demonstrate the incoherence of this jurisprudence‖ because the disclosure tort 
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is centered around keeping information from people and social networking is centered 
around the disclosure of information
185
  Abril argued that the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts was an outdated guide and that ―[i]n the absence of clear and relevant guidance, 
courts have resorted to intellectual shortcuts in their use of concepts of space, subject 
matter, secrecy, and seclusion as necessary benchmarks for privacy protection.‖186  
According to Abril, ―What were once mere indicators of privacy have become, in some 
instances, the extent of judicial inquiry….  Despite judicial attempts to find a universal 
conceptual hook on which to hang the public disclosure tort, there is simply no such 
common denominator in legal privacy analysis.‖187 
Scholars largely agreed that a significant flaw of the disclosure tort is the amount 
of speculation it requires from judges.  According to Abril, the tort‘s ―analysis calls for 
highly normative and subjective determinations, including the elusive boundaries of 
concepts like privacy, public concern, and offensiveness.  This analysis forces judges to 
rely on their perception of social norms, rather than more traditional legal methods.‖188  
Abril argued that this onus transforms judges into ―‗armchair sociologists [attempting] to 
assess cultural expectations of privacy,‘ an expansive and complex role.‖189 
The tort also calls upon judges to determine what information is ―private‖ and 
what information is public or at least ―of public concern.‖  Other scholars commenting on 
the tort have noted the practical and constitutional difficulty in defining the term ―public‖ 
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in order to determine whether information is worthy of privacy protections.
190
  Dianne 
Zimmerman noted that ―to distinguish private facts from ‗public‘ information about an 
individual, courts often look either to the location of the action or to the nature of the 
subject matter. Courts using the ‗location‘ analysis commonly state that information 
individuals reveal about themselves in public places is by definition not private.‖191 
Courts using the subject-matter analysis ―rule that the subject matter is private even 
though the locus is not.‖192  Zimmerman found that both approaches are practically 
unfeasible and threaten freedom of speech. 
Perhaps the most significant failure of the privacy tort‘s application to the Internet 
is that the tort typically fails to protect self-disclosed information.  Unlike Warren and 
Brandies, who worried about tabloids publishing their private moments, the most likely 
publisher of personal information in the Internet age is the person herself.
193
  In light of 
the mass adoption of social media and pervasiveness of electronically-mediated 
communication, Internet users have become their own worst enemy. 
Online self-disclosure lies at the heart of the problem addressed by this 
dissertation.  The rampant self-disclosure of personal information concomitant with an 
expectation of privacy is a problem because courts have struggled to determine whether 
and to what degree self-disclosed information is private.
194
  Professor Lior Stahilivetz 
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stated, ―Despite the centrality of this issue, the American courts lack a coherent, 
consistent methodology for determining whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a particular fact that has been shared with one or more 
persons.‖195   
Solove argued that part of the problem with protecting self-disclosed information 
is that courts hold that information must be a secret to be protected, and that self-
disclosed information cannot be a secret since it was voluntarily disclosed to others.  He 
calls this approach to privacy the ―secrecy paradigm.‖  Solove described the secrecy 
paradigm as an understanding of privacy based on concealment preventing others from 
invading one‘s hidden world.196  Under this conception, disclosed information is no 
longer concealed and, thus, no longer private.  Sharon Sandeen noted that this ―vision of 
privacy makes it difficult for individuals to protect personal information once it has been 
shared with others.‖197  Solove argued that the secrecy paradigm ―fails to recognize that 
individuals want to keep things private from some people but not others.‖198 
Disclosing information to some, but not all, can be very difficult in modern 
society.  Solove asserted that not all private activities are pure secrets ―in the sense that 
they occur in isolation and in hidden corners.  When we talk in a restaurant, we do not 
expect to be listened to.  A person may buy condoms or hemorrhoid medication in a store 
open to the public, but certainly expects these purchases to be private activities.‖199   
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Solove held that contrary to the notion that information in public records cannot 
be private, ―there is a considerable loss of privacy by plucking inaccessible facts buried 
in some obscure [public] document and broadcasting them to the world on the evening 
news.  Privacy can be infringed even if no secrets are revealed and even if nobody is 
watching us.‖200  In other words, context is important when considering whether 
information is public or private.  Solove and other scholars ponder whether secrecy is 
even possible in a networked world.  Solove posited that life in the Information Age 
―often involves exchanging information with third parties, such as phone companies, 
Internet service providers, cable companies, merchants, and so on.  Thus, clinging to the 
notion of privacy as total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in 
today‘s world.‖201 
Nissenbaum asserted that the labeling of information as exclusively public or 
private (what she refers to as the public/private dichotomy) fails to consider the context in 
which the information exists.
 202
 Nissenbaum rationalized an individual‘s desire to have 
―privacy in public‖ by explaining that information revealed in one context, such as being 
viewed on the street by another pedestrian, might not be seen as an invasion of privacy.  
However, a photo of the same person on the same street appearing on Google Maps 
might be perceived as an invasion of privacy.  According to Nissenbaum, the relegation 
of information into public and private spheres is rife with challenges as ―[i]nterpretations 
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of what counts as a private space may vary across times, societies, and cultures.‖203  
Nissenbaum observed that the common rebuttals to claims of privacy in public are that 
when people move about and do things in public arenas, they have 
implicitly yielded any expectation of privacy. Much as they might prefer 
that others neither see, nor take note, expecting others not to see, notice, or 
make use of information so gained would be unreasonably restrictive of 
others' freedoms. One cannot reasonably insist that people avert their eyes, 
not look out their windows, or not notice what others have placed in their 
supermarket trolleys. And if we cannot stop them from looking, we cannot 
stop them remembering and telling others. In 2001, Tampa police, 
defending their use of video cameras to scan faces one-by-one as they 
entered the Super Bowl stadium, stated, ―the courts have ruled that there is 
no expectation of privacy in a public setting.‖204 
 
In essence, information that falls within the private half of the public/private dichotomy 
warrants privacy consideration; ―for all the rest, anything goes.‖ 205     
Nissenbaum‘s theory of contextual integrity rejects the secrecy paradigm 
altogether.  According to the theory, ―[T]here are no arenas of life not governed by norms 
of information flow, no information or spheres of life for which ‗anything goes.‘‖206  
Thus, the idea that information can objectively be public or categorically undeserving of 
privacy protection is countered by the fact that ―[a]lmost everything—things that we do, 
events that occur, transactions that take place—happens in a context not only of place but 
of politics, convention, and cultural expectation.‖207 According to Nissenbaum, the 
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integrity of these contexts is maintained when norms of appropriateness and distribution 
are maintained, and this maintenance of contextual norms is the hallmark of privacy.
208
 
Other legal scholars have rejected the secrecy paradigm, too.  Strahilevitz 
proposed a form of relative privacy using social network analysis as a tool ―for resolving 
disputes where parties to a communication disagree about whether the recipient was 
entitled to share it with others.‖209  Instead of a dichotomous public/private distinction, 
Strahilevitz asserted: 
[P]rivacy tort law should not focus on the abstract, circular, and highly 
indeterminate question of whether a plaintiff reasonably expected that 
information about himself would remain ―private‖ after he shared it with 
one or more persons. Instead, the law should focus on the more objective 
and satisfying question of what extent of dissemination the plaintiff should 
have expected to follow his disclosure of that information to others.
210
 
 
This social network approach allows for a more nuanced analysis of disclosure of 
information that might have privacy implications. 
 Other scholars have urged courts to borrow concepts from other areas of the law, 
such as trade secrets, to determine whether information was public or private.
211
  Sharon 
Sandeen maintained that trade secret law had enough similarities to privacy law to offer 
significant improvements in privacy analysis. She stated: 
In the case of trade secrets, the law is designed to facilitate limited 
disclosures, preferring the small-scale dissemination and use of trade 
secret information over an environment of ultra-secrecy. A similar line 
should be drawn for personal information. Individuals should not be 
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required to choose between the life of a hermit and the life of a person 
with little or no control over the use of their personal information.
212
 
 
Sandeen drew attention to the concept of ―relative secrecy‖ used to determine 
whether a trade secret will receive legal protection.  Under the doctrine of relative 
secrecy, ―legal protection for trade secrets does not necessarily cease when information is 
disclosed to another.  Rather, information can be protected as a trade secret even if it is 
known by multiple individuals or companies.‖213  Only when information is ―generally 
known or readily ascertainable‖ will it be stripped of protection as public information.214  
The term ―generally known‖ means ―well known‖ or ―commonly known to the trade in 
which the putative trade secret owner is engaged.‖215  Sandeen noted that ―trade secret 
owners are not required to exercise all possible efforts to protect the secrecy of their 
information, but instead only those efforts that are ‗reasonable under the 
circumstances.‘‖216 
The literature reveals that the ever-increasing amount of self-disclosed 
information on the Internet renders traditional privacy remedies inert online.  The secrecy 
paradigm, which holds that information is uniformly either public or private, has proven 
largely unworkable online.  Although Internet users routinely disclose information online 
in traditionally ―public‖ ways, users still feel their expectation of privacy in this 
information is threatened and routinely violated.  This conflict has led a number of 
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scholars to propose that the law of confidentiality can serve as an effective remedy for 
online privacy harms. 
A Turn to Confidentiality Law. Michael Harvey succinctly summarized the 
common scholarly perception of traditional privacy remedies: ―[I]ndividuals whose 
privacy has been invaded by public disclosure of personal information have no viable 
remedy in American Jurisprudence.‖217  However, Harvey did not jettison hope.  He 
stated: ―Lovers of privacy should not concede defeat at this juncture, however.  For the 
law has thus far overlooked the other party who is essential to the public disclosure of 
personal information but for whom constitutional protection is tenuous in comparison to 
that of publishers – that is, the source of the information.‖218   
According to Harvey, the most common culpable party in privacy disputes is not 
the media, but rather an intimate who betrayed a confidence by revealing personal 
information.
219
  Harvey argued that ―[t]he existence of this as yet ignored link in the 
chain of public disclosure of personal information opens up the possibility of attaching 
liability at the source of the information leak under a breach of confidence theory.‖220  
Harvey proposed ―interring the private-facts tort and adopting a new approach to 
overcoming the tension between privacy interests and the First Amendment: a legally 
enforceable duty of confidentiality‖ that prevents the unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information that was promised to be held in confidence.
221
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 Numerous scholars have joined Harvey in calling for an expansion of breach of 
confidentiality law – particularly the tort of breach of confidentiality. The seminal article 
on the tort was actually a student note written by Alan Vickery.  Vickery found that 
―[t]hough still in rudimentary form, a breach of confidence tort appears to be emerging 
from the case law to provide a basis of recovery where existing law is deficient.‖222  
Vickery proposed that ―the basis for imposing liability should be disclosure of 
information revealed in the course of a nonpersonal relationship of a sort customarily 
understood to carry an obligation of confidentiality.‖223  Scott Fast urged courts to build 
upon the tort of breach of confidentiality to protect employee privacy.
224
 
This overlooked link in the publication chain – the trustee of disclosed 
information – is particularly relevant online.  The Internet is simply a technology used to 
connect people.  Where connections exist, relationships can develop, including 
contractual relationships and relationships of trust and confidence.  All connections 
online are opportunities for confidentiality. 
Steven Bibas recognized that the trustee of disclosed information could play a 
crucial role in solving the problems of surveillance and data misuse.
225
 Bibas proposed a 
contractual approach to data privacy that ―could give individuals the power to choose 
privacy or not without requiring privacy for everybody or nobody.‖226  According to 
Bibas, ―[A] contractual solution would be superior to approaches dictated by legislators, 
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bureaucrats, or judges because it would be more sensitive to individual preferences.‖227  
Like Harvey, Bibas recognized that the institutions most likely to violate an individual‘s 
privacy, such as credit bureaus and other private-sector data banks, were in contractual 
relationships with the individuals they threatened.
228
  In theory, contracting parties are 
free to specify conditions of confidentiality. 
While Susan Gilles noted the scholarly attention paid to confidentiality as an 
alternative to traditional privacy remedies, she remained skeptical because contracts for 
confidentiality, fiduciary relationships, and the tort of breach of confidentiality had very 
limited scopes.
229
  Gilles argued that the damages for breach of contract were too limited 
to be meaningful and that courts were unlikely to find the necessary intent to create 
contracts in many informal situations, such as the disclosure of a secret between 
friends.
230
  She did note that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, an equitable doctrine 
that ―operates to enforce a promise even though the formal requisites of contract are 
absent,‖ was an attractive alternative to a contract theory of recovery.231   
Gilles also found that the fiduciary theory of recovery for breach of 
confidentiality was incomplete because it was ―limited to those plaintiffs whose 
confidences have been revealed by trustees, agents, guardians, doctors, clergy, and 
lawyers.  While not unimportant, this remedy is, therefore, far from a universal cure.‖232  
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According to Gilles, this limited scope did not include many of the people who needed a 
remedy for breach of confidentiality, including friends, family, and even those 
participating in professional endeavors like a journalist‘s sources.233  Additionally, Gilles 
found that the wide array of duties owed by a fiduciary might be over-burdensome for 
most relationships.
234
  Gilles stated, ―At the center of a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship is a duty on one party to be selfless and act in the interest of another….Do 
we seriously think…a friend is prohibited from putting herself in a position where her 
own and her friend‘s interests will conflict?  Obviously not.‖235  Gilles argued, ―If the 
only duty we wish to impose is the duty to keep secrets, it seems unsound to call a 
relationship a fiduciary one.  It seems cleaner to admit the objective, to deter the 
revelation of confidences, and to fashion a remedy to achieve the goal.‖236 
Gilles recognized that the tort for breach of confidentiality had a broader scope 
than contractual and fiduciary approaches to breach of confidence and also allowed for 
the recovery of emotional damages that are unrecoverable under contract and fiduciary 
causes of action.
237
  However, ultimately, Gilles argued that the breach of confidentiality 
tort was constitutionally suspect under the First Amendment because it allowed for the 
recovery of punitive damages.
238
  Andrew McClurg agreed with Gilles and argued that 
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implied contracts of confidentiality were the appropriate remedy for breaches of 
confidence.
239
   
The argument that the breach of confidence tort might be unconstitutional was 
rebutted by Solove and Richards, who argued that the First Amendment should not apply 
to civil liability ―when government power merely serves as a backstop to private 
ordering[,]‖ as when the government enforces contracts.240 Regarding the breach of 
confidentiality tort, Solove and Richards argued that the tort is not constitutionally 
suspect because it is similar to contracts for confidentiality or promissory estoppel, which 
have survived First Amendment scrutiny.  They posited: 
The breach of confidentiality tort is a private cause of action that has both 
tort-like and contract-like elements. Duties of confidentiality can be 
created by express contracts or implied as a matter of law from the 
circumstances of a relationship. In many instances, the breach of 
confidentiality tort remedies a harm akin to those protected by contract 
law or promissory estoppel. One party voluntarily assumes a duty, either 
through an express or implied contract or promise. Breach of 
confidentiality differs from other torts such as defamation and public 
disclosure of private facts because the duty of confidentiality is understood 
as arising from a consensual relationship. Beyond a formalistic distinction 
between tort and contract, why should such different First Amendment 
consequences follow from the CEO's breach of confidentiality tort and 
implied contract actions? For the purposes of the First Amendment, the 
nature of the information involved is the same regardless of whether 
contract or tort liability is involved. Moreover, the basic theory upon 
which liability is premised is also largely the same – an express or implied 
assumption of a duty of confidentiality.
241
 
 
 In a separate article, Richards and Solove also argued that the law of 
confidentiality has a longer and more developed history than the right to privacy Warren 
and Brandies wrote about.  Richards and Solove held that ―Warren and Brandeis did not 
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invent the right to privacy from a negligible body of precedent but instead charted a new 
path for American privacy law.‖242  According to Richards and Solove, when torts 
scholar William Prosser embraced Warren and Brandeis‘s conception of privacy as a 
general protection of ―inviolate personality,‖ he drastically minimized the importance of 
confidentiality as a concept in American law.
243
  Richards and Solove observed that ―[b]y 
contrast, English law developed a flexible and powerful law of confidentiality from 
Prince Albert v. Strange, the very same case underpinning Warren and Brandeis‘s 
conception of privacy.‖244 
 Almost all of the literature on confidentiality law noted the failure of traditional 
privacy remedies and the advantages of focusing on relationships between people rather 
than the content of disclosed information.  Additionally, the literature reveals that some 
of the most effective ways to create an obligation of confidentiality are through express 
and implied agreements.  Scholars agreed that confidentiality law was much less 
problematic under the First Amendment than the disclosure tort and often overlooked by 
those seeking a redress for privacy harms.  While the review below covers these scholars‘ 
claims, few scholars have advanced implied obligations of confidentiality past the 
introductory stage. 
 Implied Obligations of Confidentiality. Scholars typically agree that implied 
obligations of confidentiality can exist and are desirable in many circumstances, but have 
not sufficiently articulated these circumstances.  Scholars have argued that the 
cumbersome nature of explicit confidentiality agreements and the limited nature of 
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explicit confidential relationships compels the need for a nuanced framework for implied 
obligations of confidentiality.  Although he ultimately argued for greater judicial scrutiny 
of confidentiality agreements, Alan Garfield recognized: 
Although parties can use contracts to protect privacy interests, they are 
often not so used.  Contracting is particularly unlikely when one shares 
information with an intimate relation—a spouse, friend, doctor, or 
psychologist—because the relationship itself suggests that a contract is 
both unnecessary and inappropriate.  When parties deal at arms length—
contracts with lending institutions, brokers, or blood banks—a 
confidentiality provision is more likely, but not certain.  Even in arms-
length transactions, such as a library or video selections, individuals may 
not perceive the need to bargain for a promise of silence.
245
 
 
 Garfield noted that the ―basic elements of contract formation – offer, acceptance, 
and consideration – are unlikely to pose any problems for contracts of silence prepared in 
formal settings.‖246  According to Garfield, the more difficult contracts of silence were 
the ones created informally, particularly oral contracts.  Garfield found ―[a]n informal 
contract of silence may be found to exist after one party casually shared information with 
another, and later claims that the other party understood that he or she gave the 
information in exchange for a promise not to disclose it.‖247  Garfield held that ―[t]he 
potential limitations on the formation of [agreements to protect privacy interests] are 
worth identifying because scholars concerned with protecting privacy interests have 
occasionally looked to contract law as a possible source of protection.‖248  
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 Implied obligations of confidentiality often arise from informal agreements that 
don‘t explicitly provide for confidentiality. Rather, confidentially can be inferred from 
other terms and contexts.  Garfield argued that a number of problems arise when trying to 
use informal contracts of confidentiality to protect privacy interests.  Particularly, he 
found that ―[e]ven when parties manifest assent to an agreement…a court can still deny 
enforcement if it believes that reasonable people would not have intended the agreement 
to be legally binding.‖249  According to Garfield, ―Reasonable people anticipate that 
commercial deals will be enforceable, but that casual arrangements between friends and 
family will not.‖250  As an example, Garfield stated that ―even if a friend extracts from 
another a promise to keep information about an AIDS test confidential, a court still might 
not enforce the agreement if it concludes that reasonable people would not have intended 
the agreement to be binding.‖251 
 In formulating his proposal for the breach of confidentiality tort, Vickery also 
examined implied contract as a basis of recovery ―because confidential and contractual 
obligations are often present in the same relationship.‖252  Vickery noted that ―[t]he 
doctrine of implied-in-fact contract means that promises are inferred from the conduct of 
the parties and common usages, practices, and understandings at the time of 
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contracting.‖253  Vickery found that courts looked to ―licensing statutes, professional 
codes of ethics, and other sources of public policy for evidence of a pervasive 
understanding of confidentiality with respect to the particular relationship involved.  
Based on this understanding, these courts have found an implied promise at the time of 
contracting not to divulge information to third parties.‖254  However, Vickery asserted 
that ―contract law, like tortious invasion of privacy, is inadequate, theoretically and 
practically, to protect confidence‖ because contract formation can be problematic and the 
damages available for breach of contract are limited.
255
 
 Like other scholars, Vickery acknowledged that implied obligations of 
confidentiality could exist, but failed to explore under what circumstances implications 
could bind a trustee of information.  Strahilevitz more deeply explored the question of 
context and looked to the design of support communities to find implied expectations of 
confidentiality.  According to Strahilevitz, groups like Alcoholics Anonymous ―share 
deeply held social norms barring the disclosure of information about attendees outside of 
the group setting.‖256  These groups are designed to promote a sort of mutually assured 
security because all of the members have disclosed intimate information.  This assurance 
could give rise to a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the information disclosed 
within the community.  Strahilevitz stated that ―certain groups can be designed to trigger 
reciprocal nondisclosure, and people making germane disclosures within these settings 
                                                 
253
 Id. 
254
 Id. 
255
 Id. at 1442-47. 
256
 Strahilevitz, supra note 13, at 969-70. 
 60 
generally ought to expect that the information disclosed will not circulate outside this 
group.‖257 
Eugene Volokh asserted that contracts, particularly implied obligations of 
confidentiality, were perhaps the only constitutional imposition of civil liability for 
speech.
258
 Volokh noted that implied contracts for confidentiality arise where ―people 
reasonably expect – because of custom, course of dealing with the other party, or all the 
other factors that are relevant to finding an implied contract – that part of what their 
contracting partner is promising is confidentiality.‖259  Volokh stated, ―I tentatively think 
that a legislature may indeed enact a law stating that certain legislatively identified 
transactions should be interpreted as implicitly containing a promise of confidentiality, 
unless such a promise is explicitly and prominently disclaimed by the offeror, and the 
contract together with the disclaimer is accepted by the offeree.‖260  According to 
Volokh: ―The great free speech advantage of the contract model is that it does not 
endorse any right to ‗stop people from speaking about me.‘ Rather, it endorses a right to 
‗stop people from violating their promises to me.‘‖261 
Andre McClurg furthered this argument and noted that implied contracts of 
confidentiality might be effective for people in intimate relationships sharing information 
online.
262
  McClurg stated the maxim that ―[p]romises can be made orally or in writing, 
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or can be inferred from conduct‖ and argued that ―[n]o difference in legal effect between 
express and implied contracts exists.  The only distinction lies in how assent to the 
contract is manifested.‖263  McClurg recognized: 
The central features of an implicit promise of confidentiality, shared by all 
[intimate, fiduciary, and otherwise confidential] relationships, include: (1) 
confidentiality is reasonably expected as a matter of custom and general 
understanding; (2) people part with private information in reliance on this 
expectation (in many cases, detrimentally changing their position in doing 
so); and (3) trust in the confidentiality of private information is necessary 
to make the relationship function properly.
264
 
 
McClurg‘s central argument was that agreements of confidentiality arise in fact in 
intimate relationships because it is commonly understood in these relationships that 
certain information is to be kept between intimates.
265
  McClurg argued that 
―consideration for the contract exists in the mutuality of the confidential agreement as 
well as in the broader emotional, physical, and other benefits each partner to an intimate 
relationship confers upon the other.‖266  McClurg proposed that mutual assent to the 
confidential agreement ―arises as a matter of custom and common understanding from the 
decision to participate in an intimate relationship.  It can be inferred from the course of 
dealing between the parties and the overall context of an intimate relationship, including 
the manner in which the private information is conveyed between intimate partners.‖267 
Here, McClurg engaged in one of the few attempts to identify specific contexts 
that could give rise to implied obligations of confidentiality: ―The fact that private 
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information is shared…between intimate partners outside the presence of others, often 
within homes behind closed doors and drawn curtains, lends support to the assumption 
that the tacit understanding of the parties is: ‗I‘m sharing this with you because I expect 
you to keep it in confidence.‘‖268  Ultimately, McClurg proposed the use of explicit 
confidentiality agreements between intimates because of the ―difficulty in identifying the 
terms of an implied confidentiality contract between intimate partners….‖269 
There have been numerous calls in the literature for an increased role for implied 
obligations of confidentiality.  Yet no literature has addressed the next logical question: 
When should courts recognize an implied obligation of confidentiality?  Some clues can 
be drawn from contract theorists who rely heavily on context to shape the obligations of 
the parties.   
The Empirical and Relational Approach to Contracts. While a sharp focus on 
context and custom instead of rigid doctrine might be novel in privacy law, it has long 
been espoused by a number of contract theorists.  For example, Stuart Macaulay, also 
known as the founder of the ―Wisconsin School‖ of contract theory,270 has developed an 
empirical view of contracts focused on the premise that customs, not rules of law, dictate 
the expectations of contracting parties.  This approach is relevant when ascertaining 
whether an implied contract of confidentiality exists between parties. 
Macualay published the results of his interviews with businessmen in his seminal 
article ―Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,‖ and found that the 
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actual rules of contract law had little impact on working businessmen.
271
  Instead, he 
found that, notwithstanding serious risks, businessmen often prefer to rely on one‘s word, 
a handshake, or common honesty and decency.
272
   
This focus on custom, norms, and context was echoed by Ian Macneil in his 
―relational theory of contracts.‖273  Macneil rejected the view that contracts were 
rationally bargained for exchanges that took place in a perfect market.  Instead, he found 
that contracts must be ―contextual with a vengeance.‖274 According to Macneil, courts  
must take relational norms into consideration when interpreting what the parties to a 
contract agreed to.
275
  Both Macualay‘s and Macneil‘s theories have relevance for 
analysis of implied obligations of confidentiality; both increase the focus on context such 
as custom and norms. Although the privacy literature regarding an empirically-based 
contextual approach to confidentiality is sparse, these contract theorists support the 
application of Nissenbaum‘s theory to confidential agreements. 
Conclusions – A Dearth of Analysis. Although confidentiality, privacy, implied 
contracts, and online communication have all been well explored as separate areas in the 
literature, very few articles have analyzed the convergence of these topics.  This 
dissertation seeks to fill that void. 
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 Stewart Macualay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 
(1963). 
272
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273
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 Jay Feinmann, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2000). 
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 Id.  Macneil asserted that the context of contractual relations could be broken down according to ten 
contract norms such as role integrity, reciprocity, and implementation of planning.  Id. 
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Generally, scholarly writing on confidentiality and privacy has almost always 
sought to address the challenges wrought to privacy by new technologies.  However, 
conceptions of privacy remain as fractious as the patchwork of privacy laws that have 
developed since the publication of Warren and Brandeis‘s famous article.  A number of 
scholars have argued that the law of confidentiality is more concrete, consistent, and 
easier to use in disputes involving the harmful dissemination of personal information.  
These scholars advocate the use of implied contracts of confidentiality for those 
disclosing information, yet no consensus has emerged regarding when and how these 
contracts might be formed online.  Most notably absent from the literature is an analysis 
of Nissenbaum‘s context-relative informational norms in implied obligations of 
confidentiality.  Courts are left to speculate as to whether a party was implicitly bound to 
confidence or whether an implied expectation of confidentiality was reasonable in any 
given circumstance.  This dissertation helps remedy this dearth of analysis by 
systematically investigating judicial consideration of context-relative informational 
norms in order to determine how implied obligations of confidentiality might be formed. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation examines implied confidentiality disputes to determine precisely 
what courts consider important in the creation of implied obligations of confidentiality.  
This dissertation examines how courts have considered the four different aspects of 
contextual integrity in implied confidentiality disputes: 1) the context; 2) the actors; 3) 
the nature of the information; and 4) the terms of disclosure.  This dissertation suggests a 
decision-making framework for courts to use when deciding whether an implied 
obligation of confidentiality exists.  This dissertation also further develops Nissenbaum‘s 
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theory of contextual integrity by applying it to implied obligations of confidentiality. To 
accomplish these goals, this dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
* What factors have courts considered important in analyzing alleged implied obligations 
of confidentiality?  Specifically: 
 How have courts considered the context in which information was disclosed? 
 How have courts considered the roles played by the senders, recipients, and 
subjects of disclosed information? 
 How have courts considered the nature of the information disclosed? 
 How have courts considered the terms of disclosure? 
 What other factors do courts consider important? 
* Are these variables considered differently in online and offline cases?  If so, how?   
* How does this analysis contribute to Nissenbaum‘s theory of privacy as contextual 
integrity?  
* How can these factors best form a decision-making framework for courts to use in 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality? 
METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation reviews 132 cases involving implied obligations of 
confidentiality to determine how courts consider context-relative informational norms in 
these disputes.  Cases for analysis were identified by searching the online version of the 
Westlaw reporting service. Searches were limited to cases that expressly addressed some 
aspect of implied obligations of confidentiality.  Cases involving both online and offline 
disputes were analyzed.  Implied confidentiality cases were identified by using multiple 
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search strings.
276
 There were no date restrictions on the search in order to analyze the 
entire history of cases addressing implied obligations of confidentiality.
277
 
LIMITATIONS 
 This dissertation has several limitations.  First, judicial opinions are sparse 
regarding privacy disputes for two major reasons: 1) The damages available for privacy 
harms tend to be small, and lawsuits are expensive.  Few attorneys will take privacy 
claims because there is such a slim chance of meaningful recovery.  2) The ―privacy 
paradox‖ involved in litigation is that lawsuits actually give more attention to information 
the plaintiff is claiming was private.  In this way, litigation is counterproductive to an 
individual‘s privacy.  Another limitation to this dissertation is that if a judge fails to 
consider context-relative informational norms, it is unclear whether the judge 
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 The following searches were conducted in the ALLCASES database with no date restriction: ―(imply 
implied) /3 confid!,‖ ―infer! /3 confidential,‖ ―(confiden! private privacy) /s impl! /p (website ―web site‖ 
internet online e-mail),‖ ―(contract! agree! term!) /s imply implied implication unspoken nonverbal) /p 
website ―web site‖ internet web online) & private privacy confid!),‖ ―(―implied confidentiality‖ 
―implication of confidentiality‖),‖ ―implied non-disclosure‖ ―implication of non-disclosure‖),‖ 
―confidentiality was implied‖ ―confidential agreement was implied‖ ―confidential relationship was 
implied‖),‖ ―(―implied confidential‖ ―implication of confidential‖),‖ ―(―implied confidentiality‖ 
―implication of confidentiality‖), (―implied obligation of confidentiality‖ ―implied duty of confidentiality‖ 
―implied obligation of secrecy‖ ―implied duty of secrecy‖ ―implied secrecy‖),‖ ―(implied in fact‖ ―implied-
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aforementioned searches yielded a universe of over 1000 court rulings involving implied obligations of 
confidentiality. The cases then were read to determine which cases did not actually discuss implied 
obligations of confidentiality.  Cases that involved the relevant search terms but dealt with unrelated issues 
were excluded from the sample. For example, cases that dealt with implied waivers of express 
confidentiality agreements were discarded, since this dissertation is only focusing on the formation, not 
waiver, of implied confidentiality.  Cases that included the term ―confidence‖ and ―confidential‖ in the 
broader sense instead of as a restriction on dissemination of information, such as ―the state‘s implied 
confidence in its decision was apparent,‖ were also discarded. Additionally, cases that contained the search 
terms but were devoid of any discussion on the merits of implied confidentiality were also discarded. For 
example, cases where a claim for breach of implied confidentiality was summarily dismissed based on a 
procedural deficiency were discarded. Cases that simply provided a list of previously documented elements 
that are required to prove a claim but no substantive analysis, such as the existence of a trade secret or a 
privacy interest in government-held information, were also discarded as redundant.   
277
 The earliest case found using the language of implied confidentiality was in 1861. Keene v. Wheatly, 4 
Phila. 157, 14 F. Cas. 180 (E.D. Pa. 1861). 
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affirmatively rejected these norms as unimportant to the decision or whether the parties 
simply failed to incorporate them into the dispute.  
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter One of the dissertation introduced the problem with expectations of 
privacy in self-disclosed information and the law surrounding privacy in a digital age and 
implied confidentiality.  This chapter has reviewed the literature on these topics and 
addressed how the dissertation will contribute to that literature.  This chapter listed 
research questions, methodology, and limitations. Finally, this chapter outlined the 
remainder of the dissertation.  
Chapter Two of the dissertation focuses on courts‘ consideration of context such 
as the characteristics of the social settings in which information is disclosed in implied 
confidentially disputes.  This chapter analyzes in what contexts implied obligations of 
confidentiality have been formed or denied and identifies trends  in the cases. 
Chapter Three of the dissertation focuses on the courts‘ consideration of the actors 
in implied obligations of confidentiality.  Specifically, chapter three examines the 
significance attributed by courts to the nature of the disclosers of information, recipients 
of information, and the people who are the subjects of the information.  This chapter 
identifies the trends and patterns in the cases. 
Chapter Four of the dissertation focuses on the courts‘ consideration of the nature 
of information in implied obligations of confidentiality.  Specifically, chapter four 
analyzes whether some kinds of information are more likely to be implied as confidential 
when they are disclosed than others.  This chapter identifies the trends in the cases. 
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Chapter five of the dissertation focuses on courts‘ consideration of transmission 
principles, that is, the express and implied terms and conditions under which transfers of 
information ought (or ought not) to occur.  This chapter will analyze how specific and 
explicit these terms must be to give rise to an obligation of confidentiality.  This chapter 
will also attempt to identify any trends and compare offline and online cases. 
Chapter Six summarizes the findings and discusses the results.  It analyzes how 
the findings develop Nissenbaum‘s theory of privacy as contextual integrity. It also 
develops a decision-making framework for judicial analysis of online and offline implied 
obligations of confidentiality based on an analysis of the factors considered important by 
courts.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
 
The central component of Nissenbaum‘s theory of contextual integrity is the 
importance of context-relative informational norms. According to Nissenbaum, privacy 
and confidentiality cannot be adequately analyzed without looking at the informational 
norms within a given context.
1
  Thus, it is important to define ―context.‖ The word 
context is defined as ―circumstances in which an event occurs; a setting.‖2 Because this 
definition is so broad, it is only minimally helpful when analyzing implied obligations of 
confidentiality.  Nissenbaum defined contexts within her framework as ―structured social 
settings characterized by canonical activities, roles, relationships, power structures, 
norms (or rules), and internal values.‖3 However, this definition is also too broad for the 
purposes of this dissertation because it overlaps with other aspects of Nissenbaum‘s 
theory. 
A more specific definition is required to separate the term ―context‖ from the 
other three factors in Nissenbaum‘s framework for contextual integrity: 1) nature of the 
information, 2) actors, and 3) terms of disclosure.  Thus, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, context is defined as 1) the relationship between the actors to a disclosure or 
                                                 
1
 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010). 
2
 ―Context,‖ THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/context (last accessed March 12, 2011 11:47 am). 
3
 NISSENBAUM, SUPRA NOTE 1, AT 132. 
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2) any external circumstance affecting the actors to a disclosure, the nature of the 
information disclosed, or the terms of disclosure. By focusing on relationships and 
external circumstances instead of the intrinsic aspects of the actors, disclosed 
information, and terms of disclosure, the term ―context‖ is different than the other three 
factors. 
The cases revealed that courts routinely and explicitly rely on context when 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality.  For example, in Taylor Energy v. U.S. 
Dept. of the Interior, an assignee of an oil and gas lease brought an action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act seeking judicial review of the decision by the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) to release financial information in a trust agreement 
between the assignee and MMS.
4
 The assignee claimed that the trust agreement was 
confidential and contained valuable trade secrets. At dispute was whether a disclosure of 
information abrogated the secrecy of the confidential information. The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia stated, ―Plaintiff correctly argues that ‗[n]ot all 
disclosures are created equal; context matters as to whether a limited disclosure places 
that information in the public domain.‘‖5  
Of the 132 cases analyzed in this dissertation, 88 explicitly considered context 
relevant in analyzing claims of implied confidentiality. This analysis of context occurred 
in many different types of disputes, including breach of contract;
6
 the breach of 
confidentiality tort;
7
 fraud;
8
 negligence;
9
 breach of trade secret;
10
 patent infringement;
11
 
                                                 
4
 Taylor Energy Co. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 2010 WL 3429470 (D.D.C.). 
5
 Id. at *8. 
6
 See, e.g., Givens v. Mullikin ex. Rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002). 
7
 See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985). 
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failure to properly disclose information under FOIA;
12
 and waiver of testimonial, 
evidentiary, and Miranda privileges.
13
  Most of these cases involved offline instead of 
online disputes. Although an overwhelming majority of the cases were not related to the 
Internet, the courts‘ logic and analysis of implied obligations of confidentiality could be 
applied to online disputes. 
The importance of context in implied obligations of confidentiality is firmly 
entrenched in the doctrine.  As early as 1861, courts in the United States recognized that 
context, such as the custom of an industry, community, or group, could play an important 
role in creating an implied obligation of confidentiality.  In Keene v. Wheatley,
14
 a 
playwright brought suit to enjoin the public performance of a play she claimed 
improperly used her dialogue. The substance and language of the play were allegedly 
obtained by a performer in one of the plaintiff‘s plays.15 The Circuit Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania found that the plaintiff 
was entitled, in her competition with professional rivals, to the co-
operation and support of every person employed by her within the walls of 
her theatre. The implied confidential restriction which ought to have 
prevented the disclosure of the words of her new play by performers of her 
own theatrical company was of the greatest importance to her in this 
competition.
16
 
                                                                                                                                                 
8
 See, e.g., Scott v. Kemp, 316 A.2d 883 (Pa. 1974). 
9
 See, e.g., Thomas v. State Emp. Grp. Benefits Prgm, 934 So.2d 753 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
10
 See, e.g., RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. 1978). 
11
 See, e.g., Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis Inc., 2005 WL 6220720 (C.D. Cal.). 
12
 See, e.g., Council on American-Islamic Relations, Cal. v. FBI, 2010 WL 4024806 (S.D. Cal). 
13
 See, e.g., WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
14
 4 Phila. 157, 14 F. Cas. 180 (E.D. Pa. 1861). 
15
 Id. at 188. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine what contextual factors are significant 
to courts that analyze implied obligations of confidentiality.  The cases revealed that 
courts look to business and industry custom, the presence and nature of negotiations, the 
nature of the relationship between the parties, the purpose of the disclosure, whether and 
how the information was solicited, the timing of the disclosure, the presence and nature 
of an accompanying transaction, and public policy when determining whether an implied 
obligation of confidentiality exists. While no one factor seemed to dominate the analysis, 
it is clear that courts considered developed relationships, the ability to negotiate, unequal 
bargaining power, and entrenched normative expectations of confidentiality as key 
components of implied obligations of confidentiality.  
Courts seemed to look for evidence of two factors more than anything else: 
mutual agreement between the parties and one party being more vulnerable to harm or 
coercion than the other. The courts‘ search for mutuality is reflected in the courts‘ 
attempts to locate and support the shared goals and expectations of the parties. Some 
factors, such as custom and negotiation, were seen as evidence of a knowing and 
voluntary acceptance of implied obligations of confidentiality. For example, if 
confidentiality was a widely accepted custom between inventors and investors in certain 
industries, then courts were likely to find that the parties in a dispute understood and 
relied upon implied confidentiality. 
Other factors, such as the purpose of the disclosure, were seen as supporting an 
implied obligation of confidentiality when the mutual goals of the parties could not be 
fulfilled without such an obligation. For example, physicians could not properly diagnose 
a patient without full disclosure of the patient‘s medical history.  Given the sensitive 
 73 
nature of a person‘s medical history, implied confidentiality was seen as necessary for the 
physician-patient relationship to properly function.   
Courts also consistently looked to whether one party in a relationship was more 
vulnerable to harm or coercion than the other. Contexts that left the disclosing party 
vulnerable to harm were seen as evidence of an assumption of confidentiality by the less 
vulnerable party as well as justification for building implied confidentiality into certain 
relationships. Courts recognized that vulnerable parties were more likely to need, but be 
unable to request, confidentiality than parties on equal footing. Thus, it was reasonable 
and likely that the recipient of information knew or should have known confidentiality 
was implied in their relationships with vulnerable parties.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the numbers of cases that addressed each contextual factor: 
Figure 1: Contextual Factors Considered by Courts 
Contextual Factor Number of Cases 
Relationship between the parties 44 
Custom 23 
Negotiation 22 
Timing of the disclosure 15 
Purpose of the disclosure 12 
Solicitation 8 
Public policy 5 
 
Of course, all of these categories required fact-specific inquiries by the courts, 
which resulted in varying outcomes for the parties to the case. Often courts considered 
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several of these factors in the same case. Yet virtually none of the courts articulated a 
specific framework or theory for why these factors were important.  The courts often 
simply stated the general rule that context was important when analyzing the facts of the 
case and provided no further explanation of their logic.  This chapter will clarify the 
judicial reasoning in cases involving implied obligations of confidentiality by identifying 
and analyzing the contextual factors –and sub-factors—important to courts. This analysis 
will reveal the truly important factors and underlying justifications for finding implied 
confidentiality and help develop a decision-making framework for implied obligations of 
confidentiality. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
The nature of the relationship between the parties is one of the most important 
contextual factors used to analyze a claim for implied confidentiality.
17
 Courts in the 44 
cases that considered this factor often found it paramount in its analysis. To some extent, 
this factor overlaps with the custom between the parties. However, this factor also 
involves other aspects of the relationship between the parties. Courts consistently found 
that long, developed relationships were likely to give rise to an implied obligation of 
confidentiality because a developed relationship likely involves trust and custom.
18
 The 
nature of particular kinds of relationships, such as doctor-patient and inventor-potential 
investor,
19
 also received the benefit of an inference of confidentiality. Additionally, 
                                                 
17
 See, e.g., Roth v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 656 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that 
―[c]ircumstances that may indicate implied confidentiality include…the informant‘s relationship with the 
agency….‖) (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179 (1993)). 
18
 See, e.g., Meyer v. Christie, 2007 WL 3120695 at *4 (D. Kan.) (finding that a bank‘s privacy policy 
promising confidentiality resulted in a binding contract where, among other things, the plaintiff ―has a 
long-term banking business and banking relationship with [one of the defendants].‖). 
19
 Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis, Inc., 2005 WL 6220720 at *10 (C.D. Cal.). 
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courts were more amendable to claims of implied confidentiality where the party 
requesting or relying on confidentiality did not have equal bargaining power with the 
recipient of the information.
20
 The reason these factors seemed important to courts is that 
implied expectations of confidentiality were more plausible in developed relationships, 
unequal bargaining power could inhibit the ability of vulnerable parties to explicitly 
request confidentiality, and relationships formed in pursuit of a common goal required 
confidentiality to be effective. 
History Between the Parties. While some relationships, such as joint ventures
21
 
and physician-patient relationships,
22
 were confidential as a matter of law, others became 
confidential or fiduciary in nature as a matter of fact due to the history between the 
parties. The case of Paul v. Aviva Life and Annuity
23
 involved a class-action lawsuit 
brought by individual business owners and the closely held corporations they operated 
against their insurance company. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant insurance 
company, Aviva, failed to disclose the risks of the insurance policy it sold to the 
plaintiffs, in violation of the defendant‘s fiduciary duty.  
At issue was whether the insurer-insured relationship was fiduciary.  Because the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that the fiduciary nature of 
the relationship cannot be implied-in-law, it considered whether the fiduciary relationship 
could be implied-in-fact. The court found that ―[a]n implied-in-fact fiduciary 
                                                 
20
 See, e.g., L-3 Comm. Corp., v. OSI Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 2595176 at *5 (2d Cir.).  
21
 See, e.g., Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 2010 WL 3503427 (E.D. Wis.). 
22
 See, e.g., Crippen v. Charter Southland Hosp., Inc., 534 So. 2d 286 (Ala. 1988); Anderson v. Strong 
Mem‘l Hosp., 775, 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1988). 
23
 2010 WL 5105925 (N.D. Tex.). 
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relationship…may be created ‗where one places trust and confidence in another, thereby 
placing the latter party in a position of influence and superiority over the former.‘‖24 In 
finding that there was no confidential fiduciary relationship between an insurer and an 
insured, the court held, ―There are no allegations of a longstanding relationship between 
the parties, nor that [the defendant] was in a position of significant dominance and 
superiority.‖25  
The case of Hogan v. DC Comics
26
 involved comic book artists who alleged that 
they pitched an idea in confidence to the famous comic book company, DC. Here, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York found that an alleged 
conversation constituted a prior relationship with DC Comics and possibly created a 
confidential relationship.
27
 In Champion v. Frazier,
28
 the Missouri Court of Appeals 
noted that case precedent supported an implied-in-fact contract based on the developed 
nature of the relationship between the parties.
29
 These cases indicate that developed 
relationships are more likely to involve implied obligations of confidentiality than newer, 
less developed ones in both contractual and fiduciary relationships. 
Of course, a mere allegation of a developed relationship is typically not enough to 
support a successful claim of implied confidentiality.
30
  The claim must be supported by 
                                                 
24
 Id. at *9. 
25
 Id. at *10. 
26
  1997 WL 570871 at *6 (N.D.N.Y.). 
27
 Id. 
28
 977 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
29
 Id. (citing Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W. 2d 922, 926 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987)). 
30
 Davies v. Kransa, 535 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1975) (stating that ―[i]n the present case, plaintiff alleges in 
her amended complaint the existence of a confidential relationship, but her conclusionary allegations, 
unsupported by factual averments, are insufficient to give rise to a triable issue.‖). 
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evidence.  Recall Massachusetts Institute of Tech. v. Harman International., which dealt 
with whether a patent for an automobile navigation system using spoken word directions 
had been used publicly or only exposed to a small group of study participants in 
confidence. The plaintiff, MIT, claimed that an implied confidentiality agreement existed 
between its researchers and trial participants because ―all field trial participants were 
trusted friends, supporters or colleagues…and . . . they understood the implied duty not to 
disclose information regarding the…project.‖31 While the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts did not discount the possibility that such close relationships 
would give rise to an implied obligation of confidentiality, it rejected the plaintiffs‘ claim 
because, among other things, they provided no evidence to support a finding of 
confidentiality.
32
 
In Fischer v. Viacom,
33
 the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland did not 
find an implied confidential relationship where, among other things, there were no prior 
dealings between the parties, who appeared to be ―complete strangers.‖34 In Markogianis 
v. Burger King,
35
 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that 
the ―level of activity between the parties, who were complete strangers to one another, 
does not give rise to any fiduciary or confidential relationship. Plaintiff had no prior 
dealings with [defendant].‖36 The court here also focused on the fact that the relationship 
                                                 
31
 584 F. Supp. 2d 297, 304 (D. Mass. 2008). 
32
 Id. 
33
 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 2000). 
34
 Id. at 544. 
35
 1997 WL 167113 (S.D.N.Y.). 
36
 Id. at *4. 
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was not only new, but it was not very involved or developed.
37
 The courts‘ analysis 
reveals that strangers are less likely to be subject to implied confidentiality obligations 
than parties who are familiar with each other. 
Specific Relationships with Heightened Probability of Implied 
Confidentiality. Several courts specified that certain kinds of relationships, such as joint 
ventures, principal-agent,
38
 physician-patient,
39
 accountant/attorney-client,
40
 employer-
employee,
41
 and those involving trusted advisors, were likely to involve an implied 
obligation of confidentiality.
42
 Nearly all these specific relationships have at least two 
                                                 
37
 Id. 
38
 See, e.g. McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). The court of appeals of 
Texas elaborated on the nature of fiduciary and confidential  relationships, stating: 
There are two types of fiduciary relationships: formal fiduciary relationships that arise as 
a matter of law, such as partnerships and principal-agent relationships, and informal 
fiduciary relationships or ―confidential relationships‖ that may arise from moral, social, 
domestic, or personal relationships. A fiduciary relationship is an extraordinary one and 
will not be created lightly. The mere fact that one party to a relationship subjectively 
trusts the other does not indicate the existence of a fiduciary relationship. A person is 
justified in believing another to be his fiduciary ―only where he or she is accustomed to 
being guided by the judgment and advice of the other party, and there exists a long 
association in a business relationship, as well as a personal friendship.‖ 
Id. at 829 (citations omitted). 
39
 See, e.g., Crippen v. Charter Southland Hosp., Inc., 534 So. 2d 286 (Ala. 1988) (finding a duty of 
confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship); Anderson v. Strong Mem‘l Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1988) (finding that ―the physician-patient relationship itself gives rise to an implied 
covenant of confidence and trust when breached.‖); Givens v. Mullikin ex rel Estate of McElwaney, 75 
S.W. 3d 383, 407 (Tenn. 2002). 
40
 See, e.g., Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 19 Ohio App. 3d 7, 12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). 
41
 See, e.g., SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing established 
precedent that ―in some circumstances, an agreement not to disclose a former employer‘s trade secrets may 
be implied from the confidential nature of the employment relationship.‖) (emphasis in original); Sweetzel, 
Inc. v. Hawk Hill Cookies, Inc., 1995 WL 550585 at *12 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
42
 See, e.g., Omnitceh Intern., Inc., v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a fiduciary 
relationship between business partners, attorneys and their clients, the insured and their insurers, and 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders). 
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elements in common: vulnerable parties and the disclosure of information in furtherance 
of a common goal.  
In Faris v. Enberg,
43
 the California Court of Appeals found that among the factors 
from which a confidential relationship can be inferred is ―proof of a particular 
relationship such as partners, joint adventurers, principal and agent or buyer and seller 
under certain circumstances.‖ 44 In Fail-Safe v. A.O. Smith,45 the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Wisconsin observed that a joint business venture between the 
parties ―by its very nature implied that disclosures made in the context of such an 
arrangement were confidential.‖46 According to the court, a joint venture is established 
under Wisconsin law by ―(1) contribution of money or services by each of the parties; (2) 
joint proprietorship and mutual control over the subject matter of the venture; (3) an 
agreement to share profits; and (4) an express or implied contract establishing the 
relationship.‖47 
The joint venture relationship is similar to relationships involving fiduciary 
duties, and the requirements for its formation provide insight into the impetus behind 
obligations of confidentiality. Joint ventures require some form of commitment of 
resources and leave both parties vulnerable to harm if the relationship fails.  This 
commitment of resources heightens the importance of the relationship and separates it 
from other relationships with fewer consequences if confidentiality is breached. Both 
                                                 
43
 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
44
 Id. 
45
 2010 WL 3503427 (E.D. Wis.). 
46
 Id. at * 22 (finding no evidence that a joint venture relationship existed between the parties). 
47
 Id. 
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parties in a joint venture also are seeking a common goal – to generate profits. Thus, 
there is an implied understanding in joint ventures that certain disclosures are meant to 
further the profit goal, with the inverse implication that disclosures should not be used for 
other, potentially harmful, purposes.  
Both parties to a joint venture have the capacity to modify their relationship. The 
mutual ability to affect the relationship is the result of placing trust and confidence in the 
other party. Finally, both parties to a joint venture have some form of agreement 
regarding the boundaries of the relationship. Other aspects of a joint venture, such as 
vulnerability, a common goal between the parties, and mutual control and agreement in 
confidential relationships are also factors considered by courts in analyzing implied 
obligations of confidentiality and will be addressed below as part of the relationship 
between the parties and later in this dissertation as wholly separate factors.   
Relationships in which one party is vulnerable to harm due to the other‘s access to 
sensitive information seemed to be a significant factor for many courts deciding whether 
an implied obligation of confidentiality existed, particularly in specific relationships in 
business, employment, and medical settings.  In the trade secret dispute in Ecolaire v. 
Crissman,
48
 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that an 
employee‘s position as vice president ―gave him access to numerous pre-existing trade 
secrets.‖49 According to the court, the nature of his relationship with his employer as a 
trusted executive also gave him an implied duty of non-disclosure.
50
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 542 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
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Disclosures made in pursuit of a common goal and recognition by the parties of 
that pursuit also seemed to be a significant factor for courts.
51
 In Carpenter Foundation v. 
Oakes,
52
 a corporation founded for the purpose of preserving items about Mary Baker 
Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, sought to enjoin the publishing of sensitive 
correspondence that contained frank discussions of religion and recollections of students 
by the founder of the corporation. The corporation insisted that the disclosure of these 
sensitive materials to the defendant, a former employee seeking to publish the materials, 
was made within a relationship of ―agency, trust and confidence‖ and that the documents 
were disclosed with ―the express and implied understanding and condition that 
documents would be circulated among only those ‗qualified‘ students of Christian 
Science.‖53  
The Court of Appeal for California agreed with the plaintiff, stating, ―[W]e have 
no difficulty in finding a fiduciary relationship established not only by reason of the 
agency created in the operation of the [non-profit‘s satellite branch], but also by virtue of 
the long, intimate, personal friendship‖ between the president of the corporation and the 
defendant, a former employee.
54
 The court then acknowledged that the common goal of 
the parties was critical for the formation of this fiduciary obligation.  The court said:  
―The transmission of the papers involved more than a mere gratuitous token of friendship 
                                                 
51
 See, e.g., Cloud v. Standard Packing Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 1967) (stating that ―[w]here the 
facts show that a disclosure is made in order to further a particular relationship, a relationship of confidence 
may be implied….‖); RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 105, 199-20 (Wis. 1978) (stating that ―a 
relationship of confidence may be implied when a disclosure is made solely for the purpose of advancing or 
implementing an existing special relationship.‖). 
52
 26 Cal. App. 3d 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). 
53
 Id. at 789. 
54
 Id. at 798. 
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between acquaintances. Its purpose was clear. It was the necessary step to effect the goal, 
repeatedly discussed by the parties,‖ of spreading the views of the founder of Christian 
Science to a limited number of pupils.
55
 Note that disclosure in pursuit of a common goal 
or in furtherance of a relationship is also an important factor separately considered by the 
courts.
56
 
Not all financial relationships were seen as fiduciary. The insurer-insured
57
  and 
debtor-creditor
58
 relationships were explicitly rejected as fiduciary or even confidential 
by some courts. The Ninth Circuit held in Star Patrol, a dispute over the development of 
the Mighty Morphin‘ Power Rangers television series and distribution of related 
products, that ―the arms-length business relationship between [the parties] is insufficient 
to impose fiduciary-like duties that arise from a confidential relationship.‖59 The court 
then helpfully recognized that although fiduciary relationships involve obligations of 
confidentiality, implied confidentiality can be established many other ways, including 
simple proof that ―an idea was offered and received in confidence, and later disclosed 
without permission.‖60  
                                                 
55
 Id. 
56
 See Chapter II, note 132 and accompanying text. 
57
 Paul v. Aviva Life and Annuity Co., 2010 WL 5105925  at *10 (N.D. Tex.). 
58
 Velasquez-Campuzano v. Marfa Nat. Bank, 896 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that ―[i]n 
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Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 92 Misc. 2d 764, 768 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1978) (observing that a bank was under no 
obligation of confidentiality because ―the relationship between the bank and the plaintiff was solely that of 
creditor and debtor.‖); Norkin v. Hoey, 181 A.D. 2d 248, 255 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1992) (stating ―whatever 
expectations of confidentiality may inhere in the traditional relationship between bank and depositor, such 
expectations are wholly lacking in the context of the debtor-creditor loan relationship‖). 
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 1997 WL 683327 at *2 (9th Cir.). 
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 Id. 
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A similar logic was employed by the Supreme Court of California in Davies v. 
Kransa,
61
 which recognized a confidential relationship might involve a ―trusted friend or 
advisor,‖ but here the defendant was merely a ―prospective purchaser or exploiter.‖62 The 
court then, as in Star Patrol, emphasized that an obligation of confidentiality might exist 
in this dispute, but the facts ―are insufficient to impose upon him the fiduciary-like duties 
that arise from a confidential relationship.‖63 Thus, relationships involving vulnerable 
parties and parties who share common goals should be analyzed for implied 
confidentiality, even if the relationship does not rise to the level of fiduciaries.    
Familial relationships, standing alone, were also not seen as inherently fiduciary 
by most courts.
64
 In Norris v. Norris, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that ―proof of the 
marital relationship in no sense established the fiduciary relationship essential to the 
establishment of a trust between the parties. But the marital status, in and of itself, 
implied a confidential relationship which is to be considered along with all other 
circumstances‖ when determining whether a relationship is fiduciary.65 However, at least 
one court found that marriage could, by itself, support a finding of an implied obligation 
of confidentiality.
66
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 535 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1975). 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Scott v. Kemp, 316 A.2d 883, 885-86 (Pa. 1974) (stating that ―[t]he bare fact that [defendant] and 
[plaintiff] were brother and sister does not, without more, place them in a relationship of confidentiality.‖).  
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 57 N.E.2d 254, 261 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). 
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 See Lakin v. Lakin, 1999 WL 1320464 at *19 (Conn. Super. Ct.) (recognizing that ―giving the nature of 
the marital relationship, Connecticut implies a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties.‖). 
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The physician-patient relationship appeared to be the paradigmatic confidential 
relationship.
67
 The nature of this relationship was best summarized by the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee in Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney
68
 as follows: 
Any time a doctor undertakes the treatment of a patient, and the 
consensual relationship of physician and patient is established, two jural 
obligations (of significance here) are simultaneously assumed by the 
doctor. Doctor and patient enter into a simple contract, the patient hoping 
that he will be cured and the doctor optimistically assuming that he will be 
compensated. As an implied condition of that contract, this Court is of the 
opinion that the doctor warrants that any confidential information gained 
through the relationship will not be released without the patient's 
permission.... Consequently, when a doctor breaches his duty of secrecy, 
he is in violation of part of his obligations under the contract.
69
 
 
The confidential physician-patient relationship is thus contractual and fiduciary. 
In Doe v. Roe,
70
 the former patient of a psychiatrist brought a lawsuit after the 
psychiatrist published a book that revealed extremely specific and sensitive details of the 
patient‘s treatment. The Supreme Court of New York County found that physicians owed 
their patients the highest fiduciary duty of confidentiality. The court entered into a 
lengthy analysis of the reasons behind this duty.  According to the court, physicians were 
under a general duty not to disclose information revealed by the patient because a patient 
should be able to freely disclose her symptoms to her doctor in order to receive treatment 
                                                 
67
 See, e.g., Pierce v. Caday, 422 S.E.2d 371, 374 (Va. 1992) (finding that ―[u]pon receipt of [a patient‘s 
confidential] information, the physician impliedly promises not to violate the confidence.‖); Doe v. Roe, 
400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1977); Ghayoumi v. McMillan, 2006 WL 1994556 (Tenn. Ct. App.); 
Givens v. Mullikin ex rel Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W. 3d 383, 407 (Tenn. 2002) (recognizing that an 
implied contract of confidentiality can exist when a patient compensates a physician in return for medical 
treatment). 
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 75 S.W. 3d 383 (Tenn. 2002). 
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 Id. at 407. 
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 400 N.Y.S. 668 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1977). 
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―‗without fear that those facts may become public property.‘‖71  In agreeing with a long 
line of established precedent, the court held: 
I too find that a physician, who enters into an agreement with a patient to 
provide medical attention, impliedly covenants to keep in confidence all 
disclosures made by the patient concerning the patient's physical or mental 
condition as well as all matters discovered by the physician in the course 
of examination or treatment. This is particularly and necessarily true of the 
psychiatric relationship, for in the dynamics of psychotherapy ―[t]he 
patient is called upon to discuss in a candid and frank manner personal 
material of the most intimate and disturbing nature….He is expected to 
bring up all manner of socially unacceptable instincts and urges, immature 
wishes, perverse sexual thoughts – in short, the unspeakable, the 
unthinkable, the repressed. To speak of such things to another human 
requires an atmosphere of unusual trust, confidence and tolerance. ... 
Patients will be helped only if they can form a trusting relationship with 
the psychiatrist.‖72 
 
Again, the court finds vulnerable parties and the disclosure of information in furtherance 
of a common goal, in this case psychiatric treatment, as significant aspects of implied 
confidentiality. 
It is important to note that the lack of a developed relationship was not seen by 
courts as a bar to implied confidentiality.  In Zippertubing v. Teleflex,
73
 the Third Circuit 
observed in a dispute over wrongfully obtained customer information that although the 
parties had no prior relationship, an implied obligation of confidentiality existed based on 
other circumstances surrounding a transaction such as implied terms of confidentiality 
and prior awareness of both parties‘ business goals and the reason for disclosing valuable 
                                                 
71
 Id. at 207, 209 (citing Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962)) (finding that ―[t]he unauthorized 
revelation of medical secrets or any confidential information given in the course of treatment, is tortious 
conduct which may be the basis for an action in damages.‖). 
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 Id. at 210 (citing Marvin S. Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. 
L. REV. 401, 405-06 (1957)). 
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customer information.
74
 Finally, courts recognized that a contract could create 
confidentiality obligations within a relationship even if the law did not inherently 
recognize certain relationships as confidential, such as the insurer-insured relationship.
75
 
Unequal Bargaining Power. Courts often were willing to find an implied 
obligation of confidentiality in relationships involving unequal bargaining power.
76
 In 
Fischer,
77
 the case in which a creator of comic characters sued a producer of television 
programs for breach of implied contract and breach of duty of confidentiality for 
producing a program allegedly based on the creator‘s ideas, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maryland noted the general rule that ―an implied duty of confidentiality 
exists in circumstances where the parties deal on unequal terms, the transaction is more 
than an arm‘s length deal, and one party trusts and relies on the other.‖78 This rule would 
seem to indicate that reliance on implied confidentiality in a developed relationship with 
unequal bargaining power is reasonable.   
Unequal bargaining power was seen as a critical component in fiduciary 
relationships.  In Paul, the case involving a lawsuit alleging the defendant failed to 
disclose the risks of the insurance policy it sold to the plaintiffs in violation of their  
                                                 
74
 Id. at 1408. 
75
 See, e.g., Thomas v. State Emp. Group Benefits Program, 934 So. 2d 753, 756-57 (La. Ct. App. 2006) 
(finding no implied condition of confidentiality can be read into an insurer‘s contract with its insured ―by 
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on the part of an insurer to maintain the confidentiality of its insured‘s medical records might arise 
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004)). 
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 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 2000). 
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 Id. at 543; see also Hogan v. D.C. Comics, 1997 WL 570871 at *5 (N.D.N.Y.) (citing case law stating 
―‗[a] confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between parties ‗where the parties do not deal on equal 
terms and one trusts and relies on the other.‘‘‖) (citations omitted). 
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fiduciary duty, the court observed that ―‗significant dominance and superiority [are] 
necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship.‘‖79 Here, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas found that the relationship between an insurer and the insured 
did not involve one party in a position of significant dominance or superiority over 
another. As a result, the relationship between the parties was not a fiduciary one.
80
 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized in 
Harold ex rel. Harold v. McGann
81
 that a confidential relationship exists ―to the extent 
that the parties do not deal with each other on equal terms.‖82 The court found that a 
―special confidence can result from ‗an overmastering dominance on one side, or 
weakness, dependence or justifiable trust, on the other‖ and that a confidential 
relationship exists when a party is required to act for the benefit of another and prohibited 
from taking a benefit due to that party for himself.
83
 For example, in In re Clark‟s 
Estate,
84
 a dispute involving an alleged abuse of a confidential relationship between Alice 
Clark and a beneficiary of her will, John Smith, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
found that the Clark‘s ―weakened mental condition and dependence on Smith in her 
financial dealings, coupled with Smith's assumption of control over Mrs. Clark's business 
                                                 
79
 Paul v. Aviva Life and Annuity Co., 2010 WL 5105925  at *9 (N.D. Tex.) (citing Martin v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. App. 2004)). 
80
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 406 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). 
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 Id. at 571. 
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affairs, fully warranted the chancellor's finding that Smith and Clark stood in a 
confidential relationship.‖85 
CUSTOM 
One of the most important aspects of an implied obligation of confidentiality is 
that the discloser and recipient of information knew or should have known that the 
information was disclosed in confidence.  For this reason, courts considered custom a 
very significant factor in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. If 
confidentiality was a regular and accepted practice in a given context, courts often found 
a discloser‘s reliance on that custom reasonable. This reliance was reasonable because the 
common knowledge of a custom made it likely that the recipient of the information was 
aware of an expectation of confidentiality before the information was disclosed, or, in 
any event, the recipient should have known to keep the information confidential.  
Courts found two types of customs important: party customs and industry 
customs. Courts were likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality for parties if 
they offered or required confidences in previous, similar contexts.  Industry customs of 
confidentiality, most commonly found in intellectual property disputes, were important to 
courts if confidentiality was a commonly accepted practice in any given industry, though 
not necessarily the custom of the parties currently requesting or being charged with an 
obligation of confidentiality. 
In both types of contextual factors, courts seemed to assume that if confidentiality 
was a known custom, then the discloser and recipient of information likely knew or 
should have known about this custom.  If the parties knew or should have known of the 
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 Id. at 635. 
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custom, it is more likely that expectations and promises of confidentiality were implied.  
Additionally, an industry‘s or recipient‘s custom of confidentiality demonstrates that the 
practice is reasonable and plausible, thus increasing the likelihood of implied 
confidentiality. 
Party Custom. Some courts looked to whether the discloser of information or the 
recipient of information had a custom of requesting or maintaining the confidentiality of 
similar disclosures or of maintaining confidentiality when dealing with the same party.
86
  
As will be discussed later, courts considered the history between the parties important. 
Thus, a custom of confidentiality between the parties would be a significant factor in 
finding an implied obligation of confidentiality in a particular disclosure. If the recipient 
of information customarily kept similar disclosures confidential for other parties, then 
that too was a factor to be considered by the courts.  
Courts also considered the absence of a recipient‘s custom of confidentiality. For 
example, in denying a claim for an implied confidentiality agreement between MIT 
researchers and participants in a research study, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts held that the researchers ―failed to support the notion that there is a 
‗recognized culture that would preclude, or at least inhibit, most of the participants in the 
field tests from disclosing information…to others.‘‖87  This case dealt with whether a 
patented automobile navigation system using spoken word directions had been used 
publicly or only exposed to a small group of study participants in confidence. The court 
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 See, e.g., Moore v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Burten v. Milton 
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focused on the particular steps taken (or not taken) by MIT researchers to ensure the 
confidentiality of the patent rather than on a generally accepted industry practice of 
confidentiality adhered to by academic researchers.  According to the courts, MIT 
provided little proof that it customarily required confidentiality of its research trial 
participants.
88
 
Industry Custom. Courts consistently considered industry custom a significant 
factor in analyzing claims for implied obligations for confidentiality.
89
  In Metrano v. Fox 
Broadcasting,
90
 the plaintiff, a screenwriter who pitched a television show about people 
with extraordinary medical conditions who can perform incredible human feats, brought a 
suit against a broadcasting producer for breach of confidence for using the screenwriter‘s 
ideas that were disclosed in a pitch meeting without his authorization. The U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California recognized that, if proven, the television 
industry‘s practice of implied confidentiality in all pitch meetings supported a plaintiff‘s 
claim for breach of confidence.
91
 
 In Moore v. Marty Gilman,
92
 the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts detailed the importance of customs in implied confidential relationships 
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‗the case with all pitch meetings in the television industry.‘‖ Id. at *7. 
92
 965 F. Supp. 203 (1997). 
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that are necessary to protect a trade secret.  The court found evidence in a previous case 
that established the existence of an industry-wide custom of confidentiality recognized by 
reputable game and toy companies ―‗to maintain the secrecy of ideas submitted by 
outside inventors.‘‖93 This fact, among others, led the court to recognize that industry 
custom could create an implied obligation of confidentiality in the pitched ideas if that 
custom is demonstrated by evidence.
94
 However, in the current dispute, the court held 
that ―there was no evidence of an industry custom or practice that would give rise to a 
shared expectation that defendants would not use any ideas that plaintiffs might 
gratuitously disclose to them.‖95 
 The cases did not reveal exactly how much evidence was required to demonstrate 
a custom strong enough to support an implied obligation of confidentiality.  One court 
suggested that the evidence must reflect a near uniform, not just anecdotal, adherence to 
custom.  In Flotec v. Southern Research,
96
 the U. S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana found in a trade secret dispute:  
The evidence showed a widespread but not uniform practice in the 
machine shop industry of keeping a customer‘s information confidential. 
The evidence does not support, however, a uniform custom of keeping 
such information confidential when it concerns components of a product 
already on the market and where the customer does not ask for any 
promise of confidentiality.
97
 
 
The court found that there was strong evidence of a custom of confidentiality and that 
―[t]he witnesses who described the supposed custom all had experience with explicit 
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confidentiality agreements in the industry‖ and all viewed the practice as beneficial to 
their business.
98
 However, the court found that this custom was not sufficient as the sole 
means of finding an implied obligation of the parties.
99
 Another court clarified that the 
mere allegation of industry custom was not sufficient to support a claim of implied 
confidentiality, particularly if that custom was contradicted by other evidence.
100
 
However, even a uniform adherence to custom might not be enough for courts to 
infer an obligation of confidentiality in a dispute. The court in Flotec found that industry 
custom, standing alone, did not justify an obligation of confidentiality. The court 
questioned ―whether it was reasonable for [the plaintiff] to rely on this asserted custom as 
the sole means to protect the confidentiality if [sic] information it claims is a secret and 
vital to its business success.‖101 Ultimately, the court found that it needed more to find 
implied confidentiality in this dispute, holding, ―To the extent that Flotec was relying on 
a supposed custom of the machine shop industry to protect the confidentiality of the 
drawings it gave to SRI, Flotec did not take reasonable steps to protect the confidentiality 
of the information on those drawings.‖102 Thus, according to the court, custom can be a 
factor, but not the factor, in determining whether confidentiality was implied when 
information was disclosed. 
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Courts emphasized that the custom of merely exchanging valuable or sensitive 
information was not, by itself, enough to establish an obligation of confidentiality.  A 
custom of confidentiality should be firmly established to be legally binding. In Fischer v. 
Viacom,
103
 the U. S. District Court for the District of Maryland found that the 
―commonplace give-and-take between those who ‗pitch‘ ideas and those who listen and 
consider‖ was not enough of a custom to give rise to a duty of confidentiality.104 
 Industry customs of confidentiality seemed most significant in disputes involving 
implied contracts, as opposed to confidential relationships formed by fiduciary 
obligations or statutes. A number of implied contract disputes looked to custom, even if 
the contract was unrelated to confidentiality. In Hogan v. DC Comics,
105
 the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of New York found, ―Whether an implied contract exists 
depends upon the general practices of the industry.‖106 However, industry custom seemed 
less significant for the broader category of confidential relationships.
 107
  For example, in 
a claim for the tort of breach of confidential relationship, the Supreme Court of Oregon 
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held: ―It requires more than custom to impose legal restraints on ‗the right to speak, 
write, or print freely on any subject whatever.‘…[A] legal duty not to speak, unless 
voluntarily assumed in entering the relationship, will not be imposed by courts or jurors 
in the name of custom or reasonable expectation.‖108 
As a refresher, implied-in-fact contracts for confidentiality cover only the agreed-
upon disclosures, whereas confidential relationships often impose a heightened fiduciary-
like duty of care, which includes a duty not to disclose any information gained within the 
scope of the relationship that would harm the discloser.
109
 In any event, it is clear that 
courts have explicitly recognized that customs can serve as evidence of an implied 
agreement of confidentiality.
110
 According to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth 
Circuit, the cause of action for an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality can be 
maintained under any circumstance where it can be concluded that the recipient of 
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information voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was 
tendered.
111
  
NEGOTIATION 
The 22 cases in which negotiation was considered offered varying judicial 
opinions on how negotiations should impact an inference of confidentiality.  Some courts 
opined that a lack of negotiation reflected an absence of the ―meeting of the minds‖ 
necessary for true agreement between the parties.
 112
  Other courts looked to whether the 
parties were negotiating at ―arm‘s-length,‖ defined as ―[o]f or relating to dealings 
between two parties who are not related or not on close terms and who are presumed to 
have roughly equal bargaining power; not involving a confidential relationship.‖113 For 
courts, ―arms-length negotiations‖ tended to serve as evidence of ample opportunity to 
explicitly request confidentiality, with the implication that the failure to exploit that 
opportunity meant that an implied obligation of confidentiality was unlikely.
114
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asked to keep ‗the details of the series on file‘‖ with no explicit promise of confidentiality). The court 
found it important to describe the fact that ―[t]hese alleged facts describe the parties acting at arm‘s length, 
with no prior dealings, no promise of confidentiality, and no employment or personal relationship that 
could give rise to a duty of trust.‖ id; see also Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Brothers, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 
1204, 1218 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that the creation of a confidential relationship would be ―unduly 
burdensome and unwarranted in policy where the sole contract between the parties has been the arms-
length submission of an idea.‖); Star Patrol Enter., Inc. v. Saban Entm‘t., Inc., 1997 WL 683327 at *2 (9th 
Cir.) (stating that ―[a]n action for breach of confidential relationship would fail because the arms-length 
business relationship between Star Patrol and the defendants is insufficient to impose fiduciary-like duties 
that arise from a confidential relationship.‖); Ranger Enter., Inc. v. Leen & Assoc., Inc., 1998 WL 668380 
at *6 (9th Cir.). 
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Failed negotiations for confidentiality were also relevant to courts because they 
indicated that an implied obligation of confidentiality was unlikely.
115
  For example, in 
Young Design v. Teletronics,
116
 the plaintiff, a data communications equipment 
manufacturer in a trade secret case, claimed that it shared secret information about a new 
wireless product within an implied confidential relationship.  However, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia highlighted a number of factors that cut against 
this assertion, including the fact that the plaintiffs ―did not require [the defendant] to sign 
non-disclosure agreement of any kind‖ and the fact that there was no evidence the 
plaintiff ―probed…for any explicit commitment to keep the technology confidential‖ after 
the defendant refused to sign a non-disclosure agreement during a business meeting.
117
 
This failed negotiation – the evidence that no confidentially agreement was reached—
seemed relevant to the court in dispelling the claim for implied confidentiality.  
In Fail-Safe v. A.O. Smith,
118
 the manufacturer of devices used to prevent pool 
suction entrapments brought a suit against the manufacturers of motors for the pumps, 
claiming, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. At dispute was whether 
the plaintiff took appropriate measures to guard the secrecy of its proprietary information. 
The plaintiff claimed it revealed its proprietary information in implied confidence 
because it explicitly agreed to keep the defendant‘s information confidential. The U.S. 
                                                 
115
 See, e.g., L-3 Comm. Corp., v. OSI Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 2595176 at *5 (2d Cir.) (finding that no 
obligation of confidentiality existed in an intellectual property dispute where the plaintiff could have, but 
failed to, insist upon ―explicit contract terms providing that L-3 would act in a fiduciary capacity.‖); 
Omintech Intern., Inc. v. Colorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that no confidential 
relationship existed in a trade-secret dispute where, among other things, the parties ―had only an arms-
length business relationship‖ and ―the parties vigorously negotiated the instruments already executed.‖). 
116
 2001 WL 35804500 (E.D. Va.). 
117
 Id. at *5. 
118
 2010 WL 3503427 (E.D. Wis.).  
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District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin found that the fact that the plaintiff 
―willingly agreed to a confidentiality agreement that protected [the defendant‘s] 
proprietary information, but did nothing to protect [its own] information provided an 
obvious signal to [the defendant] that [the plaintiff] ‗knew how to ask that information be 
considered confidential if it really thought the company‘s crown jewels were at risk.‘‖119 
According to the court, this ―signal,‖ i.e., the lack of a request for confidentiality despite 
the opportunity to do so, defeated the plaintiff‘s claim of implied confidentiality because 
the defendant was likely unaware of any confidentiality obligation. 
However, other courts found that the presence of negotiation within an arms-
length transaction had no effect on or actually increased the likelihood of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality.
120
 This is particularly true for disputes involving 
confidential relationships imposed by law, as opposed to those imposed by contract.
121
  
Negotiations often occurred within the context of a financial transaction. Ten 
courts found that the presence and nature of an accompanying transaction were relevant 
in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality.
122
  While the courts did not explain 
why the existence of a transaction was significant, they seemed to reason that if the 
                                                 
119
 Id. at *21. 
120
 See, e.g, Smith v. Dravo, 203 F.2d 369, 377 (7th  Cir. 1953) (finding that ―[t]he implied limitation on the 
use to be made of the information had its roots in the ‗arms-length‘ transaction.‖); Knapp Schenk & Co. 
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Lancer Management Co., Inc., 2004 WL 57086 (D. Mass); Davies v. Kransa, 535 P.2d 
1161, 1167 (Cal. 1975) (noting that although no fiduciary-like confidential relationship existed in an arms-
length transaction between businessmen, ―[t]he circumstances of that transaction may impose upon 
defendant a duty to refrain from unauthorized disclosure of the idea.‖); Formex Mfg., Inc., v. Sullivan 
Flotation Sys., 1992 WL 131161 (Fed. Cir.). 
121
 See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren General Hosp., 1998 WL 156997 at *12 (Ohio Ct. App.) (finding that in 
confidential relationships between physicians and patients ―there is no indication that patients bargain for 
confidentiality; rather, it is assumed.‖). 
122
 See, e.g., Roth v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 656 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that 
―[c]ircumstances that may indicate implied confidentiality include whether the informant was paid….‖). 
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parties were otherwise entering into a transaction with legal obligations, then an implied 
obligation is more likely in that context than when there is no underlying transaction 
between the parties.
123
 The existence of a transaction indicates an apparent quid pro quo 
or reciprocity critical for both implied contracts and voluntary confidential 
relationships.
124
 
Because there were no cases directly on point, it is unclear whether situations 
involving consumers and standard-form contracts of adhesion would result in a greater 
likelihood of implied confidentiality due to an inability to negotiate terms. According to 
many courts that addressed the issue, failure to take advantage of an opportunity to 
request confidentiality as part of a negotiation between parties reflected a lack of desire to 
keep information confidential. Because parties to standard-form contracts had no 
opportunity to negotiate, their failure to request confidentiality should not be held against 
them under the logic employed by these courts. 
For example, Internet users bound by a website‘s terms-of-use agreement have no 
meaningful opportunity to negotiate for confidentiality. Thus, a lack of negotiation for 
confidentiality cannot be held against them. In these instances, a court would likely need 
to give greater weight to other contextual factors that might reflect the intention of the 
parties regarding confidentiality.  Thus, in disputes involving standard-form contracts, the 
                                                 
123
 See, e.g., Givens v. Mullikin ex rel Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d, 407-08 (Tenn. 2002) (finding that 
―[a]n implied covenant of confidentiality can arise from the original contract….‖); Ghayoumi v. McMillan, 
2006 WL 1994556 (Tenn. Ct. App.); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. 
Ohio 1965); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 484-46 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 
201 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1977); Thomas v State Emp. Group Benefits Program, 934 So. 2d 753, 757 (La. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
124
 Note that this reciprocity is also the motivation behind attributing significance to the timing of the 
disclosure of information. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.  
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absence of any meaningful opportunity to negotiate could shift more weight on to other 
factors courts consider in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. 
TIMING OF THE DISCLOSURE 
The timing of the disclosure of information was significant for courts, as they 
were loathe to imply confidentiality when disclosures occurred before a promise of 
confidentiality was made or before a substantive relationship was formed.
125
 The U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas stated in Keane v. Fox Television 
Stations, 
126
 a dispute over the alleged confidential disclosure of the idea for the popular 
―American Idol‖ television show, that ―[t]he ‗idea man who blurts out his idea without 
having first made his bargain‘—whether in a so-called sales packet, Internet postings, or 
discussions with family members and callow undergraduate students – ‗has no one but 
himself to blame for the loss of bargaining power.‘‖127 The Fifth Circuit in Smith v. Snap-
On Tools, the dispute over the alleged confidential disclosure of a novel ratchet made by 
                                                 
125
 See, e.g., Vantage Point v. Parker Brothers, 529 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that ―the mere 
voluntary act of submitting an idea to one with whom the plaintiff has had no prior dealings will not make 
the disclosure one in confidence, even if stated to be so. A person may not ‗by his gratuitous and unilateral 
act,…impose upon another a confidential relationship.‘‖) (citations omitted); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 
150 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Enberg v. Syndicast Serv., Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 323-24 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 297 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 2004); 
Learning Curve Toys, LLC v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 1998 WL 46894 (N.D. Ill.) (referencing testimony that 
supported the fact that the parties ―arrived at a confidentiality agreement prior to sharing information with 
each other‖); Kleck v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 819, 824 (W.D. Tex. 2000); but cf, 
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, 736 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that a 
disclosure might have been made in confidence even if the disclosure preceded any conduct on the 
recipient‘s part indicating the existence of an implied-in-fact contract). 
126
 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 942 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
127
 Id. (quoting Kleck v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 819, 824 (W.D. Tex. 2000)); see also 
Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., 2000 WL 979664 at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that ―[n]othing in the 
pleadings suggests that plaintiff communicated to defendant the requirement of confidentiality before the 
presentation‖); RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 105, 119 (Wis. 1978) (finding that ―[t]he contract 
clause came too late to protect the confidentiality of the drawing, which had been disclosed at an earlier 
time‖); Holloman v. O. Mustad & Sons (USA), Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (finding 
that no confidentiality obligation existed where the plaintiff admitted to revealing a trade secret to others 
for testing purposes without first entering into non-disclosure agreements with those people); Hoeltke v. 
C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 1935).  
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combining parts of two existing tools, said that ―[r]eliance on confidentiality, however, 
must exist at the time the disclosure is made. An attempt to establish a special 
relationship long after an initial disclosure comes too late.‖128 
By focusing on timing, the courts seem to be trying to ensure that the recipient of 
the information had the opportunity to either decline confidentiality or refrain from 
entering into a relationship with confidentiality obligations. Courts will not imply 
confidentiality unilaterally. A promise of confidentiality or decision to enter into a 
confidential relationship must be voluntary by both parties.
129
 In Klekas v. EMI Films,
130
 
a dispute concerning the alleged confidential disclosure of a screenplay and novel that 
purportedly became the famous movie ―The Deer Hunter,‖ the California Court of 
Appeal held that to establish an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality, ―the plaintiff 
must show, [among other things], that under all circumstances attending disclosure it can 
be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions 
on which it was tendered (i.e. the offeree must have the opportunity to reject the 
attempted disclosure if the conditions were unacceptable)….‖131 
PURPOSE OF THE DISCLOSURE 
Courts regularly looked to the purpose of the disclosure of information to 
determine if an implied obligation of confidentiality existed.
132
  Courts considered 
                                                 
128
 833 F.2d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1988). 
129
 See, e.g., Innospan Corp. v. Intuit, Inc., 2011 WL 856265 at *6 (N.D. Cal.) (stating that ―[i]t is trickery 
to send an unsolicited business plan to someone the sender thinks is a potential business investor and then 
to foist confidentiality duties on that recipient without his agreement in advance‖). 
130
 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
131
 Id. at 1114; see also Star Patrol Enter. v. Saban Entm‘t, Inc., 1997 WL 683327 at *1 (9th Cir.). 
132
 See, e.g., Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 26 Cal. App. 3d 784, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that a 
fiduciary confidential relationship existed where, among other things, the purpose of the disclosure of 
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disclosures made in order to promote a common goal or further develop the relationship 
as evidence of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Courts seemed to recognize that if 
confidentiality is necessary to encourage disclosure or if it is necessary for any given 
disclosure to be effective, then an inference of confidentiality is more reasonable than it 
is in relationships where confidentiality seems unnecessary.   
The case of Sentinel Products v. Mobil Chemical
133
 involved a patent and trade 
secret dispute whereby valuable information was disclosed by a product developer to 
potential buyers allegedly in confidence. The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts held that ―‗where the facts demonstrate that a disclosure was made in 
order to promote a specific relationship, e.g. disclosure to a prospective purchaser to 
enable him to appraise the value of the secret, the parties will be bound to receive the 
information in confidence.‘‖134 Looking at the facts on record, the court found that ―[t]he 
jury could reasonably conclude that a confidential relationship should ‗be implied where 
disclosures have been made in business relationships between…purchasers and 
suppliers…or prospective licensees and licensors.‘‖135  
It seems that the court recognized that the developer‘s need for confidentiality 
would have been obvious to a buyer before the disclosure, and, as a result, the court was 
                                                                                                                                                 
sensitive information was clearly to advance a relationship in which the recipient was to inform a restricted 
group of students); Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 757 F.2d 1401, 1408 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that an 
implied duty of confidentiality existed where, among other things, the only purpose of a disclosure of 
confidential information was to facilitate a business relationship and procurement of services); RTE Corp. 
v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 105, 119-20 (Wis. 1978) (stating, ―[I]t is true that a relationship of confidence 
may be implied when a disclosure is made solely for the purpose of advancing or implementing an existing 
special relationship.‖); Omitech Intern., Inc., v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994); Cloud v. 
Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1967). 
133
 2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass). 
134
 Id. at * 12 (quoting Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 493 (1st Cir. 1985)). 
135
 Id. 
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willing to find an implied obligation of confidentiality in the relationship. The U.S. 
District Court of Massachusetts continued this rationale in Knapp Schenk v. Lancer 
Management,
136
 finding that where secret data were explicitly disclosed for the purpose 
of evaluating intellectual property in contemplation of acquiring it, ―a jury could 
reasonably find that an implied confidential relationship arose.‖137 This case involved 
rigorous negotiations surrounding the acquisition of all rights associated with the ―Splash 
Fuel Oil Dealers Program,‖ which provides insurance service packages for oil heat 
dealers.
138
 
Courts similarly looked to the purpose of disclosure when patients sought 
treatment from physicians.  According to these courts, the disclosure of sensitive 
information was necessary to receive medical treatment.
139
 Thus, an obligation of 
confidentiality can be implied in law because patients have little choice as to whether to 
withhold sensitive information.
140
 Additionally, in order to effectively satisfy their duty 
of responsible medical treatment, physicians must have access to a patient‘s confidential 
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 2004 WL 57086 (D. Mass). 
137
 Id. at *12. 
138
 Id. 
139
 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 
210-11 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1977) (finding that in the dynamics of psychotherapy ―[t]he patient is called upon 
to discuss in a candid and frank manner personal material of the most intimate and disturbing nature….He 
is expected to bring up all manner of socially unacceptable instincts and urges, immature wishes, perverse 
sexual thoughts – in short, the unspeakable, the unthinkable, the repressed.‘‖). 
140
 See, e.g., Pierce v. Caday, 422 S.E.2d 371, 374 (Va. 1992) (finding that a ―thorough, accurate medical 
history furnished by the patient is an indispensable component of medical treatment. In other words, receipt 
of that confidential information is ‗an inseparable part of the health care,‘ it is vital to the proper discharge 
of the general duty imposed on practitioners.‖) (citations omitted); State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 895 
(S.D. 1979) (finding that confidentiality may be inferred from a psychiatric social worker-client 
relationship if, among other things, ―[c]onfidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties‖). 
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information, such as her medical history.
141
 Thus, the need for a patient to disclose 
information within these relationships justifies and compels the implied obligation of 
confidentiality. 
SOLICITATION 
Eight courts analyzing a claim for implied confidentiality considered whether and 
how information was solicited although no court considered this factor as solely 
determinative.
142
  Instead, it was seen as one of many factors relevant in their analysis.
143
 
The Fifth Circuit in Smith v. Snap-On Tools,
144
 a dispute over the alleged confidential 
disclosure of a novel ratchet made from parts of two existing tools, held that ―[w]hen a 
manufacturer has actively solicited disclosure from an inventor, then made use of the 
disclosed material, the manufacturer may be liable for use or disclosure of the secret in 
the absence of any expressed understanding as to confidentiality.‖145 
                                                 
141
 Pierce, 422 S.E.2d at 374. 
142
 See, e.g., Moore v. Marty Gilman, 965 F. Supp. 203, 215 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding in a claim for breach 
of implied confidentiality that ―[d]efendants did not solicit plaintiffs or do anything to foster the impression 
that it was their regular practice to seek out and buy ideas of others‖); Meyer v. Christie, 2007 WL 3120695 
at *4 (D. Kan.); Jackson v. LSI Industries, Inc., 2005 WL 1383180 at * 3 (M.D. Ala.) (finding in a claim 
for breach of implied contract  for confidentiality and a promise to pay for an idea that ―[i]f Defendant is 
requesting that the Plaintiff disclose his idea, most Courts will find that such requests or solicitation implies 
a promise to pay for the idea, if the Defendant uses it.‖); Enberg v. Syndicast Serv., Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 
309, 323-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that ―[w]e do not believe that the unsolicited submission of an 
idea to a potential employee or potential business partner…presents a triable issue of fact for 
confidentiality.‖). 
143
 See, e.g., DPT Lab., LTD. v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., 1999 WL 33289709 (W.D. Tex.) (finding that 
―confidentiality may be implied when the recipient actively solicits the disclosure.‖); Phillips v. Frey, 20 
F.3d 623, 632 (5th  Cir. 1994); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953); Research, 
Analysis & Dev., Inc., v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54, 56 (Cl. Ct. 1985) (finding that although unsolicited 
data was disclosed, an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality was formed on other factors such as 
preexisting laws governing confidential disclosure to the government). 
144
 833 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1987). 
145
 Id. at 580. 
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Courts seemed to deduce that solicited information was more likely more 
sensitive than unsolicited disclosures and, as a result, this information was more likely to 
be seen as being implicitly disclosed in confidence.  Or, perhaps courts felt more 
comfortable placing the onus of rebutting an inference of confidentiality on those who 
solicit information. Those who solicit information as part of a transaction have the power 
to shape their offer and, as a result, are in better position to explicitly dispel any notion of 
confidentiality.  The absence of solicitation was also seen as a significant factor by 
courts. Courts typically found that unsolicited disclosures did not support a finding of 
implied confidentiality.
146
 This is because unsolicited information often resulted in a 
disclosure of information before confidentiality was agreed upon.  
PUBLIC POLICY 
Six courts explicitly considered public policy when analyzing implied 
confidentiality disputes.  Public policy was less important in disputes involving implied-
in-fact agreements for confidentiality than it was in what courts referred to as implied-in-
law agreements and fiduciary relationships.  Public policy was invoked when the 
dynamics of a particular relationship were such that justice demanded it, not when there 
was a mutual agreement of confidentiality between the parties.
147
 For example, the 
attorney-client relationship requires confidentiality in order for the relationship to be 
                                                 
146
 See, e.g., Smith, 833 F.2d at 580 (finding that there is no implied confidential relationship where 
plaintiff ―disclosed the invention of his own initiative…[and] without discussing pecuniary recompense for 
his suggestion‖); Moore v. Marty Gilman, 965 F. Supp. 203, 215 (D. Mass. 1997); Rogers v. Desa Int‘l, 
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (emphasizing the unsolicited nature of the disclosed 
information in rejecting a claim for implied confidentiality). 
147
 Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., Inc., 2000 WL 979664 (C.D. Cal.) (holding that ―[a]n action for breach of 
confidence ‗is not based upon apparent intentions of the involved parties; it is an obligation created by law 
for reasons of justice‘ and ‗where in fact the parties made no promise.‘‖) (citations omitted). The court 
further specified that ―a breach of confidence claim is not limited to circumstances were a fiduciary 
relationship exists between the parties.‖). Id. 
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effective. An attorney cannot offer effective legal representation if his client will hold 
back information for fear that it is not safe with his attorney. Thus, the law supports this 
confidentiality in order to further the public benefit gained by effective counsel.  Implied-
in-fact confidentiality agreements and public policy were not seen as mutually exclusive, 
though.  Rather, they were both seen as factors that supported the imposition of implied 
confidentiality.  
The courts‘ consideration of public policy was most apparent in cases involving 
the physician-patient relationship and other relationships involving a high degree of trust 
that society has an interest in maintaining.
148
 The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Alsip v. 
Johnson City Medical Center,
149
 a case involving a spouse‘s request for the 
communications between her husband, a deceased patient, and doctor after a surgery 
mishap, held that the covenant of confidentiality between physicians and patients ―arises 
not only from the implied understanding of the agreement between the patient and the 
doctor, but also from a policy concern that such private and potentially embarrassing 
information should be protected from public view.‖150 
In order to determine if an implied confidential evidentiary privilege exists, the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota in South Dakota v. Martin laid out a four-part test, of 
which the final two parts were that the relationship should be, in the opinion of the 
relevant community, one that should be fostered and that the benefit of confidentiality 
                                                 
148
 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 214 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1977); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 
482, 484 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982); Ghayoumi v. McMillan, 2006 WL 1994556 (Tenn. Ct. App.). 
149
 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006). 
150
 Id. at 726 (citing Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 407 (Tenn. 2002)). 
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outweighs the benefit gained by transparency.
151
 Here, the court used a balancing test for 
public policy, weighing the societal benefit of confidentiality against the public‘s and 
litigant‘s need for information. The dispute in this case centered around whether a 
telephone communication between a criminal defendant and psychiatric social worker in 
which the defendant told the social worker,―I just killed somebody,‖ was privileged.152  
Public policy could also serve to invalidate an implied covenant of confidentiality 
in limited circumstances, as with all other contract terms.
153
 In Alsip, the court said that: 
For example,...the covenant [of confidentiality] is voided when a doctor 
determines that a patient's illness presents a foreseeable risk to third 
parties; in such circumstances, the doctor has a duty to break the patient's 
confidence and risks no civil liability when he does so. State law also 
requires doctors to report ―any wound or other injury inflicted by means of 
a knife, pistol, gun, or other deadly weapon, or by other means of 
violence‖ to police, in clear violation of the covenant of confidentiality, in 
order to promote vital societal interests in public safety, law enforcement, 
and crime deterrence. Public policy as reflected in state law also vitiates 
the covenant of confidentiality by requiring doctors to report suspected 
child abuse, sexual assault, and instances of venereal disease in minors 
who are thirteen and under. Thus, the covenant of confidentiality is not 
absolute and can be voided when its enforcement would compromise the 
needs of society.
154
 
 
Thus, a public policy in favor of confidentiality is a significant factor for courts in 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality, but only to the extent that it is not 
outweighed by countervailing public interests such as public safety, law enforcement, and 
crime deterrence. The court found that the defendant‘s statement was not privileged 
                                                 
151
 South Dakota v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 895 (S.D. 1978). 
152
 Id. 
153
 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 214 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1977) (stating that ―[i]t is not disputed 
that under our public policy the right of confidentiality is less than absolute….In no case, however, has the 
curiosity or education of the medical profession superseded the duty of confidentiality.‖); Alsip v. Johnson 
City Medical Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tenn. 2006)(citing Planters Gin Co. v. Federal Compress & 
Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tenn.2002)). 
154
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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because there was ―nothing in the record which would indicate that the conversation was 
made in confidence or with the expectation of confidentiality.‖155  
CONCLUSION 
The cases revealed that courts look to the contexts of party and industry custom, 
the presence and nature of negotiations, the nature of the relationship between the parties, 
the purpose of the disclosure, whether and how the information was solicited, the timing 
of the disclosure, the presence and nature of an accompanying transaction, and public 
policy when determining if an implied obligation of confidentiality exists.  
While no one factor seemed to dominate the analysis, courts considered 
developed relationships, the ability to negotiate, unequal bargaining power, and 
entrenched normative expectations of confidentiality key components of implied 
obligations of confidentiality. Courts seemed to look for two main factors in their 
analysis: mutual agreement between the parties and one party being more vulnerable to 
harm or coercion than the other. The courts‘ search for mutuality is reflected in the 
courts‘ attempts to locate and support the shared goals and expectations of the parties. 
The courts‘ emphasis on vulnerability is seen in their attempts to protect those who need 
to disclose information but are limited in their ability to obtain an explicit confidentiality 
agreement. 
According to courts, if confidentiality was a regular and accepted practice in a 
given context, a discloser‘s reliance on that custom is reasonable. Courts also looked to 
see whether the parties negotiated for confidentiality.  Some courts viewed a lack of 
negotiation as evidence that no confidentiality agreement was reached. Other courts 
                                                 
155
 Id. at 896. 
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viewed an individual‘s failure to request confidentiality when presented with the 
opportunity to do so as evidence that no agreement was reached.  Some courts looked to 
see if negotiation for confidentiality was even possible, like with a website‘s terms-of-use 
agreement. In these instances, other contextual factors became more important to the 
court since a true negotiation of terms did not occur. 
The nature of the relationship between the parties was important for courts 
looking for evidence of a mutual agreement of confidentiality or unequal bargaining 
power. Courts consistently found that longer, developed relationships were evidence of 
an implied obligation of confidentiality. The nature of specific of relationships, such as 
the relationship between a doctor and her patient, also received an inference of 
confidentiality. Courts were more amenable to claims for implied confidentiality where 
the party requesting or relying on confidentiality did not have equal bargaining power 
with the recipient of the information. The reason these factors seemed important to courts 
is that implied expectations of confidentiality were more plausible in developed 
relationships and unequal bargaining power could inhibit the ability of vulnerable parties 
to negotiate for confidentiality. 
Courts considered the disclosure of information made in order to promote a 
common goal or to further develop the relationship as evidence of an implied claim of 
confidentiality. Courts seemed to recognize that if confidentiality is necessary to 
encourage disclosure, or if it is necessary for any given disclosure to be effective, then an 
inference of confidentiality is more reasonable there than in relationships where 
confidentiality seems unnecessary. Courts also seemed to deduce that solicited 
information was more evocative of a bargain or transaction and, as a result, solicited 
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information was more likely to be seen as being implicitly disclosed in confidence in 
exchange for the information. 
The timing of the disclosure of information was significant; courts were loathe to 
imply confidentiality when disclosures occurred before a promise of confidentiality was 
secured or before a substantive relationship was formed. Finally, courts looked to public 
policy both to support and defeat claims of implied confidentiality.  
Ultimately, courts seemed to be trying to ascertain two things: 1) what was the 
true agreement of the parties and 2) does the relationship, by its nature, require an 
implied obligation of confidentiality? Using these two frames, courts were able to parse 
the factors that could help them answer these questions. Each factor considered by courts 
could and should be part of any decision-making framework.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
HOW THE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION DISCLOSED AFFECTS IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Recall Nissenbaum‘s theory of contextual integrity: Privacy and confidentiality 
cannot be adequately analyzed without looking at the informational norms within a given 
context.
1
 Nissenbaum identified four factors relevant to informational norms: 1) context, 
2) the nature of the information, 3) actors, and 4) terms of disclosure. This chapter will 
focus on the courts‘ consideration of the nature of the information in analyzing implied 
obligations of confidentiality.  
While all obligations of confidentiality involve the disclosure of information, not 
all information is the same. Some information is very sensitive, such as intimate thoughts 
and health-related information. Other information is mundane and uninteresting, such as 
an individual‘s daily routine. Some information is completely public, like the price of 
goods and services. Other information is proprietary, secret, or both, such as a company‘s 
trade secrets. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how the nature of information, 
which can vary greatly, affected the judicial analysis of implied obligations of 
confidentiality. 
Within her framework, Nissenbaum sometimes referred to the nature of 
information as the ―attributes of the information‖ or ―information types.‖2 According to 
                                                 
1
 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010). 
2
 Id. at 143. 
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Nissenbaum, the nature of the information concerns what the information was about, or, 
as James Rachels has put it, ―the kind and degree of knowledge.‖3 Nissenbaum stated, 
―Informational norms render certain attributes appropriate or inappropriate in certain 
contexts under certain conditions.‖4 As an example, she observed that physicians can ask 
about the intimate details of their patients‘ bodies, but employers generally cannot do the 
same of their employees.
5
 
The concept of ―the nature of the information‖ is expansive. It seems virtually 
impossible to create an exhaustive taxonomy for the category.
6
 Nissenbaum noted this 
problem herself when she stated that the concept of the nature of the information 
―recognizes an indefinite array of possibilities.‖7 Thus, the goal of this chapter is simply 
to identify which attributes had a noticeable impact on the courts‘ decisions. The cases 
revealed that courts regularly and often explicitly relied on the nature of the information 
when analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality.  For example, in Resnick v. 
Resnick, a business dispute between brothers, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
                                                 
3
 Id. (quoting James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4(4) PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 323, 371 (1975)). 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Indeed, Nissenbaum did not even define the ―nature of the information,‖ stating: 
Those who may be expecting a precise definition of information type or attribute will be 
disappointed, for I rely throughout on an intuitive sense, assuming that it is as adequate 
for the explication of contextual integrity as for many important practices and polices 
successfully managed in society with nothing more. One need look no further than the 
endless forms we complete, the menus we select from, the shopping lists we compile, the 
genres of music we listen to…and the terms we submit to search engines to grasp how at 
ease we are with information types and attributes…. In general, attribute schemes will 
have co-evolved with contexts and not be readily accessible to fixed and finite 
representations. 
Id. at 144. 
7
 Id. 
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District of New York excluded loan application information from a potential implied 
obligation of confidentiality between a bank and its depositors.
8
 Here, a banking and trust 
company claimed it was under an implied obligation of confidentiality not to disclose its 
banking relationship with one of the other parties to the lawsuit. The court suggested that 
while some information was implicitly confidential, it was not clear that the bank was 
under an implied obligation to keep a lending relationship confidential.
9
 
Of the 132 cases analyzed in this dissertation, 44 explicitly considered the nature 
of the information relevant in analyzing a claim of implied confidentiality. The remaining 
cases did not expressly mention the nature of the information, though it may have been a 
factor in the decisions. This analysis of the nature of the information occurred in many 
different types of disputes, including suits involving banking relationships,
10
 implied 
covenants of confidentiality in medical-care contracts,
11
 trade secret misappropriation,
12
 
patent ownership and infringement,
13
 requests for information under the Freedom of 
                                                 
8
 1990 WL 164968 (S.D.N.Y.). 
9
 Id. at *7. 
10
 Resnick v. Resnick, 1990 WL 164968 (S.D.N.Y.); Twiss v. New Jersey, 591 A.2d 913 (N.J. 1991); 
Graney Dev. Corp. v. Tasken, 92 Misc. 2d 764 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1978); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 
1087 (Penn. 1998). 
11
 Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.2d 
482 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div.1982); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1977). 
12
 Rogers v. Desa Int‘l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 955 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Daily Int‘l Sales Corp. v. Eastman 
Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
13
 FMC Corp. v. Guthery, 2009 WL 485280 (D.N.J.); Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info., LLC, 2010 WL 743878 
(D. Or.); Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis, Inc., 2005 WL 6220720 (C.D. Cal.). 
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Information Act,
14
 and general contract and business-related disputes.
15
 Only one case 
involved an online dispute.
16
 
The nature of the information was considered by courts according to type. This 
chapter identifies the different types of information that have been significant to courts 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. The cases revealed that, consistent with 
the courts‘ consideration of context, courts tended to find implied obligations of 
confidentiality in situations involving information that, if disclosed, could harm a 
vulnerable party.  This was revealed in courts‘ holdings that sensitive, secret, and 
proprietary information all could harm the discloser of information if confidence was 
breached by the recipient. Courts also seemed to protect information that intrinsically 
could be expected to remain confidential, which is another trait of sensitive and 
proprietary information.  
Courts were most likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality where 
confidentiality was instrumental to the disclosure; that is, it was unlikely that the 
information would have been disclosed without an obligation of confidentiality. Courts 
also found that some kinds of information, like secrets, sensitive health information, and 
valuable proprietary information, likely evoke a heightened sense of confidentiality in the 
recipients of information. Courts seemed to recognize that an inference of confidentiality 
                                                 
14
 Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2010); Council on American-
Islamic Relations, Cal. v. FBI, 2010 WL 4024806 (S.D. Cal); Roth v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 656 F. Supp. 2d 
153, 165 (D.D.C. 2009). 
15
 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1979). 
16
 Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info., LLC, 2010 WL 743878 (D. Or.).. 
 114 
was much more reasonable when the disclosed information intrinsically evoked a 
heightened sense of gravitas in the recipient. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the numbers of cases that addressed each type of 
information: 
Figure 1: The Type of Information Considered by Courts 
Type of information Number of Cases 
Secret information 20 
Highly personal information 16 
Proprietary or useful information 15 
Information exposing discloser or subject to physical harm 8 
Information that is likely to be shared 5 
 
None of the courts articulated a specific framework or theory for why the nature 
of the disclosed information was important. The courts often simply drew attention to the 
nature of the information and did not detail their analysis.  Thus, the picture of what 
information attributes courts consider important is largely drawn from inferences. This 
chapter is an attempt to analyze these inferences, which will hopefully clarify the courts‘ 
reasoning. By identifying the many ways in which the type of the information disclosed 
was important in judicial decision-making, the important factors and underlying 
justifications for finding implied obligations of confidentiality can become clear. 
SECRET INFORMATION 
Courts placed great significance on whether the information disclosed was a 
secret. For the purposes of this analysis, a secret is defined as ―[s]omething kept hidden 
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from others or known only to oneself or to a few.‖17 Many of the cases in which secrecy 
was a relevant factor in a claim for implied confidentiality were disputes involving trade 
secrets. Part of the reason courts considered secrets important in these disputes is that 
information must be generally unknown or the owner must have attempted to protect the 
information in order for it to be eligible for trade secret protection.
18
 In determining 
whether information was adequately protected, courts often were asked to determine if an 
agreement of implied confidentiality was reasonable in a given context.
19
 This is 
particularly true when dealing with ideas that were pitched to potential investors or 
businesses.
20
 While secret information contributed to finding an implied obligation of 
confidentiality, publicly known information decreased the likelihood of such an 
obligation.
21
 
For example, the case of Keane v. Fox Television Stations
22
 involved a dispute 
over a television producer‘s alleged confidential disclosure of the idea for the popular 
                                                 
17
 Secret, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (May 10, 2011), 
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/secret. It is important to differentiate the concept of 
secrecy from the larger concept of privacy, which includes secrets as well as other concepts such as control 
over information, blackmail, and the right to make decisions about one‘s body and family. In distinguishing 
between secrets and private information, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated in Humphers v. First 
Interstate Bank of Oregon, ―Secrecy involves intentional concealment. ‗But privacy need not hide; and 
secrecy hides far more than what is private.‘‖ 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985) (quoting SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 11 
(1983)); see also DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2009). 
18
 See, e.g., Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex.2004) (―The critical 
threshold requirement for pursuing [a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret or misappropriation of an 
idea] is secrecy/confidentiality.‖). 
19
 See, e.g., Universal Reinsurance Co. LTD., v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 1999 WL 771357 at *10 
(S.D.N.Y.); Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis Inc., 2005 WL 6220720 at *10 (C.D. Cal.) (analyzing how secret 
information was for purposes of an implied obligation of confidentiality in the context of a patent dispute); 
Williams v. Coffee County Bank, 308 S.E.2d 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
20
 Torah Soft LTD. v. Drosnin, 2001 WL 1425381 (S.D.N.Y) (finding no implied confidentiality where an 
idea was disclosed in a letter to others besides the alleged confidant.).  
21
 See, e.g., Keane, 297 F. Supp. 2d  at 941. 
22
 297 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
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―American Idol‖ television show to a television network. Here, the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Texas said the fact that the producer had advertised his idea for a 
show over the Internet before disclosing it to the television station ―completely 
eviscerates his ability to characterize that concept as a trade secret or as an idea that was 
conveyed in confidence to a select group.‖23 
Another case that reflects the importance the courts assign to information being at 
least relatively secret for a valid claim of implied confidentiality is Star Patrol 
Enterprises v. Saban Entertainment.
24
 This case involved a breach of confidentiality 
claim based on an implied-in-fact contract, which was allegedly formed when an 
entertainment company pitched an idea for the Mighty Morphin‘ Power Rangers 
television show to television producers. The Ninth Circuit found that the entertainment 
company successfully alleged the elements of breach of confidentiality because it alleged 
that the idea for the television production had not been made public.
25
  
If information was easily discoverable, courts were unlikely to find an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. A good example of this is the case of Flotec v. Southern 
Research.
26
 This case involved a trade secret dispute between a manufacturer of an 
oxygen regulator (Flotec) and a competitor (SRI), which was given access to some of the 
disputed information by Flotec allegedly in implied confidence. However, the 
information was not completely a secret. The information had been in the open market 
for several years, and Flotec‘s product was susceptible to reverse engineering.  
                                                 
23
 Id. at 941 (emphasis added). 
24
 1997 WL 683327 (9th Cir.). 
25
 Id. at *2. 
26
 16 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana was asked to 
determine if the disclosure of the trade secret was made with an implied obligation of 
confidentiality.  The court found no implied confidentiality and stated that the defendant 
―knew that the Flotec components shown in the drawings had been on the market for a 
couple of years and were readily susceptible to reverse engineering by any skilled 
company interested in trying to compete.‖27 The court found that, among other reasons, 
because the information was freely available, Flotec should have known that the 
information was a not secret and the disclosure was not made in confidence.
28
  
However, one court found that the fact that information was public did not 
prevent a finding of implied confidentiality. In Smith v. Dravo Corp.,
29
  Dravo Corp. 
approached the designer of a proprietary shipping container ostensibly about purchasing 
the design. Based on some preliminary negotiations, the designer sent Dravo detailed 
information concerning its business. However, Dravo ultimately rejected the purchase 
and designed its own container that was allegedly similar to the designer‘s container. 
Although the designer passed away before the lawsuit, his estate representatives brought 
a claim for breach of confidentiality and sought to enjoin Dravo‘s use of the container. 
Dravo claimed that the container design could have been easily obtained through public 
inspection, as the containers were in public use. The court responded: 
It is unquestionably lawful for a person to gain possession, through proper 
means, of his competitor's product and, through inspection and analysis, 
create a duplicate, unless, of course, the item is patented. But the mere fact 
that such lawful acquisition is available does not mean that he may, 
                                                 
27
 Id. at 1007. 
28
 Id. at 1006-07. 
29
 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953). 
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through a breach of confidence, gain the information in usable form and 
escape the efforts of inspection and analysis.
30
 
 
Thus, a lack of secrecy was not a bar to an implied obligation of confidentiality for this 
court. While no court articulated exactly how secret information must be in order to 
contribute to the creation of an implied obligation of confidentiality, most courts agreed 
that the information should at least not be widely known or ―public‖ information.31 
However, if a recipient entered into a confidential relationship because it was easier to 
obtain or use information when delivered by the discloser, it appears that an implied 
obligation of confidentiality can still exist even if the information is publically available. 
In other words, if the confidentiality agreement provided the defendant some kind of 
advantage that it would not have had otherwise, it is still enforceable.  
HIGHLY PERSONAL INFORMATION 
In sixteen cases, courts considered highly personal information an important 
factor in the creation of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Highly personal 
information seemed to be most significant to courts when dealing with health-related 
information.
32
 However, the courts‘ logic seemingly could include any personal 
                                                 
30
 Id. at 375. 
31
 See, e.g., Universal Reinsurance Co. LTD. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 1999 WL 771357 at *10 
(S.D.N.Y.) (―[P]laintiffs must show the existence of an implied-in-fact confidentiality agreement. As 
discussed above, plaintiffs‘ information in this case is not the type that warrants confidentiality protection. 
They have failed to refute defendant‘s evidence that all of the plaintiffs‘ information is publicly available 
and that the program was not novel.‖); Williams v. Coffee Cnty. Bank, 308 S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1983) (―It would be anomalous indeed to permit appellant to recover for appellees‘ breach of an implied 
duty of confidentiality when the only information disclosed was a matter of public record and undisputedly 
was not confidential.‖); Daily Int‘l Sales Corp. v Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1983) (noting that one factor courts could consider in determining if an implied obligation of 
confidentiality exists is the ―degree to which the information has been placed in the public domain or 
rendered readily accessible through publication or marketing efforts.‖). 
32
 See, e.g., Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006) (recognizing an implied 
covenant of confidentiality in medical-care contracts between physicians and their patients due to the 
intimate nature of the information shared within the relationship); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 
484-46 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982); Crippen v. Charter Southland Hosp., Inc., 534 So. 2d 286 (Ala. 1988). 
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information such as intimate thoughts or conversations, embarrassing personal facts, or 
even financial information.  
An example of the courts‘ focus on health-related information is the case of 
Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Division.
33
 This worker‘s compensation case 
involved an employer‘s request to question a physician treating one of its employees 
outside of the presence of the employee and his counsel. The employee, Billy Overstreet, 
had complained of hearing loss and claimed it was caused by his employment by the 
defendant, TRW, as a painter, a tow motor operator on the shipping dock, and an 
assembly line worker. Overstreet saw a physician who concluded that his hearing loss 
was caused, in part, by his employment with TRW.  
However, TRW denied Overstreet‘s claim for worker compensation and 
Overstreet brought suit seeking worker‘s compensation benefits. TRW requested 
permission to interview Overstreet‘s physician out of the presence of Overstreet and his 
counsel because TRW asserted that Overstreet‘s injury was not due to his employment 
with TRW. The Supreme Court of Tennessee then analyzed whether Overstreet‘s 
physician was bound by an implied obligation of confidentiality to refrain from 
disclosing information relating to his examination of Overstreet. 
 The court noted in this case that obligations of confidentiality between a patient 
and physician can be implied based not only an implied understanding between the 
patient and doctor, ―but also from a policy concern that such private and potentially 
embarrassing information should be protected from public view.‖34 The court stated, 
                                                 
33
 256 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008). 
34
 Id. at 633-34. These two different grounds for implied confidentiality are understood as confidentiality 
implied ―in fact‖ and ―in law.‖ Id. 
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―This confidentiality in care-giving exists because ‗[t]o the physician we bare our 
bodies…in confidence that what is seen and heard will remain unknown to others.‘‖35 
This statement reflects an awareness that highly personal information is likely to be 
disclosed with an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
In the case of Doe v. Roe,
36
 the court seemed to give great weight to the sensitive 
nature of the health-related information when determining an implied obligation of 
confidentiality existed. Here, a former patient of a psychiatrist brought a claim for breach 
of confidentiality against the psychiatrist after the psychiatrist published a book that 
revealed information about the patient during treatment.  The Supreme Court of New 
York County, New York found: 
[A] physician, who enters into an agreement with a patient to provide 
medical attention, impliedly covenants to keep in confidence all 
disclosures made by the patient concerning the patient's physical or mental 
condition as well as all matters discovered by the physician in the course 
of examination or treatment. This is particularly and necessarily true of the 
psychiatric relationship, for in the dynamics of psychotherapy ―[t]he 
patient is called upon to discuss in a candid and frank manner personal 
material of the most intimate and disturbing nature.... He is expected to 
bring up all manner of socially unacceptable instincts and urges, immature 
wishes, perverse sexual thoughts – in short, the unspeakable, the 
unthinkable, the repressed.‖37 
 
One judge found that the health information received by pharmacists also made 
implied obligations of confidentiality likely. The case of Suarez v. Pierard
38
 involved, 
among other claims, a claim of breach of implied contract of confidentiality brought by a 
                                                 
35
 Id. at 644 (citing Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tenn. 2006)). 
36
 93 Misc. 2d 201 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1977). 
37
 Id. at 210 (citing Marvin S. Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. 
L. REV. 401, 405-406 (1957)). 
38
 663 N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996). 
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pharmacy customer against a pharmacist after the pharmacist disclosed the customer‘s 
responses to questions about her mental health treatment and condition to third parties. 
The majority of the court found that the customer failed to adequately plead an implied-
in-fact contractual duty of confidentiality. However, in a concurrence, one judge 
observed that ―[pharmacists] maintain extensive patient records and counsel patients on 
drug interactions. In doing so, they can literally reconstruct a patient‘s medical history. 
Surely the public has a right to expect that pharmacists will keep the health conditions 
and treatments of their clients in confidence.‖39 Although the judge reiterated that the 
facts of the current dispute did not support a claim for breach of an implied contract of 
confidentiality, this concurrence further demonstrates that sensitive information can be 
relevant to the creation of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Personal financial information also was considered sensitive by courts in implied 
confidentiality disputes.
40
 In the case of McGuire v. Shubert,
41
 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether a bank‘s duty of confidentiality to a 
customer can be implied. The court observed, ―Based on common law principles of 
contract and agency, a number of jurisdictions have held that a bank has an implied 
contractual duty, as a matter of law, to keep financial information concerning a depositor 
confidential.‖42 The court‘s rationale was partly that ―[i]t is inconceivable that a bank 
                                                 
39
 Id. at 1044 (Breslin, J., concurring). 
40
 See, e.g., Twiss v. Dept. of Treasury, Office of Financial Mgmt., 591 A.2d 913, 919-20 (N.J. 1991) 
(recognizing that New Jersey has recognized an implied obligation of confidentiality in bank records); 
Const. Defense Fund v. Humphrey, 1992 WL 164734 (E.D. Pa.) (―The general view…is that a bank has an 
implied contractual duty of confidentiality and can be held liable to its customer for disclosing information 
on the customer‘s accounts without the customer‘s consent or other justification.‖). 
41
 722 A.2d 1087 (Penn. 1998). 
42
 Id. at 1090. 
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would at any time consider itself at liberty to disclose the intimate details of its 
depositors‘ accounts.‖43 This focus on ―intimate‖ information demonstrates that some 
courts look to the sensitivity of financial information in determining whether there is an 
implied obligation of confidentiality.
44
 
It appears that when considering obligations of confidentiality that were implied-
in-fact, courts looked at whether the sensitive nature of the information would serve as a 
signal to the recipient that the information was disclosed in confidence.
45
 This is because 
implied-in-fact obligations are based on the understanding between the parties. Here 
social norms can play a large role in determining whether an implied obligation of 
confidentiality was reasonable or likely.  Courts seemed to reason that sensitive 
information was more likely than non-sensitive information to have been disclosed 
according to an implicit promise of confidentiality. The rationale for this logic is that the 
recipient would or should have realized that sensitive information is routinely disclosed 
in confidence, thus an express promise of confidentiality need not be made. Instead, as a 
matter of course, it is reasonable to expect and rely on implied confidentiality when 
disclosing sensitive information. 
                                                 
43
 Id. at 1091. 
44
 Cf Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgmt. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (recognizing that  while 
New York recognizes an implied duty of confidentiality between a bank and its depositors, it does not 
recognize such a duty between a bank and its borrowers because one who defaults on his debts to a 
merchant cannot expect that his default will be kept a complete secret); Resnick v. Resnick, 1990 WL 
164968 (S.D.N.Y.) (recognizing that no implied obligation of confidentiality exists for a bank regarding the 
status of a borrower‘s loan, but it is unclear whether banks are under an implied obligation of 
confidentiality concerning other pieces of information regarding their lending relationship with a 
borrower); Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 92 Misc. 2d 764, 768 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1978) (finding that 
information about the status of a borrower‘s loan ―was not information that the borrower would normally 
expect would be kept confidential. One who defaults on his debts owed to a merchant cannot expect that his 
default will be kept a secret.‖). 
45
 See, e.g., Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2010) (―‗[T]he texts 
of the emails undermine any implication that the documents were meant to be protected by a [confidential] 
privilege.‘‖).  
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In situations where confidentiality was implied in the absence of an understanding 
the between the parties regarding confidentiality, courts seemed to value the potential for 
harm if sensitive information were disclosed. The focus in these cases was not the 
agreement of the parties, but rather furthering some policy through implied 
confidentiality. In the case of health-related information, courts seemed to try to protect 
vulnerable parties who disclosed information.  This concern for vulnerability is consistent 
with the courts‘ consideration of context in Chapter Two. 
PROPRIETARY OR USEFUL INFORMATION 
In fifteen cases, courts considered the proprietary and useful nature of information 
when determining whether implied obligations of confidentiality existed. Proprietary 
information was information individuals and business considered to be their property. 
Useful information was any information that had a utility for individuals and 
organizations and was typically commercial in nature. Much like with sensitive 
information, the disclosure of proprietary information can serve as a signal to recipients 
of the information that the disclosure is expected to be confidential.   Specifically, in 
commercial settings, courts seemed to hold that proprietary and useful information was 
likely to be disclosed via an implied obligation of confidentiality.  
A contrasting case is Densy v. Wilder,
46
 which involved a dispute over an idea for 
a film.  Here, the plaintiff, Victor Densy, pitched an idea for a film based on the life of 
famed cave explorer Floyd Collins to the secretary of Billy Wilder, a writer, producer, 
and director for the Paramount Pictures Corporation. Densy telephoned Wilder‘s 
secretary to request to speak to Wilder. Wilder‘s secretary insisted that Densy disclose 
                                                 
46
 46 Cal. 2d 715 (Cal. 1956). 
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the story idea to her, and he did. He claimed that the secretary promised to pay Densy if 
Wilder used the idea. Densy never heard back from Wilder, but years later Paramount 
released a film that closely resembled the synopsis and historical facts that Densy 
disclosed to Wilder‘s secretary.   Densy claimed that Wilder and Paramount violated their 
breach of implied contract to either pay Densy or keep the idea he pitched confidential.   
The Supreme Court of California held that ―[t]he law will not imply a promise to 
pay for an idea from the mere fact that the idea has been conveyed, is valuable, and has 
been used for profit; this is true even though the conveyance has been made with the hope 
or expectation that some obligation will ensue.‖47 The language of the court reflected its 
decision that the mere fact that information was valuable could not, standing alone, 
justify an implied obligation of confidentiality.  Regardless, it is clear that some courts 
found the useful or proprietary nature of information significant in analyzing implied 
obligations of confidentiality.
48
 
                                                 
47
 Id. at 739. 
48
 See, e.g., Sentinel Prod. Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass.) (finding that an implied 
confidential relationship could exist where one business received information about a product from a 
potential seller with knowledge that the product was eligible for patent protection and reason to know that 
the seller was disclosing a trade secret); Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54 (Cl. 
Ct. 1985) (referencing the propriety nature of plaintiff‘s information in finding that an implied-in-fact 
contract existed prohibiting the Air Force from disclosing the plaintiff‘s proposal regarding aerospace 
research and development); Prescott v. Morton Int‘l., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 404 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality existed 
where the discloser of information made the proprietary nature of the information clear to the recipients); 
Kleck v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 819, 824 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (―[T]he great weight of 
authority requires that an idea be novel before it will be protected under a breach of confidence or other 
quasi-contractual theory.‖); Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 300 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding 
that ―New York law implied a requirement that ‗when one submits an idea to another, no promise to pay 
for its use may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if the elements of novelty and originality 
are absent‘‖). 
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For example, in the patent dispute Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp,
49
 the Fourth Circuit was 
asked to determine if an implied confidentiality agreement existed between an inventor 
and potential purchaser. The court stated: 
It is argued that there was no confidential relationship existing between 
complainant and defendant with respect to the disclosure of complainant's 
invention; but this contention is groundless. Complainant offered to 
disclose his invention to defendant with a view of selling it to defendant, 
and so stated in his letter. Defendant was interested in the proposition and 
invited the disclosure, otherwise it would not have seen complainant's 
specification and drawings until the patent was granted. While there was 
no express agreement that defendant was to hold the information so 
disclosed as a confidential matter and to make no use of it unless it should 
purchase the invention, we think that in equity and good conscience such 
an agreement was implied; and having obtained the disclosure under such 
circumstances, defendant ought not be heard to say that there was no 
obligation to respect the confidence thus reposed in it.
50
 
 
The court here focused on, among other things, the signaling effect of the valuable and 
proprietary nature of the disclosed information in order to find an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. The court seemed to reason that because the information was valuable, it 
should be obvious that the inventor would not disclose it to the potential purchaser 
without restrictions on its use. Thus, it was reasonable to find an implied obligation of 
confidentiality.  
INFORMATION EXPOSING DISCLOSER OR SUBJECT TO PHYSICAL HARM 
Some information is kept confidential because revealing it could subject the 
discloser or subject of the information to physical harm from a third party. For example, 
the identity of police informants and related pieces of information often are kept 
confidential because if they were to be made public, criminals implicated by the 
                                                 
49
 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935). 
50
 Id. at 923. 
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informant might seek to harm him. Courts considered this factor significant in eight cases 
in which the courts were called upon to determine if an implied obligation of 
confidentiality existed between the discloser and recipient of information. All of these 
cases involved disputes under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  In these cases, 
requests were filed for the identities and other information concerning confidential 
government informants.  The agencies responded to the requests by invoking a FOIA 
exemption to disclosing the information. The agencies claimed an implied obligation of 
confidentiality between the government and their confidential sources.  
For example, in Council on American-Islamic Relations v. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation,
51
 the Council on American-Islamic Relations requested documents 
regarding government surveillance of Muslim groups.  In response, the FBI invoked 
FOIA Exemption 7(D), which allows an agency to withhold records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes that could reasonably be expected to disclose the 
identity of a confidential source.
52
 According to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California, ―Exemption 7(D) applies if the agency establishes that a source has 
provided information under either an express or implied promise of confidentiality.‖53 
According to the court, the FBI was attempting to protect ―the names and identifying 
information of telecommunications companies, internet[sic] service providers, and 
financial institutions which have provided information to the FBI in furtherance of the 
FBI‘s criminal and national security investigations.‖54  
                                                 
51
 2010 WL 4024806 (S.D. Cal). 
52
 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). 
53
 2010 WL 4024806 at *14 (citations omitted). 
54
 2010 WL 4024806 at *15. 
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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California extensively 
referenced the leading precedent on implied confidentiality for government sources in 
law enforcement investigations, U.S. Department of Justice v. Landano.
55
 The court 
stated: 
The Supreme Court in Landano rejected the argument that ―an assurance 
of confidentiality can be inferred whenever an individual source 
communicates with the FBI because of the risk of reprisal or other 
negative attention inherent in criminal investigations.‖ Instead, the agency 
must explain why, in the particular case, there was an implied assurance of 
confidentiality, although it may rely on factors such as ―the nature of the 
crime investigated and the witness' relation to it.‖ In the present case, the 
FBI has carried its burden with regard to any individual informants 
because it is reasonable to infer that an informant in a terrorism case 
would assume confidentiality based on the ―nature of the crime 
investigated.‖56 
 
The court ultimately concluded that the implied claim of confidentiality was supported 
because disclosure of the requested information would likely cause substantial harm to 
the sources who disclosed information to the FBI.
57
 The court seemed to reason that the 
threat of harm to the discloser of information was so great that it was reasonable to infer 
that disclosure would not have occurred without an obligation of confidentiality. Thus, 
even if a promise of confidentiality was not explicit, it was implied. 
 Several other courts adopted this logic.  In Roth v. U.S. Department of Justice,
58
 
an inmate on death row in Texas sought information from the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) under FOIA relating to the FBI‘s use of confidential sources in its  investigation of 
the inmate. The inmate claimed that this information could corroborate his claim that he 
                                                 
55
 508 U.S. 165 (1993). 
56
 Council on American-Islamic Relations v. FBI, 2010 WL 4024806 at *15 (S.D. Cal.) (citations omitted). 
57
 Id. at *16. 
58
 656 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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did not commit the four murders he was convicted of. The DOJ claimed Exemption 7(D), 
which permits the withholding or redacting of information where disclosure ―could 
reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source.‖59 Under this 
exemption, the court must determine ―whether the sources named or providing withheld 
material were in fact confidential.‖60  
Of course, confidentiality for sources can be explicitly provided, or an assurance 
of confidentiality can be reasonably inferred from the circumstances.
61
 The court found 
that ―[c]ircumstances that may indicate implied confidentiality include whether the 
informant was paid, the informant‘s relationship with the agency, the character of the 
crime at issue, and the source‘s relationship to the crime.‖62 Here, the court looked to the 
character of the crime at issue to determine the nature of the information. This analysis 
was done in order to ascertain the degree of vulnerability and likelihood of harm if the 
information is disclosed.
63
 After reviewing the documents, the court found that the 
information withheld under 7(D) had been obtained via an express or implied assurance 
of confidentiality. 
                                                 
59
 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (2009). 
60
 Roth, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 164. 
61
 Id. (citing U.S. Dep‘t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165 (1993)). 
62
 Id. 
63
 See, e.g., Richardson v. U.S. Dep‘t. of Justice, 730 F.Supp.2d 225, 237-38 (D.D.C. 2010) (―The nature of 
the crime investigated and informant‘s relation to it are the most important factors in determining whether 
implied confidentiality exists.‖); Coleman v. FBI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that 
plaintiff‘s conviction  for ―numerous violent crimes‖ including murder, rape, and kidnapping, as well as 
―the relation of the witness thereto is precisely the type that the implied confidentiality exemption 
expressed in Landano is designed to encompass‖); Skinner v. U.S. Dep‘t. of Justice, 2010 WL 3832602 
(D.D.C.) (recognizing that an implied grant of confidentiality for confidential sources has been recognized 
with respect to the cocaine trade, gang-related murder, methamphetamine trafficking operations, and other 
violent acts committed in retaliation for witnesses‘ cooperation with law enforcement). 
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found in another FOIA 
dispute, Richardson v. U.S. Department of Justice,
64
 with facts similar to Roth, that ―[i]n 
determining whether the source provided information under an implied assurance of 
confidentiality, the Court considers ‗whether the violence and risk of retaliation that 
attend this type of crime warrant an implied grant of confidentiality for such a source.‘‖65 
In Rugerio v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
66
 another FOIA case seeking information 
about the government‘s use of confidential sources, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan found that the evidence ―established that implied assurances 
of confidentiality existed here because the information given by the DEA‘s informants 
related to crimes that inherently involve violence and risk of retaliation.‖67 The court 
cited an affidavit in support of its finding that ―[d]ue to the type of information which is 
provided by the sources and the fact that the individuals are associates of the plaintiff, it 
is highly unlikely that the source would have provided information to the DEA other than 
under circumstances of implied confidentiality.‖68 
Thus, the logic of these courts seems to be that if information makes a discloser 
vulnerable to physical harm, then it is likely that confidentiality was implied because it is 
likely that the government sources would not have disclosed the information otherwise. 
This logic is consistent with the logic employed by judges who looked for evidence of the 
necessity of confidentiality in the disclosure of information. That is, if confidentiality was 
                                                 
64
 2010 WL 3191796 (D.D.C.). 
65
 Id. at *9 (citing Mays v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 234 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
66
 234 F. Supp. 2d 697 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
67
 Id. at 704. 
68
 Id. (emphasis and citations omitted). 
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necessary to keep a particular disclosure from physically harming the discloser, but no 
explicit promise of confidentiality was made, courts were likely to support an implied 
obligation of confidentiality.  Under this logic, confidentiality would be less likely to be 
recognized by the courts in contexts where confidentiality was not important to the 
discloser or unnecessary to protect the discloser of information. For example, without 
confidentiality, an eyewitness to a crime might not disclose information to the 
government. However, an eyewitness to an embarrassing celebrity slip-up might still 
agree to be interviewed because celebrities are less likely than violent criminals to 
retaliate against eyewitnesses. 
INFORMATION THAT IS LIKELY TO BE SHARED 
Some courts called upon to determine if an implied obligation of confidentiality 
existed simply asked if the disclosed information was inherently the kind of information 
that would be shared with others. This kind of information was less likely to be subject to 
an implied obligation of confidentiality than information that is traditionally kept 
confidential. Whereas the other types of information contributed to the creation of an 
obligation of information, this type actually detracted from implied obligations of 
confidentiality. This type of information was not a neutral or ―catch-all‖ category. Rather, 
some courts expressly discussed how information that is likely to be shared eroded the 
likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
A good example of this analysis is the case of Google v. Traffic Information,
69
 
which involved a patent dispute over two pieces of traffic-management software. This 
action was triggered when a software company called Traffic told the cell-phone 
                                                 
69
 2010 WL 743878 (D. Or.). 
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company T-Mobile via an e-mail marked ―confidential‖ and ―for settlement purposes 
only‖ that Google‘s patents infringed upon a Traffic patent. T-Mobile then disclosed the 
contents of that e-mail to Google, which, in anticipation of a suit against it by Traffic, 
sued Traffic for patent infringement. In the course of litigation, Traffic asserted that T-
Mobile was bound by an implied confidentiality agreement not to disclose the e-mail that 
sparked Google‘s lawsuit. However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon 
disagreed.  The court stated: 
I do not find this argument persuasive because the record in this case 
contains no evidence even of an implied confidentiality agreement 
between T-Mobile and Traffic. There is nothing inherently confidential 
about a statement accusing a third party's product of patent infringement. 
Traffic should reasonably have anticipated – and perhaps even intended-
that its claim of infringement by Google's product would be 
communicated to Google – how better for T-Mobile to refute Traffic's 
infringement claim than by seeking Google's help in explaining [its traffic 
software]?
70
 
 
 The court focused on the fact that the content of the information should have 
signaled to the discloser that it was likely to be shared with other parties.  As a result, the 
court found no implied obligation of confidentiality. Again, this logic is consistent with 
the logic of courts that look to the need for confidentiality for  disclosure to occur.
71
  
Here, it appears that the nature of the information was such that the disclosure was likely 
to occur without a promise of confidentiality. Confidentiality was largely irrelevant and 
thus unlikely to be implied. 
 It is also worth noting that this is only one of seven cases analyzed in this 
dissertation that dealt with an exclusively online disclosure of information. 
                                                 
70
 Id. at *3. 
71
 This same logic can also be applied to the sensitivity of information factor. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 
Misc. 2d 201, 210 (NY. Gen. Term. 1977) (finding that confidentiality is a necessity in the physician-
patient relationship because such intimate information is revealed within it). 
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Unfortunately, the court did not devote any analysis to the significance of the medium in 
this case. The court merely concluded there was no evidence of implied confidentiality in 
the e-mail because there was no confidentiality agreement between the parties. Instead, 
the e-mail was ―unilaterally‖ labeled confidential, which is not enough, by itself, to give 
rise to an implied obligation of confidentiality.
72
 
CONCLUSION 
The nature of the information disclosed was a significant factor for courts that 
analyzed implied obligations of confidentiality. The cases revealed that, similar to the 
way courts considered the context factor, courts focused on information that could harm a 
vulnerable party if disclosed.  Secret and proprietary information could harm the 
discloser of information if confidence was breached by the recipient. Additionally, courts 
seemed to find that information that intrinsically could be expected to connote 
confidentiality, such as highly personal information, contributed to finding an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. Conversely, disclosed information that was likely to be 
widely shared was unlikely to be part of an implied obligation of confidentiality.  
Courts were most likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality where it 
was unlikely that the information would have been disclosed without an obligation of 
confidentiality. Some information, like highly personal or sensitive health information, 
and valuable proprietary information, is likely to have connotations of confidentiality for 
the recipients of information. Courts seemed to recognize that an inference of 
confidentiality was much more reasonable when the information exchanged evoked or 
should have evoked a heightened sense of awareness of confidentiality by the recipient. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HOW THE ACTOR ATTRIBUTES AFFECT IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Often, assumptions of confidentiality are not based on the circumstances 
surrounding a disclosure of information or on the nature of what is being disclosed, but 
rather, on who is sending, receiving, or is the subject of the information. Every disclosure 
of information involves actors, and the attributes of these actors can affect implied 
obligations of confidentiality. This chapter will focus on the courts‘ consideration of 
actors and how actors‘ attributes affect implied obligations of confidentiality. 
According to Nissenbaum‘s theory of contextual integrity, privacy and 
confidentiality cannot be adequately analyzed without looking at the informational norms 
within a given context.
1
 Nissenbaum identified four factors that determine informational 
norms: 1) context, 2) the nature of the information, 3) actors, and 4) terms of disclosure.  
Actors play a large role in developing the contextual integrity of information. 
Within her framework, Nissenbaum stated that ―[i]nformational norms have three 
placeholders for actors: senders of information, recipients of information, and 
information subjects.‖2 According to Nissenbaum, the sender and recipient can be single 
or multiple individuals or collectives such as organizations and companies. However, 
since privacy is an inherently personal concept, Nissenbaum believed that only people, 
not entities like corporations, could be the ―subjects‖ of information under her theory. 
                                                 
1
 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010). 
2
 Id. at 141. 
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Nissenbaum held that ―[i]n specifying an informational norm, it is crucial to 
identify the contextual roles of all three actors [sender, recipient, and subject] to the 
extent possible; that is, the capacities in which each are acting.‖3 Nissenbaum gave the 
healthcare context as an example. She stated that ―there are numerous informational 
norms prescribing information sharing practices where the subjects and senders are 
patients themselves, and where the recipients are physicians…. Other norms apply in 
cases where the recipients are receptionists, bookkeepers, nurses, and so forth.‖4 The 
importance of actors also can be seen after the initial disclosure of information, i.e., in the 
―downstream‖ disclosure of confidential information to third parties. For example, 
Nissenbaum noted that different norms apply when a physician shares a patient‘s 
information with fellow practitioners, insurance companies, and the physician‘s spouse. 
In sum, Nissenbaum argued that our sense of privacy in disclosed information is 
almost always at least somewhat affected by the attributes and roles of the sender, 
subject, and recipient of information. She stated, ―Usually, when we mind that 
information about us is shared, we mind not simply that it is being shared but that it is 
shared in the wrong ways and with inappropriate others…. [M]ost of the time these 
requirements are tacit and the states of all parameters need not be tediously spelled out.‖5 
Nissenbaum maintained that ―it is relevant to know whether the actors are government or 
private, and in what capacity they act, among an innumerable number of possibilities.‖6 
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Of course, actors are an inherent part of every disclosure of information and every 
claim of implied confidentiality. Even if a person is not the subject of the information 
disclosed, such as with most trade secrets, there is a sender and recipient of information. 
When personal information is exchanged, the sender and subject of the information are 
often the same person, such as with a patient disclosing information to a physician.
7
 In 28 
of the 132 cases analyzed for this dissertation, courts explicitly commented on the nature 
of the actors. In the remaining cases, no significance regarding the role of the actor could 
be inferred from the courts‘ analysis. The goal of this chapter is to identify which actor 
attributes had a noticeable impact on the courts‘ decision in those 28 cases.  
The cases revealed that vulnerability and an imbalance of power or sophistication 
were the most significant actor-related factors for courts analyzing obligations of 
confidentiality.  Courts most often merely mentioned an actor‘s job title or level of 
sophistication, which seemed to indicate that the court at least recognized that attribute.
8
 
In all of the cases analyzed, information that involved a person as the subject was self-
disclosed. Thus, there was no separate analysis for the ―subject of the information‖ in 
these cases. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the numbers of cases that addressed particular attributes of 
actors: 
                                                 
7
 Id. at 142. 
8
 Obvious examples of implied confidentiality based on profession include claims of implied confidentiality 
based on a specific evidentiary privilege such as the attorney-client privilege.  In Wildearth Guardians v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado denied a claim of implied 
confidentiality based on the attorney-client privilege where an e-mail was ―shotgunned‖ to more than ten 
recipients, ―only two of whom were attorneys.‖ 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1266 (D. Colo. 2010); see also 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that employees 
categorically owe an implied duty of confidentiality to employers to protect their trade secrets and 
confidential information). 
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Figure 1: The Attributes of Actors 
Actor Attribute Number of Cases 
Vulnerability or sophistication 22 
Resources 8 
Bad-faith 3 
 
Ultimately, it appears that courts are receptive to finding an implied obligation of 
confidentiality when a discloser or subject of information is vulnerable and/or when a 
recipient of information is sophisticated. Some disclosers of information were seen as 
inherently vulnerable, such as the infirm and elderly, while others were vulnerable 
because they were significantly less sophisticated than the recipient of information. 
Courts also looked to whether an actor had more resources than the other party to a 
dispute, which in a few cases resulted in a de facto distinction between individuals and 
corporate or group actors.  Finally, several courts considered whether actors were acting 
in good faith or bad faith, suggesting that dishonest representations of trustworthiness 
could be used to encourage a potential discloser of information to unjustly place her 
confidence in the recipient. Thus, these courts found that a recipient‘s bad faith could be 
evidence of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
VULNERABILITY OR SOPHISTICATION 
If one party to a disclosure of information was more sophisticated than the other, 
courts seemed to find that there was an imbalance between the parties and that the less 
sophisticated party was vulnerable to harm. Additionally, some individuals were seen as 
inherently vulnerable, such as minors, the elderly, the feeble-minded, and the infirm. 
Similar to the vulnerability analyses in Chapters Two and Three, courts found that 
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vulnerable disclosers of information increased the likelihood of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality.
9
   
Additionally, courts seemed to find sophisticated parties more likely than 
unsophisticated parties to understand that confidentiality was implied in a given context 
because sophisticated parties were more likely to be cognizant of norms of confidentiality 
in which information is disclosed. The recipient‘s awareness of the need for 
confidentiality with vulnerable parties
10
 could be the basis for an implied-in-fact 
confidentiality agreement or confidential relationship, but it also could subject the 
recipient to an obligation of confidentiality that was created by courts in the absence of 
an understanding between the parties.
11
  
The attributes of actors in implied obligations of confidentiality were most 
significant in the healthcare context.
12
 For example, the case of Overstreet v. TRW 
Commercial Steering
13
 involved a worker‘s compensation dispute between an employer 
                                                 
9
 To reiterate, in all of the cases analyzed that involved personal information, the discloser and the subject 
of the information were the same person. All of the sensitive personal information revealed in the cases was 
self-disclosed. 
10
 See, e.g., McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Penn. 1998) (―It is inconceivable that a bank would 
at any time consider itself at liberty to disclose the intimate details of its depositors‘ accounts. Inviolate 
secrecy is one of the inherent and fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers or 
depositors.‖); Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgmt. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (―New York 
recognizes an implied duty of confidentiality between a bank and its depositors, but not between a bank and 
its borrowers.  Information about the status of a borrower‘s loan is ‗not information that the borrower 
would normally expect would be kept confidential.‘‖) (citations omitted)). 
11
 See, e.g., Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006) (―[T]he covenant of 
confidentiality arises not only from the implied understanding of the agreement between a patient and a 
doctor, but also from a policy concern that such private and potentially embarrassing information should be 
protected from public view.‖); Overstreet v. TRW Com. Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 634 (Tenn. 2008). 
12
 See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren General Hosp., 1998 WL 156997 at *12 (Ohio Ct. App.) (finding that in 
confidential relationships between physicians and patients ―there is no indication that patients bargain for 
confidentiality; rather, it is assumed‖); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 
1985). 
13
 256 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008). 
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and employee and a question of whether an implied covenant of confidentiality existed 
between the employee and the physician who treated him. The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee found that ―an implied covenant of confidentiality arises between an employee 
and any physician supplied by the employer.‖14 Among the reasons why the court 
recognized this covenant was the fact that the role of the physician is to be exposed to 
bare bodies and sensitive information with the expectation such information will remain 
unknown to others.
15
 Thus, sophisticated parties, such as physicians, in relationships with 
vulnerable parties, such as patients, are likely to receive information under an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. 
Courts largely found that sophisticated recipients of information were more likely 
to be bound by an implied confidentiality than unsophisticated recipients.
16
  For example, 
the case of Young Design v. Teletronics
17
 involved a trade secret dispute in which a 
salesman for Young Design disclosed proprietary amplifier technology in the course of 
business negotiations with a foreign representative of the technology company 
Teletronics. The salesman did not require the agent for Teletronics to sign a 
confidentiality agreement before disclosing the amplifier technology. When Teletronics 
made use of Young Design‘s amplifier technology, Young Design brought a claim for 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 634-35 (―The covenant is implied in law and does not depend on the mutual intent of the 
contracting parties.‖). 
15
 Id. at 634; see also Suarez v. Pierard, 663 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (Breslin, P.J., specially 
concurring) (―[P]harmacists maintain extensive patient records and counsel patients on drug interactions. In 
doing so, they can literally reconstruct a patient‘s medical history. Surely the public has a right to expect 
that pharmacists will keep the health conditions and treatments of their clients in confidence.‖). 
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 See, e.g., Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 744 F.Supp.2d 831, 858 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (finding it 
remarkable the plaintiff failed to obtain a confidentiality agreement because, among other reasons, the 
plaintiff ―was a sophisticated business operative that had entered into confidentiality agreements with 
companies who were doing business with the plaintiff in the past‖) 
17
 2001 WL 35804500 (E.D. Va.). 
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misappropriation of trade secrets. Young Design argued that an implied confidentiality 
agreement existed between Young Design and Teletronics. The U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia disagreed, finding that ―[h]ere, we are faced with a very 
informal, off-the-cuff gentleman‘s agreement between an avid sales-person who is 
familiar with [confidentiality agreements], and a corporate representative without a 
strong command of the English language.‖18 
The court focused on the imbalance in the sophistication of the two parties.  
Whereas Young Design‘s salesman had experience with and understanding of trade-
specific confidentiality agreements (―nondisclosure agreements‖), the court found that the 
foreign representative of Teletronic‘s ―command of the English language is not strong.‖ 
Additionally, the court pointed out that the salesman had little knowledge of the technical 
aspects of the business. Thus he was not in a good position to bind the company to 
confidentiality regarding the trade secrets of other businesses.
19
 Based on the court‘s 
logic, an obligation of confidentiality is less likely when it is the recipient, not the 
discloser, of information who is the vulnerable or unsophisticated party. This is a logical 
result, given that the disclosers or subjects of the information are the parties who will be 
harmed by a breach of confidentiality. 
The Second Circuit gave perhaps the most nuanced analysis of inherently 
vulnerable parties in L-3 Communications v. OSI Systems.
20
 This case involved a disputed 
business merger and the question of whether the plaintiff and defendant, two 
corporations, entered into a confidential fiduciary relationship. The district court found 
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 Id. at *6. 
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 2008 WL 2595176 (2d Cir.). 
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the parties to be in a confidential relationship, which was challenged on appeal. The 
Ninth Circuit summarized the relevant law when it stated: 
A confidential relationship typically arises where one party is particularly 
vulnerable to another party; this vulnerability usually arises from 
―advanced age, youth, lack of education, weakness of mind, grief, 
sickness, or some other incapacity.‖ The vulnerability of one party to the 
other ―is the necessary predicate of a confidential relation, and the law 
treats it as absolutely essential.‖ Where one party in a relationship is 
particularly vulnerable to the other because of such an infirmity, the need 
to impose a fiduciary duty on the stronger party is obvious. In some 
instances, the California courts have expanded the concept and found 
confidential relationships to exist in commercial dealings.
21
 
 
However, here the court found that the defendant ―was not vulnerable to [the plaintiff] in 
a way that could give rise to an implied confidential relationship. The parties started off 
on equal footing. Both were sophisticated corporations, experienced in acquisitions, and 
represented by counsel.‖22 The court seemed to reason that because the parties were so 
sophisticated with confidentiality agreements and had the benefit of counsel, it was 
unlikely that an obligation of confidentiality or a confidential relationship was implied.
23
 
With such resources and time, any confidentiality agreement would likely have been 
express. 
 The defendant argued that it was vulnerable to the plaintiff because it trusted the 
plaintiff to represent both of them in business negotiations with third parties. The court 
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 Id. at *5 (quoting Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 106 Cal. App. 4th 257, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003); Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc., 125 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 
22
 Id. 
23
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explicit contract terms providing that [the plaintiff] would act in a fiduciary capacity…. But [the defendant] 
did not do any of those things.‖). A discloser‘s failure to request confidentiality when it easily could have 
done so was a significant contextual factor for courts and was discussed in Chapter Two. See Flotec, Inc. v. 
Southern Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Rogers v. Desa Int‘l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 
2d 955 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
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stated that while the defendant may have rendered itself vulnerable, ―where a 
sophisticated party that starts on equal footing bargains away its rights without ensuring 
in the terms of the contract that it is receiving a reciprocal duty, that is not the type of 
vulnerability that [triggers fiduciary duties.] ‖24 Thus, it would appear that courts consider 
sophistication and vulnerability in relation to the other party.
25
 If both parties are equally 
vulnerable or equally sophisticated, then it appears that courts are less likely to find an 
implied obligation of confidentiality than in relationships where the discloser is more 
vulnerable or sophisticated than the recipient.
26
  
While a feeble state of mind could render the discloser of information vulnerable 
to the recipient, such facts must be firmly established to give rise to an implied obligation 
of confidentiality. The case of Harold ex rel. Harold v. McGann,
27
 involved, among other 
things, a claim of violation of fiduciary duty and confidential relationship arising out of 
the sale of a patent and confidential business negotiations. Here, a businessman alleged 
that the defendant, Bryan A. McGann, fraudulently induced the businessman‘s elderly 
father, who died before the suit was filed, to sell McGann a patent for a product to help 
administer medicine to pets. The businessman claimed McGann breached the contract in 
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 Id. (citations omitted); see also Scott v. Kemp, 316 A.2d 883 (Penn. 1974) (―[A] business association 
may be the basis of a confidential relationship only if one party surrenders substantial control over some 
portion of his affairs to the other.‖). 
25
 See, e.g., Harold ex rel. Harold v. McGann, 406 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
26
 While this logic was seemingly employed by most courts, it was often countered by other factors. For 
example, in Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., the Fifth Circuit reversed a finding of implied confidentiality by 
the district court where a ―relatively unsophisticated individual‖ with little education submitted an 
invention to a large corporation. 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court accepted the 
plaintiff‘s argument that ―[u]nder the circumstances…the manufacturer should have known that he, as the 
inventor, expected [compensation or confidentiality] even if he did not request it.‖ Id. In reversing, the 
Fifth Circuit found that because the plaintiff disclosed his idea before requesting confidentiality, the court 
found no implied confidentiality existed. Id. at 581. 
27
 406 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
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numerous ways and claimed that McGann and the company he formed to market the 
patented product breached their implied confidential relationship with the businessman 
and his father. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was asked 
to determine if a confidential relationship was implied between the parties. The court 
found that a confidential relationship exists ―when one party ‗has reposed a special 
confidence in each another [sic] to the extent that the parties do not deal with each other 
on equal terms.‘ This special confidence can result from ‗an overmastering dominance on 
one side, or weakness, dependence or justifiable trust, on the other.‘‖28  
The court did not find a sufficient power differential between the parties to 
support an implied confidential relationship. The court focused on the fact that the 
businessman failed to plead any facts demonstrating his father‘s decreased capacity to 
understand the relationship between the parties notwithstanding a claim of advancing age. 
This attention to comprehension supported the court‘s logic that if the parties are on an 
equal footing with each other, then an implied confidential relationship of a fiduciary 
nature is unlikely.
29
 
RESOURCES 
Courts also found that an imbalance of resources between the parties contributed 
to a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. In eight cases, this was 
demonstrated in the practical distinction between individuals and corporate or group 
                                                 
28
 Id. at 571 (citations omitted). 
29
 See, e.g., Harold ex rel. Harold v. McGann, 406 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Pa. 2005); see also Lanius v. 
Donnell, 432 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1968); Roberts v. Chase, 166 S.W.2d 641, 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942) 
(―The fiduciary relation may be of any kind which implies confidence, as trustee and beneficiary, attorney 
and client, parent and child, guardian and ward, physician and patient, nurse and invalid, confidential friend 
and adviser, indeed, any relation of confidence between persons which gives one dominion or influence 
over the other.‖); Omnitech Intern., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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actors. No court explicitly analyzed individuals under different standards than 
corporations or groups in disputes involving implied obligations of confidentiality.
30
 
However, in practice, corporate or group entities typically had access to more resources 
than individuals, and in eight cases, courts seemed to take this factor into consideration. 
A good example of this is the case of Omnitech International v. Clorox, a case between 
two corporations: a roach spray manufacturer (Omnitech) and potential investor 
(Clorox).
31
  
The parties entered into negotiations about entering into a joint manufacturing 
venture, and Omnitech disclosed confidential business information to Clorox as part of 
the negotiations. However, the negotiations broke down, and eventually Omnitech 
brought suit against Clorox for, among other things, breach of contract, misappropriation 
of trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, Omnitech argued that a 
―special relationship of trust and confidence was created by virtue of the confidential 
information it conveyed to Clorox.‖32 
However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. It found that no confidential or fiduciary 
relationship existed because, among other things, ―the record in this case is replete with 
evidence that Omnitech and Clorox had only an arms-length business relationship, 
including undisputed testimony that…both sides were represented by competent counsel 
                                                 
30
 Some courts did note that commercial entities were less likely to need confidentiality than individuals. 
See, e.g., Council on American-Islamic Relations, Cal. v. FBI, 2010 WL 4024806 at *16 (S.D. Cal.) (noting 
that while it is possible for the government to claim an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act based 
on an implied promise of confidentiality to entities, that exemption is ―is claimed sparsely with regard to 
commercial institutions‖). 
31
 11 F.3d 1316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994). 
32
 Id.  
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in the drafting and consummation of the agreements.‖33 This focus on counsel 
demonstrates how equality in resources can diminish the likelihood of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality between the parties. This seems particularly true when the 
parties are engaged in complex business negotiations instead of simple verbal 
exchanges.
34
  
BAD-FAITH 
In three of the cases analyzed, courts considered whether an actor was acting in 
bad faith. Bad-faith recipients of information were more likely to be subject to implied 
obligations of confidentiality than recipients acting in good faith.
35
 According to these 
courts, acting in bad faith to gain information, for example, by pretending to be interested 
in business negotiations, demonstrated that the information was not freely obtainable 
otherwise and, thus, the information was likely disclosed in confidence.   
For example, the case of Phillips v. Frey
36
 involved a trade secret 
misappropriation dispute between a manufacturer of deer-hunting stands, W.C. Phillips, 
and potential purchasers of the manufacturer‘s business. The potential purchasers 
                                                 
33
 Id. The court also found that no fiduciary relationship existed because the parties vigorously negotiated 
the terms of their proposed agreement and Omnitech concealed much of its financial information from 
Clorox, which would seem to indicate that Omnitch did not view Clorox as a confidant. 
34
 See, e.g., Formex Mfg., Inc. v. Sullivan Flotation Sys., Inc., 972 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Neis, 
dissenting) (arguing against the majority decision that no implied duty of confidentiality existed because 
the parties were simply two businesses negotiating at arm‘s length with no preexisting contracts.). 
35
 See, e.g., Bartell v. Onbank, Onbank & Trust Co., 1996 WL 421189 (N.D.N.Y.) (―New York law does 
not appear to recognize an implied duty of confidentiality, a fiduciary duty, or any other duty of care 
between a bank and its borrowers, absent a showing of malice or bad faith.‖). In Bartell, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of an 
implied duty of confidentiality against a bank because the plaintiffs failed to allege any malice or bad faith 
on the part of the bank. However, it refused to dismiss the same claims against an individual employee of 
the bank who was the bank‘s agent because it found that employee acted with malice and ill will toward the 
plaintiff in obtaining the plaintiff‘s loan request documents and distributing the materials at a mergers and 
acquisitions seminar as a demonstrative aid. Id. at *1, *4. 
36
 20 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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obtained Phillips‘s trade secrets while negotiating for the purchase of his business. The 
potential purchasers led Phillips to believe they had a legitimate interest in buying his 
business, including his trade secrets. The potential purchasers requested Phillips‘s 
financial statements, a complete and detailed inventory of his equipment and tools, 
information about how his deer stand was manufactured, and a tour of his manufacturing 
plant.
37
  
Shortly after Phillips turned over this information, the potential purchasers 
claimed to have problems securing financing, and the deal fell through.  Several 
employees of the potential purchasers kept most of the documents containing Phillips‘s 
sensitive and proprietary information. Less than a year later, the formerly potential 
purchasers began selling a deer stand that was virtually identical to Phillips‘s deer stand. 
Phillips then brought a claim for trade secret misappropriation.
38
 Regarding 
misappropriation, the court held that ―[o]ne is liable for disclosure of trade secrets if (a) 
he discovers the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a 
breach of confidence reposed in one who is in a confidential relationship with another 
who discloses protected information to him.‖39 
The facts indicated that the potential purchasers negotiated in bad faith to 
purchase Phillips‘s business. The potential purchasers claimed that they did not have 
financing to purchase the business, but evidence at court revealed that they made no 
                                                 
37
 Id. at 626. 
38
 The Fifth Circuit found that ―protection will be awarded to a trade secret holder against the disclosure or 
unauthorized use by those to whom the secret has been confided under either express or implied restriction 
of nondisclosure or by one who has gained knowledge by improper means.‖ Id. at 629 (citing Kewanee Oil 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); Carson Products Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453, 461 (5th 
Cir.1979); Weed Eater, Inc. v. Dowling, 562 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tx. Ct. App. 1978); Brown v. Fowler, 316 
S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tx. Ct. App. 1958)). 
39
 Id. at 630 (citations omitted). 
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effort to obtain financing and that they most likely would have received financing had 
they applied. The potential purchasers had significant possible collateral.
40
 The court 
found that ―[i]n the face of such evidence, it does not amount to a miscarriage of justice 
for the jury to believe that the defendants improperly discovered the trade secret and 
breached their confidential relationship.‖41 The court appeared to find an implied 
obligation of confidentiality arising out of the potential purchaser‘s actions taken in bad 
faith to convince Phillips to disclose information. 
In addition to the policy of discouraging malfeasance by holding bad-faith actors 
to obligations of confidentiality, the existence of actions taken in bad faith also served as 
evidence of the recipient‘s state of mind.  The court found that, even though the plaintiff 
never explicitly requested confidentiality, given the recipient‘s bad faith, the jury ―could 
validly accept . . .  that the defendants knew or should have known that the information 
was a trade secret and the disclosure was made in confidence.‖42 Thus, it would appear 
that, according to this court, confidentiality can be implied in some instances where the 
recipient of information acted in bad faith in order to receive information. 
Although the court found no bad faith on the part of the actors, the case of Flotec, 
v. Southern Research
43
 cited Phillips for the proposition that a jury can find an implied 
obligation of confidentiality ―in view of evidence tending to show that the defendant had 
not been sincere in its interest in buying the business and had used negotiations merely as 
                                                 
40
 Id.  
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. at 632. 
43
 16 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
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a guise for obtaining the secret manufacturing process.‖44 Flotec involved a dispute 
between a manufacturer of oxygen regulators and a competitor.  The manufacturer, 
Flotec, sued the competitor, Southern Research, Incorporated (SRI), for misappropriation 
of trade secrets after a proposed business deal between the two parties dissolved and SRI 
began to manufacture its own oxygen regulators.  SRI had received technical drawings 
for the oxygen regulators from Flotec while the parties were still in negotiations. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana was asked to consider 
whether SRI was under an implied obligation of confidentiality with respect to Flotec‘s 
trade secrets. The court recognized that an explicit promise of confidentiality between the 
parties is not necessary ―if the recipient of the information knew or should have known 
that the information was a trade secret and that the owner of the secret expected the 
recipient to keep the information secret.‖45 The court found that this standard, which is 
part of unfair competition law, was not met in this case. The facts did not reveal any bad 
faith by SRI. The court found, among other things, that ―[t]here simply is no evidence 
here that SRI gave any indication that it agreed to keep Flotec‘s information confidential. 
Nor does the evidence show that Flotec could reasonably have inferred such consent from 
SRI‘s silence on the subject.‖46 
The case law seems to suggest that if a recipient acted in bad faith to obtain 
information, then an implied obligation of confidentiality was more likely than when a 
recipient acted in good faith to obtain information. This factor is consistent with the 
courts‘ concern for vulnerable parties since the discloser of information is often unaware 
                                                 
44
 Id. at 1006. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. at 1007. 
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if a recipient is acting in bad faith. As a result, such an ―ignorant‖ discloser of 
information is vulnerable to a betrayal and breached confidentiality. 
CONCLUSION 
Regarding the attributes of actors in implied obligations of confidentiality, courts 
seemed to look for three major traits: 1) vulnerability or sophistication, 2) resources, and 
3) bad-faith. Vulnerability and sophistication were sometimes seen as polar opposites. If 
one party was more sophisticated than the other, then the less sophisticated party was 
seen as vulnerable. Other parties, such as the infirm and elderly, were seen as inherently 
vulnerable. Courts were more likely to find recipients dealing with vulnerable disclosers 
bound by an implied obligation of confidentiality than when the parties were more 
equally situated or inherently sophisticated. 
Courts also looked to whether an actor had more resources than the other party to 
a dispute, which in a few cases resulted in a de facto distinction between individuals and 
corporate or group actors. When actors that received information had more resources than 
the discloser of information, then an implied obligation of confidentiality was more likely 
than when the parties had similar resources.  
Finally, several courts considered whether the recipient of information acted in 
bad faith in receiving information. Bad-faith actors were more likely to be bound by an 
implied obligation of confidentiality than good faith actors. The courts seemed to justify 
this result under a policy and evidentiary rationale. First, courts sought to further the 
policy of discouraging recipients of information from acting in bad faith to gain the 
confidence of the discloser by preventing them from disclosing their unjustly received 
information. Additionally, bad faith also served as evidence to courts that the recipient 
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knew that the received information was disclosed in confidence. Otherwise, according to 
the logic of the courts, acting in bad faith would not have been necessary to gain the 
information. Ultimately, the role of the actor, while likely the least significant of 
Nissenbaum‘s four factors, was still an important aspect for courts in analyzing implied 
obligations of confidentiality.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER V  
HOW TERMS OF DISCLOSURE AFFECT IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Terms regarding the disclosure of information are naturally present in express 
confidentiality agreements. However, terms can also shape an implied agreement of 
confidentiality. For example, a stamp of ―confidential‖ on documents, by itself, is not 
sufficient to form an express confidentiality agreement. However, it might serve as 
evidence of an implied agreement of confidentiality. Often, terms of disclosure conflict 
with each other. Other times, external laws regarding the disclosure of information can 
serve as ―terms‖ that can create (or abolish) an implied obligation of confidentiality.  
This chapter seeks to analyze how terms of disclosure are analyzed by courts 
faced with an alleged implied obligation of confidentiality. According to Nissenbaum‘s 
theory of contextual integrity, privacy and confidentiality cannot be adequately analyzed 
without looking at the informational norms within a given context.
1
 Nissenbaum 
identified four factors relevant in informational norms: 1) context, 2) the nature of the 
information, 3) actors, and 4) terms of disclosure.  
Within her framework, Nissenbaum, who also called terms ―transmission 
principles,‖ defined terms as constraints ―on the flow (distribution, dissemination, 
transmission) of information from party to party in a context.‖2 According to 
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 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010). 
2
 Id at 145. 
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Nissenbaum, ―The transmission principle parameter in informational norms expresses 
terms and conditions under which such transfers ought (or ought not) to occur.‖3 
While terms could be explicit, Nissenbaum found that they usually were implied. 
She stated, ―The idea of a transmission principle may be the most distinguishing element 
of the framework of contextual integrity; although what it denotes is plain to see, it 
usually goes unnoticed.‖4 Nissenbaum held that terms could stipulate many things: they 
could dictate that information could be shared freely. Alternatively, terms could stipulate 
that information can only be used if the subject of the information knows about the use 
(―notice‖) or if the subject gives her permission for the use (―consent‖).5 Terms giving 
notice or consent are quite prominent online, as the website privacy policy regime is 
nothing more than a system for giving notice of and obtaining consent for the use of 
personal information. Express online terms also provide for the commercial exchange of 
information. Under certain terms of disclosure on websites, information can be bought, 
sold, or leased under many or no restrictions on the use or further disclosure of the 
information.
6
 Other online terms, such as symbols, icons, and even website features, 
could serve as terms contributing to an implied obligation of confidentiality.
7
 
In sum, Nissenbaum argued that terms are perhaps the most significant, but not 
sole, aspect of informational norms that restrict the flow of information.
8
 The cases 
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4
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5
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6
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7
 Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 (2011). 
8
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supported this assertion. She gave friendship as an example of a context laden with terms 
of disclosure. She observed, ―Friends share information reciprocally, generally assuming 
that what they say to each other will be held in confidence.‖9 According to Nissenbaum, 
this is an implied term of disclosure. Nissenbaum recognized that while some departures 
from this norm are generally allowable, certain implied terms of friendship are 
considered violated when friends stray too far from the term of confidentiality.
10
 For 
example, she held that ―[f]erreting out information about a friend from third parties, 
peeking in a diary, or divulging to others information shared in a friendship are actions 
that not only may be judged as betrayals, but call into question the very nature of the 
relationship.‖11 In such instances, the terms of disclosure are deemed to have been 
breached. 
Nissenbaum contrasted the terms of disclosure in friendships with those in health 
care relationships. This contrast highlighted the different ways terms are disclosed and 
can affect relationships. Like friendships, health care relationships carry an implication of 
confidentiality. Yet unlike with friendships, the information subject‘s discretion does not 
―reign supreme.‖12 Instead, Nissenbaum stated,  the physician can control the terms of 
disclosure, ―in the sense that a physician might reasonably condition care on the fullness 
of the patient‘s information disclosure.‖13 This contrast demonstrates how the terms of 
disclosure are context specific. Terms can be stipulated within relationships by the 
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discloser (who is typically the subject) or recipient of information. Terms also can be 
stipulated by some outside source, such as patient/client confidentiality laws or the 
voluntary oaths taken by physicians. 
Terms of disclosure can be explicit in or inferred from a virtually limitless 
number of contexts. Yet scholars have not analyzed exactly how courts consider the 
terms in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. No framework for such an 
analysis has been adopted by the courts. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to determine 
which terms courts explicitly recognized as significant in implied confidentiality 
disputes.   
The cases revealed that courts typically tried to locate the true understanding of 
the parties by looking at terms within and outside of disclosure relationships. Of the 132 
cases analyzed in this dissertation, 66 specifically addressed terms of disclosure, 
recognizing or refusing to recognize an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the numbers of cases that analyzed each kind of term or 
consideration involving terms: 
Figure 1: The Kinds of Terms or Term-related Considerations in Implied 
Confidentiality Disputes 
 
The Kinds of Terms Number of Cases 
Confidentiality indicators 38 
          Terms indicating a desire for confidentiality 24 
          Terms indicating confidence will be kept 14 
External Terms 15 
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Term-related Considerations  
Conflicting terms 22 
Explicitness 17 
 
Courts placed the most emphasis on any term (statement, action, symbol, etc. 
indicating a preference regarding disclosure) that would have been apparent to the other 
party. Thus, the perception of terms seemed to be the most significant factor for courts in 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. The most common terms explicitly 
recognized by courts were those that indicated either a discloser‘s desire for 
confidentiality or that confidentiality of information would be respected by the recipient. 
If perceived, these terms could justify one party‘s reliance on confidentiality, which can 
be the basis of a contract or a claim for promissory estoppel. These types of terms, which 
will be referred to here as ―confidentiality indicators,‖ were the most significant to courts 
in finding an implied obligation of confidentiality. Courts applied this logic even if 
subsequent terms conflicted with previous terms, unless an explicit contract prohibited 
implied terms of confidentiality. 
Courts also found that explicit, that is, clear and specific terms contributed to a 
finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Courts held that terms that purportedly 
create implied obligations of confidentiality must be clear and definite enough for the 
promises and expected performances of each party to be reasonably certain. Finally, 
courts looked to external terms, e.g., terms like laws, business policies, and regulations 
that might shape an implied obligation of confidentiality. Courts typically found that 
external terms were significant in implied confidentiality disputes if the discloser or 
recipient either knew or should have known about the terms. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY INDICATORS 
Courts often looked for what will be referred to as ―confidentiality indicators,‖ 
i.e., signals, statements, or actions that indicate that either a desire for confidentiality or 
that the disclosed information would be kept confidential.
14
 In effect, courts held that two 
different kinds of confidentiality indicators could contribute to the formation of an 
implied obligation of confidentiality: terms indicating a desire for confidentiality and 
terms indicating that confidence would be kept. 
Terms Indicating a Desire for Confidentiality. Unsurprisingly, one of the most 
important terms of disclosure to courts was a desire or request for confidentiality by the 
discloser of information. A simple request for confidentiality does not, by itself, 
constitute a binding agreement between the parties. However, courts were significantly 
more likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality when the discloser of 
information displayed a desire to restrict the flow of information than when the discloser 
showed no interest in confidentiality.
15
 Conversely, the absence of an indicator or signal 
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 See, e.g., Grayton v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 327 (Fed. Cl. 2010); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. 
Supp. 664, 679-82  (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that no obligation of confidentiality existed for any disclosure 
not explicitly marked as ―confidential‖ under a pre-existed agreement regarding use of disclosed 
information within a business relationship.); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1114 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1984); Rogers v. Desa Int‘l, Inc., 183 F. Supp.2d  955, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that a 
claim of implied confidentiality is without merit where, among other things, the plaintiff  ―did not indicate 
on the video tape he sent [to the defendant], either in the video itself or on an outside label, that information 
contained therein was confidential.‖); Daily Int‘l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no implied obligation of confidentiality where, among other things, ―[n]o 
documents were stamped or labeled with the word ‗confidential‘ or like warnings.‖); Neimi v. Am. Axle 
Mnfg. & Holding, Inc., 2007 WL 29383 at *4 (Mich. Ct. App.) (finding no implied obligation of 
confidentiality where, among other things, plaintiffs ―did not make any reasonable efforts to preserve the 
confidentiality of the designs provided to the defendants. They did not mark the documents as confidential, 
or require an express agreement of confidentiality‖). 
15
 See, e.g., Knapp Schenk & Co. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Lancer Mgmt. Co., Inc., 2004 WL 57086 (D. Mass.); 
WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 9-10 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1973) (―[T]he very scheme adopted for 
communicating the letter reveals a deliberate intention not to reveal the author‘s personal identity. All these 
circumstances yield but one possible conclusion: that the author of the letter did not want his personal 
identity revealed and, therefore, that the letter was communicated under an implied understanding of 
confidentiality.‖). 
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of confidentiality by the discloser was relied upon by courts to find that no implied 
obligation of confidentiality existed.
16
  
These terms were created many different ways. Some terms were symbols or 
single words, such as a ―confidential‖ stamp on documents.17  Other terms were vague 
assertions, such as ―this is between us.‖18 Other factors of contextual integrity – context, 
actors, and the nature of the information – served as evidence of an implied term of 
confidentiality in a relationship.
19
 The reason courts considered the expression of 
confidentiality so important is that, in order to find an implied obligation of 
confidentiality, courts asked whether the recipient ―knew or should have known‖ that the 
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 See, e.g., Grayton v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 327 (Fed. Cl. 2010); FMC Corp. v. Guthery, 2009 WL 
485280 at *5 (D.N.J.) (―Here, the Court is not convinced that Guthery provided confidential information…. 
[W]hen he produced [documents], he did not request that they be marked ‗confidential.‘‖); Mass. Institute 
of Tech. v. Harman Int‘l Indust., Inc., 584 F. Supp.2d 297, 304 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding that no implied 
obligation of confidentiality existed where ―[n]o record evidence shows either that the researchers gave any 
instructions to keep any information that drivers gathered while using the Back Seat Driver system 
confidential….‖); Young Design, Inc. v. Teletronics Int‘l, Inc., 2001 WL 35804500 at *5 (E.D. Va.) 
(―There is no evidence in this record that plaintiff took any efforts to create a confidential relationship with 
defendant. There were no proprietary use warnings on invoices, no letters or emails reminding defendant 
about confidentiality obligations, and no evidence of oral discussions with any other of defendant‘s 
employees.‖); Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 2010 WL 3503427 at *21 (E.D. Wis.) (finding no 
implied duty of confidentiality exists where the plaintiff provided ―no indication‖ to the defendant that the 
information the plaintiff was provided was intended to be kept in confidence.). 
17
 See, e.g., Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54 (1985). 
18
 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 156 (Md. 2011) (―Detective Schrott's words, ‗This is between you 
and me bud. Only me and you are here, all right? All right?,‘ on their face imply confidentiality….  No 
reasonable lay person would have understood those words to mean anything other than that the 
conversation, at that moment and thereafter, even if not before, was ‗between‘ only Detective Schrott and 
Petitioner.‖). 
19
 See, e.g., Diodem, LLC v. Lumenis Inc., 2005 WL 6220720 at *10 (C.D. Cal.) (finding an implied 
obligation of confidentiality could exist from a totality of the circumstances, where, among other things, 
none of the recipients of information had any basis for inferring the information was disclosed for free and 
unrestricted use); Young Design, Inc. v. Teletronics Int‘l, Inc., 2001 WL 35804500 at *5 (E.D. Va.) 
(recognizing that indicators such as reminders about confidentiality obligations, oral discussions about 
confidentiality, or warnings on communications designating the information as confidential could 
demonstrate efforts to create a confidential relationship); Hollomon v. O. Mustad & Sons (USA), Inc., 196 
F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (finding no confidential relationship where the plaintiff failed to 
present any evidence that he informed the defendant his designs were being disclosed in confidence). 
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disclosed information was confidential.
20
 One of the ways this knowledge is transmitted 
to the recipient of information is through terms of disclosure. 
Some of the confidentiality indicators identified by courts were signals, 
statements, or actions that indicated to recipients a desire by the discloser for 
confidentiality or an assumption or expression that the disclosed information was 
confidential.
21
 A good example of this is found in Grayton v. United States.
22
 In this case, 
an individual brought suit against the United States seeking compensation for an alleged 
improper taking by the Social Security Administration (SSA).  Maurice Grayton 
submitted a proposal to the SSA that certain Social Security benefits should be delivered 
via a debit card transaction instead of a paper check. Grayton claimed that an implied-in-
fact contract was formed when he submitted his suggestion to the SSA. He claimed that 
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 See, e.g., Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 2010 WL 3503427 at *21 (E.D. Wis.) (―None of the letters 
or data…bared any symbol denoting that the information contained therein was confidential. Moreover, 
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is under a duty to keep it.‖); Sentinel Products Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass. 
2001). 
21
 See, e.g., Grayton v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 327 (2010); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 
679-82  (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that an obligation of confidentiality existed for any disclosure not 
explicitly marked as ―confidential‖ under a pre-existed agreement regarding use of disclosed information 
within a business relationship); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1114 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984); Rogers v. Desa Int‘l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that a claim of 
implied confidentiality is without merit where, among other things, the plaintiff ―did not indicate on the 
video tape he sent [to the defendant], either in the video itself or on an outside label, that information 
contained therein was confidential‖); Daily Int‘l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no implied obligation of confidentiality where, among other things, ―[n]o 
documents were stamped or labeled with the word ‗confidential‘ or like warnings‖); Neimi v. Am. Axle 
Mnfg. & Holding, Inc., 2007 WL 29383 at *4 (Mich. Ct. App.) (finding no implied obligation of 
confidentiality where, among other things, plaintiffs ―did not make any reasonable efforts to preserve the 
confidentiality of the designs provided to the defendants. They did not mark the documents as confidential, 
or require an express agreement of confidentiality.‖). 
22
 92 Fed. Cl. 327 (Fed. Cl. 2010). 
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one of the implied terms of this contract was a ―promise not to reveal or use [his] 
suggestion without compensating him for it‖ and a promise to keep his trade secret 
confidential otherwise.
23
 He filed suit alleging that the SSA failed to keep its implied 
promise of confidentiality. 
Grayton relied on the case Airborne Data v. United States
24
 to support his 
implied-in-fact contract theory. This case held that an implied-in-fact contract of 
confidentiality can ―arise[] from submission of trade secrets [to a federal agency] under a 
restrictive legend pursuant to a regulation.‖25 According to the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims in Grayton, the Airborne case stands for the rule that ―the government is bound 
by contract to obey regulatory restrictions on the use of trade secrets identified as such 
and may be liable for breach of that contract term.‖26 
Unfortunately for Grayton, Airborne Data did not support his claim for implied 
confidentiality because he failed to place a restrictive legend on the proposal he sent to 
the SSA. The court made clear that ―a federal agency is under no obligation to keep 
unsolicited proposals confidential, when restrictive legends that could identify the 
proprietary information therein are inadequate or missing.‖27 While this case deals with 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 334. 
24
 702 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  
25
 Id. at 1353. According to the court, ―As of 1976, it was the official policy of the Department of the 
Interior (and of USGS) to encourage the submission of unsolicited proposals containing relevant new 
ideas.‖ Id. at 1359 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 14-4.5101-2(c), 3(a) (1977)). To that end, valid departmental 
regulations how an individual might submit data not to be disclosed to the public for any purpose, or used 
by the department for any purpose other than evaluation of a proposal. The regulations also provided that a 
submission would indicate how it was to be used by way of a restrictive legend which dictated, among 
other things, what information was confidential.  
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 Grayton, 92 Fed. Cl. at 334. 
27
 Id. (citing Xerxe Group, Inc. v. United States, 278 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
plaintiff‘s ―failure to identify and clearly demarcate what it considered restricted data is fatal  to its 
claim‖)); Block v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 68, 74 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (holding that ―the plaintiff‘s failure 
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the idiosyncratic context of submission of proprietary ideas to the government, it 
demonstrates the broader significance to courts of confidentiality indicators as terms of 
disclosure and the deference that courts give to the rules embedded in established systems 
designed for information disclosure. 
Another example of the significance of confidentiality indicators is the case 
Sentinel Products v. Mobil Chemical,
28
 which involved claims between a product 
developer and potential purchaser of a machine for making plastic bags. The developer, 
Sentinel, disclosed valuable trade secrets – including the actual machine – to  
 the potential purchaser, Mobil, on a trial basis. At the end of the trial period, Mobil 
returned the bag-making machine to Sentinel and arranged to manufacture its own 
machine, which it had allegedly copied from Sentinel. Sentinel brought a number of 
claims, including misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and fraud and 
misrepresentation. Mobil‘s principal defense was that the disclosed information was not a 
trade secret because it was not entrusted to Mobil in confidence nor was the machine a 
protected secret.
29
 
The court did not accept Mobil‘s argument.30 Instead, it found that an implied 
confidential relationship existed between the parties. The court noted that a number of 
facts supported this finding: 
                                                                                                                                                 
here to identify any proprietary information in his unsolicited Joint Proposal requires dismissal of the 
plaintiff‘s implied-in-fact contract claim for protection of his alleged proprietary information‖)). 
28
 2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass.). 
29
 A requirement to gain trade secret protection is that the owner must have taken reasonable steps to 
preserve the secrecy of the design. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 
1165 (1st Cir. 1994). 
30
 Sentinel, 2001 WL 92272 at *10-12. 
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[T]he fact that Sentinel made it clear that it had applied for a patent before 
it gave Mobil a machine to try, the fact that Mobil was to return the 
machine if it elected not to purchase the Sentinel 5000, the fact that all 
machines were stamped ―patent pending,‖ the fact that the machines were 
kept under wraps at trade shows, and the fact that Mobil had been a 
customer, but never a competitor, of Sentinel, may lead a jury to find that 
Sentinel's precautions were sufficient to protect the trade secret status of 
the design of the machine.‖31 
 
The court seemed to focus on, among other things, privacy indicators in making 
its decision finding an implied confidential relationship, particularly the fact that the 
machine was ―clearly marked patent pending.‖32 According to the court, this particular 
indicator was capable of conveying a number of messages. The court held: 
A jury could reasonably reject Mobil's argument that by emphasizing the 
patent, Sentinel was admitting that the design of the machine was not 
confidential. Another interpretation could be that Sentinel was putting 
Mobil and other potential buyers on notice that (1) it believed that the 
design of the machine was unique and gave it a competitive advantage in 
the marketplace; and (2) that Sentinel did not expect anyone to copy the 
machine without payment to Sentinel. In fact, I find this latter 
interpretation more persuasive and consistent with the law. Thus, while 
one cannot infringe a patent before a patent has issued, information can be 
afforded trade secret status during that time.
33
 
 
The court concluded, ―In short, by notifying a potential buyer that a patent is pending, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that the buyer is being given notice that it is being 
entrusted with valuable, proprietary information which cannot be used without 
compensation to its owner.‖34 This case demonstrates why any framework for implied 
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 Id. at *10. 
32
 Id. at *11. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id.; see also Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54 (1985) (finding an implied 
contract for confidentiality based on, among other things, a ―Proprietary Statement‖ suggesting the 
confidential nature of an unsolicited proposal). 
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obligations of confidentiality should be broad enough to encompass confidentiality 
indicators and their various interpretations. 
The importance of a discloser‘s communication of a desire for confidentiality also 
is reflected in some courts‘ requirement that the recipient of the information be notified 
of the desire for confidentiality before the disclosure is made. Courts were hesitant to 
enforce an implied obligation of confidentiality if the recipient did not have the 
opportunity to reject the proposed confidentiality agreement. In Faris v. Enberg,
35
 Edgar 
Faris, a television show developer, pitched an idea for a sports quiz show to a sports 
announcer, Richard Enberg. Sometime after the two met, a very similar show appeared 
on television with Enberg as the master of ceremonies. Faris brought a suit against 
Enberg and the television show‘s producer for misappropriation of the sports quiz show 
idea and for breach of an implied obligation of confidentiality. The California Court of 
Appeal found that in order for a valid confidentiality obligation to exist, ―[t]here must 
exist evidence of the communication of the confidentiality of the submission or evidence 
from which a confidential relationship can be inferred.‖36 
Here, the court found that no rational recipient of the information disclosed by 
Faris could be bound to an understanding that a secret was being imparted. The court 
found, ―One could not infer from anything Enberg did or said that he was given the 
chance to reject disclosure in advance or that he voluntarily received the disclosure with 
an understanding that it was not to be given to others.‖37 The court appeared to be 
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 97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
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 Id. at 323. 
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 Id. at 324. 
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looking for an external manifestation of the desire for confidentiality. The court 
observed: 
Only in plaintiff's response to summary judgment is there reference to his 
own thoughts from which one might infer that he felt there was a 
confidence. But he never, so far as we can tell, communicated these 
thoughts to Enberg, and nothing of an understanding of confidence can be 
inferred from Enberg's conduct. No other special facts exist from which 
the relationship can be inferred: there was no implied-in-fact contract; the 
material was not protectable; and they were not yet partners or joint 
adventurers, and there was no buyer/seller or principal/agent 
relationship.
38
 
 
Thus, the court advanced a number of reasons, including the need for the recipient to 
understand his obligations, for focusing on whether the discloser of information 
expressed a desire for confidentiality in order to find an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. 
Not all courts found that confidentiality indicators contributed to an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. One of two online-related cases involving terms expressing 
a desire for confidentiality was Google v. Traffic Information
39
 This case involved a 
patent dispute over Google‘s popular ―Google Maps‖ software. This lawsuit was 
triggered when Traffic Information, a technology company, sent Google‘s business 
partner, T-Mobile, an email. This email warned T-Mobile of a potential patent issue 
between Traffic‘s patents and Google maps. Traffic claimed that Google Maps violated 
its  patents. The email from Traffic to T-Mobile‘s attorney was marked ―confidential‖ 
and ―for settlement purposes only.‖40 T-Mobile subsequently disclosed the contents of the 
                                                 
38
 Id. Notice that the court draws upon the other factors of contextual integrity in its analysis. 
39
 2010 WL 743878 (D. Or.).  
40
 Id. at *1. 
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e-mail to Google. Traffic asserted that it did not consent to such a disclosure and that a 
confidentiality agreement existed between T-Mobile and Traffic regarding the email. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon found the confidentiality 
indicators in Traffic‘s email unpersuasive. The court held that ―the record in this case 
contains no evidence of even an implied confidentiality agreement between T-Mobile and 
Traffic…. [T]he fact that the email was marked ‗confidential‘ does not affect the 
justiciability analysis.‖41 Of course, the confidentiality indicator was not the sole factor 
considered by the court. The court also found that: 
There is nothing inherently confidential about a statement accusing a third 
party‘s product of patent infringement. Traffic should reasonably have 
anticipated – and perhaps even intended – that its claim of infringement by 
Google‘s product would be communicated to Google – how better for T-
Mobile to refute Traffic‘s infringement claim than by seeking Google‘s 
help in explaining [the software]?
42
 
 
Notice that this court, like the court in Faris, drew upon the other factors of contextual 
integrity in its analysis: the nature of the information (there was ―nothing inherently 
confidential‖), the actor‘s knowledge (the actor had no reasonable anticipation of 
disclosure), and the relationship between the parties (there was no need for 
confidentiality over the disputed information for the business relationship to work). Thus, 
this case is an excellent example of how the four factors of contextual integrity relate to 
each other.  Nissenbaum metaphorically described the coexistence of the four factors in 
an image of ―juggling balls in the air, moving in sync: contexts, subjects, senders, 
receivers, information types, and transmission principles.‖43 
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 Id. at *3. 
42
 Id. 
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 The similar case of Innospan v. Intuit,
44
 which also involved a confidentiality 
indicator in an email, reached a similar result. Here, Innospan, an IT business, shared a 
business plan via email with Intuit in an attempt to open a conversation about Intuit 
investing in Innospan. The e-mail contained a confidentiality statement.
45
 Additionally, 
the business plan had the following phrase at the bottom of each page: ―This document 
contains confidential and proprietary information that belongs exclusively to 
[Innospan].‖46 
 Ultimately Intuit failed to invest in Innospan‘s business and instead invested in a 
different business. Innospan brought a claim for, among other things, breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract to keep certain information confidential. However, here the mere 
existence of the confidentiality indicator was not enough to rise to the level of an implied 
contract. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found that this 
claim failed because 
The only mention of confidentiality in the January 31 e-mail appeared in 
the e-mail's automated signature which read: ―this e-mail message is 
intended for the personal use of the recipient(s) named above ... this 
message may be...privileged and confidential...if you are not an intended 
recipient, you may not review, copy or distribute.‖ This automated 
signature did not, however, create a binding contract to keep the contents 
confidential. The purpose of such a signature is merely to advise the 
recipient that the communication is potentially privileged. While an 
implied contract is created through conduct rather than words, there must 
be intent to contract. There is no meeting of the minds or intent to contract 
based on this boilerplate disclaimer. Thus, there can be no implied-in-fact 
contract based on the January 31 e-mail.
47
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 2011 WL 856265 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
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 Id. at *1. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at *6. 
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The court explicitly rebutted Innospan‘s argument that ―because the business plan itself 
was marked as ‗proprietary‘ and ‗confidential,‘ defendant implicitly agreed to maintain 
confidentiality.‖48 The court held that ―[a] rote stamp cannot, in and of itself, create an 
implied-in-fact contract.‖49 This opinion is consistent with the other cases analyzed in 
this dissertation demonstrating that disclosers of information cannot unilaterally impose 
terms of confidentiality outside of a confidential relationship. Some reciprocal act by the 
recipient of information is typically required. Yet it is clear that confidentiality indicators 
and other terms requesting confidentiality are critical components of any implied 
obligation of confidentiality analysis.  
Another example of courts‘ consideration of indicators is Flotec v. Southern 
Research.
50
 This was a misappropriation of trade secrets dispute between a manufacturer 
of oxygen regulators (Flotec) and a competitor (SRI). As with many misappropriation 
cases, the parties disclosed confidential information to each other as part of a business 
negotiation that eventually dissolved. Flotec brought suit after SRI began manufacturing 
its own line of oxygen regulators that reflected the ideas disclosed to SRI by Flotec. 
Flotec argued that the court should find that ―when SRI accepted Flotec‘s technical 
drawings so that it could prepare a bid to manufacture components for Flotec, SRI had an 
implied duty to maintain Flotec‘s information in confidence and not to use that 
information for its own purposes.‖51 
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 Id. 
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 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1006-07 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
51
 Id. at 1005 (emphasis in original). 
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The court rejected this argument for various reasons. One of them was that there 
were no indicators of confidentiality that would or should have led the recipient to know 
that the disclosure was made in confidence. The court asked, ―What were the 
circumstances as they appeared to SRI? SRI knew that Flotec had not ever indicated in 
any way—on the drawings themselves, or in discussions between the parties—that it 
considered any information to be secret.‖52 While confidentiality indicators do not 
unilaterally create a confidential agreement between the parties, this analysis reveals that 
courts consider such indicators significant in implying restrictions on the use of 
information. 
Terms Indicating Confidence Will Be Kept. Courts were also more likely to 
find an implied obligation of confidentiality if the recipient of information gave some 
indication the information disclosed would remain confidential than when such an 
indicator was absent.
53
 Terms recognizing that disclosed information was confidential 
also fulfilled the requirement that the recipient know about the implied confidentiality.
54
  
An assurance of confidentiality might seem counterintuitive to the concept of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality because the most obvious examples of assurances of 
confidentiality are explicit, e.g., ―I promise not to tell a soul.‖ However, not all 
assurances of confidentiality are express or clear.  
                                                 
52
 Id. at 1006-07. 
53
 See, e.g., Moore v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding no implied or express 
obligation where, among other things, ―Coach Moore did not request, and Gilman did not give, assurances 
of confidentiality‖); Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 54 (1985). 
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 See, e.g., Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (―[E]vidence of knowledge of 
confidence or from which a confidential relationship can be implied is a minimum prerequisite to the 
protection of freedom in the arts…. [N]othing of an understanding of confidence can be inferred from 
[Defendant‘s] conduct.‖). 
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A potential recipient‘s vague reassurances to the discloser that the information 
will be protected could form an implied obligation of confidentiality. This is true even if 
confidentiality was not expressly agreed upon otherwise. A wide range of statements, 
conduct, and symbols (―indicators‖) could demonstrate an implied willingness to keep the 
confidence of information.
55
  
One of the most significant acknowledgements of confidentiality in a case 
involving an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality was in Research, Analysis, & 
Development v. United States.
56
 In this case, an aviation research firm (RAD) alleged that 
the Air Force breached an implied-in-fact contract of confidentiality by releasing 
proprietary information that was contained in the firm‘s unsolicited proposal to the 
government asking for Air Force business. 
RAD submitted its unsolicited proposal for business encompassing a ―technical 
‗revolutionary‘ concept‖ for an advancement in aircraft sensor systems.57 Along with the 
proposal, RAD submitted a ―Proprietary Statement‖ that indicated the confidential nature 
of the information and detailed the limited ways in which the information could be 
used.
58
 After presumably evaluating RAD‘s submission, the Air Force sent RAD a letter 
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 See, e.g., Kashmiri v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 156 Cal. App. 4th 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
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 Id. The text of the Proprietary Statement read:  
This data shall not be disclosed outside the Government and shall not be duplicated, used, 
or disclosed in whole or in part for any purpose other than to evaluate the proposal; 
provided, that if a contract is awarded to this offeror as a result of or in connection with 
the submission of this data, the Government shall have the right to duplicate, use, or 
disclose the data to the extent provided in the contract. This restriction does not limit the 
Government's right to use information contained in the data if obtained from another 
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regarding the proposal. According to the U.S. Claims Court, ―The letter continually 
referred to the plaintiff‘s sensor ‗concept‘ and acknowledged its novelty.‖59 Most 
importantly, the letter acknowledged the Air Force‘s intent to keep RAD‘s proposal 
confidential. In the third and final paragraph of the letter, the Air Force stated: 
We appreciate the effort you have expended in keeping the USAF 
informed of your novel concepts. RAD will certainly be considered when 
future procurements related to novel sensor development and use are 
contemplated. The information you have provided in the subject proposal 
will be appropriately safeguarded. No disclosure of the information will 
be made nor will any part of the proposal be reproduced without explicit 
permission from RAD Inc.
60
 
 
Despite these assurances, the Air Force published a sensor system concept 
identical to that proposed by RAD in a publication called the Commerce Business Daily 
(CBD).  RAD ultimately brought a claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract for 
confidentiality. RAD claimed that, among other considerations, the Air Force‘s letter to 
RAD agreeing not to disclose RAD‘s proprietary data created an implied-in-fact 
contractual obligation on the part of the government to safeguard the data.
61
  
The U.S. Claims Court agreed. The court found that RAD‘s submission of  a 
proposal with the proper restrictive legend and the government‘s letter promising 
confidentiality constituted a ―meeting of the minds,‖ which created an implied-in-fact 
                                                                                                                                                 
source without restriction. The data subject to this restriction is contained on the pages so 
marked. 
Id. at 56. 
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contract.
62
 The court held that the actions of the parties, ―specifically defendant‘s…letter 
demonstrates a mutual intent to contract to safeguard plaintiff‘s proprietary data.‖63 Thus, 
the Air Force‘s indication that a confidence would be kept was a key term for the court in 
finding an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Conversely, terms that indicated that the recipient did not intend to keep 
information confidential could decrease the likelihood of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality.
64
 An example of this is Chief of Staff v. Connecticut Freedom of 
Information Commission.
65
 This case involved an administrative dispute resulting from 
Connecticut‘s Freedom of Information Commission ordering the City of Hartford, 
Connecticut, to disclose, among other things, proposals for the redevelopment of city 
property. The proposals contained personal information, detailed business information, 
and business strategies.
66
 
The city attempted to withhold the records based on the claim that the responses 
were submitted by developers under an implied assurance of confidentiality by the city. 
The court disagreed and stated: 
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 Id. (―[Defendant‘s] letter agreeing to safeguard plaintiff‘s proprietary data provides further support for 
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 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Guthery, 2009 WL 485280 (D.N.J.). 
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 1999 WL 643373 (Conn. Super. Ct.). 
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the name and address of the entities involved in each proposed development plan, a 
summary of the developers' sources of funding, finance plan, projected costs, intended 
uses of funds, projected development schedule, projected operating revenue and 
expenses, resume and experience, lender preferences, and property manager profile, as 
well as maps and drawings of the development plan and photographs of buildings. Some 
of the responses also contained individuals' social security numbers and bank account 
information. 
Id. 
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In the present case, there was no express assurance of confidentiality by 
the City to the developers. Whether there was an implied assurance of 
confidentiality presents a close question. On the one hand, some of the 
developers requested confidentiality and a majority apparently had an 
understanding that their proposals would remain confidential. On the other 
hand, the City informed the developers that their concepts would be shared 
among various city council and staff members and some of the developers 
shared their proposals with each other.
67
 
 
The notice provided by the city regarding its plans to disclose the information was 
important for the court, which refused to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the 
FOIC. The FOIC found that the responses were not given in confidence, and the court 
found that this was not a clearly erroneous holding.
68
 
EXTERNAL TERMS 
Sometimes the terms of an agreement were not offered by the parties or did not 
originate within the relationship between the parties. Instead, they were supplied by 
reference to external laws, organizational codes, policies, and external arrangements and 
agreements. These ―external terms‖ were often not expressed in the agreement between 
the parties, but they still contributed to an implied obligation of confidentiality. For 
example, in cases involving a physician‘s implied obligation of confidentiality to his or 
her patient, courts looked to external laws such as a state‘s professional licensing 
requirements, statutes, and the Hippocratic Oath to affirm the implied obligation.
69
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 See, e.g., Biddle v. Warrant Gen. Hosp., 1998 WL 156997 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998);Overstreet v. TRW 
Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008) (looking to state statutes such as the Patients‘ 
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records and identifying information.‖); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 
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These external terms increased the likelihood of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. Disclosers of information are more likely to rely on implied 
confidentiality when external terms apply to the disclosure than when they do not. For 
example, most patients likely know that their physicians take the Hippocratic Oath, which 
requires that doctors respect their patients‘ confidentiality.70 Thus, a patient‘s inference of 
confidentiality is likely reasonable. External terms also increase the likelihood that the 
recipient of information knew or should have known of his or her obligation of 
confidentiality. 
Courts looked to various laws, organizational codes, policies, and external 
arrangements and agreements to shape their analysis of implied obligations of 
confidentiality.
71
 Recall the case of Grayton v. United States,
72
 in which Maurice Grayton 
brought suit against the United States after the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
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allegedly adopted his proposal that certain social security benefits should be delivered via 
a debit card transaction instead of a paper check. Grayton claimed that an implied-in-fact 
contract was formed when he submitted his suggestion to the SSA. He claimed that one 
of the implied terms of this contract was a ―promise not to reveal or use [his] suggestion 
without compensating him for it,‖ which included a term to keep his trade secret 
confidential.
73
 
The plaintiff relied on the case Airborne Data v. United States
74
 to support his 
implied-in-fact contract theory. This case held that an implied-in-fact contract of 
confidentiality can ―arise[] from submission of trade secrets [to a federal agency] under a 
restrictive legend pursuant to a regulation.‖75 The mention of a restrictive legend is a 
reference to an external regulation of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
which, according to the Federal Circuit in Airborne Data, ―prescribed how an unsolicited 
proposal should be worded to incorporate such a restrictive legend, and prohibited 
departmental personnel from disclosing, or using the secrets for purposes other than 
evaluation.‖76 
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the Airborne Data case did not support his claim 
for implied confidentiality because he failed to place a restrictive legend that indicated 
the proposal was confidential on the proposal he sent to the SSA. The court made clear 
that ―a federal agency is under no obligation to keep unsolicited proposals confidential, 
when restrictive legends that could identify the proprietary information therein are 
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inadequate or missing.‖77 These cases demonstrate how external terms can shape implied 
obligations of confidentiality. While simply placing a confidential stamp on a submission 
might not be enough to create an implied obligation, the courts in Grayton and Airborne 
Data acknowledged that a combination of the USGS regulation and the indicator (a 
stamp, for example) could be sufficient.
78
 
Another example of how external terms can shape implied obligations of 
confidentiality is the case of United America Financial v. Potter,
79
 which involved a 
company‘s request for documents from the Postmaster General and U.S. Postal Service 
(USPS). The requested documents purportedly contained allegations that the company 
was involved in an identity theft scam involving USPS employees. The USPS contended 
that Exemption 7(D) of the FOIA allowed the agency to withhold the documents. These 
documents identified USPS employees who made a complaint to the Inspector General 
about the company.
80
 The USPS also claimed that the Inspector General Act (IGA) 
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7(D), ―an agency must show that an individual provided information to the government for the purpose of a 
criminal or national security investigation under either (1) an express assurance of confidentiality or (2) 
under circumstances that support an implied assurance of confidentiality.‖ Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & 
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justified withholding the documents because the IGA provides that such complaints are to 
be anonymous to the public at large. 
The IGA, which applies to the USPS, provided that ―[t]he Inspector General shall 
not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of 
the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General 
determines such disclosure is unavoidable.‖81 The court determined that ―these 
circumstances—the promise of confidentiality in the IGA and the pendency of the 
criminal investigation—constitute ‗circumstances that support an implied assurance of 
confidentiality…‘ and, hence, information identifying the source will be considered 
properly redacted under Exemption 7(D).‖82 Here, an external law had a direct impact as 
a term in an implied obligation of confidentiality.  
The case of Biddle v. Warren General Hospital
83
 demonstrates how external 
terms shape a physician‘s implied duty of confidentiality to his or her patients. This case 
involved the unauthorized disclosure of patient records by a hospital to law firms and, 
ultimately, the media. Biddle, a patient at Warren General Hospital in Ohio, claimed, 
among other things, that the hospital breached its duty of confidentiality to him. The 
Court of Appeals of Ohio noted: 
The duty of confidentiality is derived from several sources, the first of 
which is the statutory physician-patient privilege….Second, the 
Hippocratic Oath, although rather brief, focuses significantly on 
confidentiality and states, in part ―[w]hat I may see or hear in the course of 
the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, 
which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself 
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holding such things shameful to be spoken about.‖ Third, an Ohio 
physician's certificate to practice medicine may be revoked or suspended 
for the willful betrayal of a professional confidence. Fourth, the 
relationship between physician and patient is fiduciary in nature.
84
  
 
The Hippocratic Oath and confidentiality requirements to maintain a physician‘s 
license can be seen as external terms to an obligation, which, according to the court, is 
―assumed.‖85 The court went on to explicitly recognize the tort of breach of 
confidentiality in Ohio and reverse a grant of summary judgment that had dismissed the 
plaintiff‘s claim for breach of patient confidentiality. 
The common theme of all these cases was that if the discloser of information 
knew or should have known that the recipient was bound by some law, organizational 
code, policy, or external arrangement or agreements to keep the information confidential, 
then the law, policy, or regulation could be considered an external term regarding the 
disclosure of information and could create or dispel an implied obligation of 
confidentiality.  
CONFLICTING TERMS 
Often, a relationship can involve conflicting terms about whether certain 
information is confidential. This conflict can be significant in analyzing implied 
obligations of confidentiality. Even if the parties have a previous agreement, implied 
confidentiality can be created or dispelled by terms that conflict with that previous 
agreement. The purpose of this section is to analyze how courts responded to conflicting 
terms in claims of implied confidentiality. When faced with conflicting terms, most 
                                                 
84
 Id. at *3 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02(B), R.C. 4731.22(A)(4) and citing Hammonds v. 
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1965)). 
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courts looked at the most recent term regarding the disclosure of information to 
determine whether an implied obligation of confidentiality existed.  A notable exception 
was in instances in which explicit terms prohibited implied agreements of confidentiality. 
In such cases, courts typically refused to find an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
This research suggests that an implied obligation of confidentiality can be created 
by terms even if the parties are otherwise bound by a contract with no reference to 
confidentiality.
86
 For example, in the case of Prescott v. Morton,
87
 the plaintiff, Norman 
Prescott, claimed that an implied-in-fact confidentiality contract arose when he disclosed 
to the defendant proprietary designs for a shipping cylinder for chemical compounds 
containing metals, known as a bubbler. These designs contained statements indicating 
that they were Prescott‘s property. The defendant, Morton, disputed this claim and stated 
that an implied contract would contradict their express agreement, which was simply a 
warranty for compliance with Department of Transportation regulations.
88
  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts refused to grant 
Morton‘s motion for summary judgment and stated that the contractual agreement 
between the parties ―does not memorialize their entire relationship. A separate implied-
in-fact contract governing the dissemination of information between the parties would not 
be contradictory.‖89 Thus, the scope of a contract is critical in instances where an implied 
obligation of confidentiality is claimed within a contractual relationship. The fact that 
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confidentiality is not provided for in a contract is not necessarily evidence that no implied 
agreement of confidentiality exists. 
The case of Knapp Schenk v. Lancer Management
90
 demonstrated how an implied 
obligation of confidentiality can exist even if the obligation conflicts with an explicit 
confidentiality agreement. Here, an insurance agency (Knapp) entered into business 
discussions with another business (Lancer) for the purposes of exploring the purchase of 
Knapp‘s insurance program. The parties executed a ―Letter of Intent‖ (LOI) for the 
purchase of the program. The LOI contained a confidentiality section that bound the 
parties to confidentiality over any non-public information specifically designated as 
confidential by the disclosing party.
91
 Unfortunately, Knapp failed to designate much of 
the information it disclosed to Lancer as confidential, and Lancer ultimately disclosed 
information to third parties after negotiations between the parties dissolved.  
Knapp brought a suit against Lancer, alleging unlawful use of confidential, 
proprietary, and trade secret information acquired during sale negotiations. Knapp argued 
that even though it did not designate the disclosed information as confidential, an implied 
confidential relationship arose between the parties with respect to the disclosed 
information. Testimony revealed that Knapp verbally requested and was assured of 
confidentiality while disclosing information.
92
 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts refused to dismiss the claim before a finding of fact because ―a jury could 
find that the undisputed facts surrounding the exchange of information support an implied 
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finding of confidentiality.‖93 This case demonstrates how implied obligations of 
confidentiality can exist even when disclosures fall outside of the scope of a previous 
confidentiality agreement. 
The case of DPT Laboratories v. Bath & Body Works
94
 also demonstrates how 
implied confidentiality can exist even if an express confidentiality agreement between the 
parties does not provide for it. This case involved a dispute between two businesses that 
entered into confidentiality agreements with each other in an attempt to explore a 
potential business relationship. As part of the agreements, DPT disclosed proprietary 
body lotions to Bath & Body Works.  Bath & Body Works was promised manufacturing 
and licensing revenues if DPT could develop a new body lotion that met the defendant‘s 
criteria.
95
  
At Bath & Body Works‘s request, DPT sent Bath & Body Works a new body 
lotion for analysis. The purchase orders for these new lotions contained no restrictions on 
the use of the lotions or their underlying formulas. After receiving the new lotions, Bath 
& Body Works sent the bottles of lotion to a different laboratory with orders to create a 
formula that duplicated the qualities of DPT‘s lotion. Bath & Body Works then declined 
to enter into a business relationship with DPT and instead entered into a manufacturing 
agreement with the laboratory that duplicated DPT‘s lotions. DPT then brought a lawsuit 
alleging, among other things, trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract.  
Bath & Body Works contended that it did not violate the terms of the 
confidentiality agreement with DPT because there was no language in the purchase 
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orders for the lotion that would have prevented it from sharing the lotion with another lab 
for reverse engineering. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas 
disagreed. The court found that Bath & Body Works‘s view of its confidentiality 
obligations was too narrow.
96
 According to the court, Bath & Body Works ―has provided 
no reasonable basis as to why the lack of restricting language on the purchase orders is 
dispositive of the nature of the parties‘ relationship. The Restatement counsels against 
taking a key-hole view toward the issues in this case as [Bath & Body Works] has 
done….‖97 
The court held that Bath & Body Works‘s ―narrow view toward the scope of the 
parties‘ understanding toward confidentiality ignores the fact that misappropriation can 
be based on implied confidentiality. The Fifth Circuit has held that confidentiality may be 
implied when the recipient actively solicits the disclosure.‖98 Thus, the court clearly 
found that implied confidentiality can co-exist with express confidentiality agreements 
for similar disclosures in certain situations and, in the present case, that ―the limitation on 
[Bath & Body Works]‘s actions is not determined solely by the specific terms of the 
confidentiality agreements.‖99  
Ultimately, the court denied Bath & Body Works‘s motion for summary judgment 
and found that Bath & Body Works either knew or should have known that DPT‘s 
disclosures were made in confidence based on a number of factors:  
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(1) BBW initiated contact with DPT, (2) BBW promised substantial 
revenues if DPT's product was selected to replace BBW's lotion, and (3) 
the parties executed confidentiality agreements, supports a finding that 
BBW should have known that the lotion samples it received from DPT 
must be held in confidence and could not be used to copy DPT's lotion 
formula.
100
 
 
The confidentiality agreement in this case was actually used as evidence to support a 
claim of implied confidentiality, even though it did not explicitly provide for 
confidentiality over a specific piece of information. This case serves as a good example 
of how courts consider a number of different factors, including terms inside and outside 
of contracts, in determining whether an implied obligation of exists. 
 Terms of disclosure also could dispel an obligation of confidentiality, even if such 
an obligation was previously implied.
101
  Some courts were hesitant to find an implied 
obligation of confidentiality in information when an express confidentiality agreement 
already existed between the parties and the information at issue was not included.
102
 The 
case of Fail-Safe v. A.O. Smith
103
 involved a dispute between Fail-Safe, a manufacturer 
of devices used to prevent pool suction equipment accidents, against a manufacturer of 
motors for pool and spa pumps, A.O. Smith, over, among other things, misappropriation 
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of trade secrets. Here, the two parties entered into negotiations to develop technology to 
combat ―pool suction entrapment‖ accidents.104  
After seeing Fail-Safe‘s ad in a trade magazine, A.O. Smith contacted Fail-Safe to 
start a business relationship. The parties entered into a series of explicit agreements, one 
of which was a one-way confidentiality agreement: Fail-Safe had to keep A.O. Smith‘s 
information confidential, but A.O. Smith was not obligated to keep Fail-Safe‘s 
information confidential.  Ultimately, the relationship between the parties dissolved, and 
A.O. Smith proceeded with its development of the technology, incorporating some of the 
information disclosed by Fail-Safe. Fail-Safe claimed that A.O. Smith took its 
information under an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied that A.O. 
Smith was obligated to keep Fail-Safe‘s disclosures secret notwithstanding the fact that 
the parties entered into a confidentiality agreement that prohibited Fail-Safe from 
disclosing A.O. Smith‘s information. The court held that it was ―loathe to create out of 
wholecloth an implied confidentiality agreement where there [sic] the parties already 
signed an express confidentiality agreement that had clear provisions that were ‗one-way‘ 
in nature and did not require [A.O. Smith] to keep [Fail-Safe]‘s information 
confidential.‖105 The court focused on the fact that Fail-Safe willingly agreed to a 
confidentiality agreement that clearly protected A.O. Smith‘s information, but did 
nothing to protect its own information.
106
 According to the court, this agreement provided 
                                                 
104
 Id. According to the court, ―Pool suction entrapment occurs when a swimmer is trapped by the suction 
forces created by water rushing out of a drain in an artificial pool, such as a swimming pool, hot tub, or 
spa.‖ Id. at *1. 
105
 Id. at *21. 
106
 Id. 
182 
 
an obvious signal to the defendant that the plaintiff knew how to ask for information to be 
considered confidential if it so desired.
107
 
 While the court seemed to leave open the possibility that an implied obligation of 
confidentiality could exist notwithstanding potentially conflicting terms in an express 
agreement, the court found that there was no evidence that A.O. Smith actually knew or 
should have known that the information disclosed to it was a trade secret.
108
 Indeed, Fail-
Safe actually sent A.O. Smith a letter clarifying that no formal agreement was in place 
regarding Fail-Safe‘s proprietary information.109 This finding is consistent with the 
rulings of other courts that refused to allow a unilateral imposition of confidentiality upon 
a party that did not or could not have been expected to know of its obligation.
110
 
Explicit terms prohibiting implied agreements also can prevent an implied 
obligation of confidentiality.
111
 For example, the case of Best Western v. Furber
112
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involved a claim for implied breach of contract that arose when members who own and 
operate hotels under the hotel chain name Best Western posted allegedly confidential and 
defamatory comments concerning Best Western to a website. Best Western asserted that 
an implied confidentiality contract existed between itself and its members ―arising out of‖ 
the Best Western membership agreement and bylaws.
113
 Under Best Western‘s theory, 
the fact that the bylaws require that executive sessions of the board of directors be 
confidential serves as evidence of the confidential nature of the relationship between Best 
Western and its members.
114
  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona disagreed. It noted that the 
confidentiality provisions in the bylaws applied to the Best Western board of directors, 
not Best Western members. Additionally, the court noted that Best Western‘s 
membership agreement prohibited additional implied agreements between the parties via 
an integration clause, which provided that the written agreement represented the whole 
agreement between the parties with no other outside terms.
115
 Thus, at least one court 
found that an explicit agreement precluding implied obligations of confidentiality was 
effective. 
The cases revealed that any disclaimer of implied confidentiality must be clear 
and unambiguous to be effective. The case of Anderson v. Century Products
116
 involved a 
claim by an inventor against a manufacturer for, among other things, misappropriation of 
ideas shared within a confidential relationship. This claim arose after the plaintiff, Dana 
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Anderson, submitted an idea for a unique baby stroller to the defendant, Century, which 
was in the business of manufacturing baby strollers. Century asserted that it disclaimed 
any confidential relationship with Anderson when Anderson signed and agreed to 
Century‘s idea submission policy (ISP). Paragraph 8 of Century‘s ISP form contained a 
clause warning that ―no confidential relationship is being established‖ between the 
parties.
117
 
While the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire acknowledged 
that implied confidential relationships may be expressly disclaimed, the language in the 
ISP was not sufficient to constitute a ―clear and unambiguous‖ waiver of confidentiality. 
The court found that the term ―confidential relationship‖ was open to a number of 
interpretations.
118
 According to the court, this language could easily be interpreted to 
cover only the obligations between the parties during Century‘s review of the idea for the 
stroller and, thus, to ―exclude from the waiver‘s coverage any ties and obligations that 
arose after Century decided to affirmatively use the idea.‖119 The court continued: 
The waiver appears to only address Century's potential liability for failure 
to maintain secrecy by consulting industry experts in aid of the review 
procedure, rather than for disrespecting plaintiff's proprietary rights should 
they decide to use the idea. Granted, this may be only one of several 
reasonable understandings of the language, but this is enough for the court 
to hold that the language does not constitute a clear and unambiguous 
waiver [of confidentiality].
120
 
 
 Thus, the court found that implied obligations of confidentiality can survive 
explicit waivers if the waivers of confidentiality are not clear enough. This finding is 
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significant because it not only demonstrates the requirements for waiver, but it also 
demonstrates the relative strength of implied obligations of confidentiality. The court did 
not seem to give any less legal effect to the implied confidential relationship than it 
would an explicit one. 
EXPLICITNESS 
Courts held that terms that purportedly create implied obligations of 
confidentiality must be clear and definite enough for the promises and required 
performances of each party to be reasonably certain.
121
 When courts were presented with 
terms regarding the disclosure of information, they looked to the reasonable expectations 
of the parties at the time the terms were offered.
122
 The expectations of the parties are 
typically determined by examining ―the totality of the circumstances‖ and may be 
―shown by the acts and conduct of the parties, interpreted in the light of the subject 
matter and of the surrounding circumstances.‖123 Part of this analysis looks to how 
explicit the representations at issue are.
124
  
The case of Moore v. Marty Gilman
125
 involved a dispute between an inventor 
who created a foam ball for use in football coaching drills and a sporting goods 
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manufacturer. The inventor contacted the manufacturer about the possibility of improving 
and mass producing the inventor‘s foam ball. However, negotiations broke down, and the 
manufacturer developed and sold its own improved foam ball. The inventor then brought 
suit alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of express and implied contract, 
fraud, and unfair trade practices.
126
 
The plaintiffs – the inventor and his wife – alleged that an implied confidential 
relationship existed between the parties based on a number of express and implied terms, 
including the inventor‘s statement that negotiations would be ―between you and I,‖ 
meaning between the inventor and the manufacturer. The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts dismissed this claim of confidentiality, finding that the 
statement was not explicit enough.
127
 According to the court, that statement ―cannot 
reasonably be construed as a request for confidentiality with respect to the work that [the 
manufacturer] would be undertaking, as distinguished from a colloquial way of informing 
[the manufacturer] that he, [the inventor], would be interested in exploring the possibility 
of entering into a joint business venture with the [manufacturer].‖128  
Because the statement could easily be interpreted in a way that was not a request 
for confidentiality, the court found it was not definite or specific enough to create a 
confidential relationship. Particularly harmful to the inventor‘s case was the fact that he 
admitted that there was no confidential agreement and that confidentiality was never 
addressed in the negotiations.
129
 Although the court was open to the possibility that the 
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facts, taken as a whole, could create an implied obligation of confidentiality even if it was 
not explicitly discussed, the court found that the evidence did not support such an 
inference.
130
  
It seems axiomatic that the more specific the terms regarding a waiver of 
confidentiality, the less likely it is that confidentiality is going to be implied. Indeed, 
highly specific terms dispelled any implied obligation of confidentiality in several of the 
cases analyzed.
131
 A good example of this is the case of BDT Products v. Lexmark,
132
 
which involved a dispute between paper handling systems consultants (BDT) and a 
printer manufacturer (Lexmark). Here, the parties worked closely together on numerous 
printer projects and entered into a number of confidentiality agreements covering 
proprietary information exchanged between the parties. After Lexmark received BDT‘s 
confidential prototypes, the relationship between the parties broke down. Ultimately, 
Lexmark produced its own printer-related product that was very similar to BDT‘s. BDT 
subsequently brought suit based on an implied contract of confidentiality and 
misappropriation of trade secrets. 
In establishing that Lexmark used BDT‘s trade secrets without express or implied 
consent, BDT relied upon evidence that confidentiality was implied. However, this 
evidence contradicted the explicit written terms between the parties. The court stated that 
―[b]ecause it is undisputed that the parties repeatedly entered into confidentiality 
agreements that expressly and unambiguously disclaimed any restrictions on Lexmark's 
use of information provided by BDT, it is axiomatic that no express or implied duty 
                                                 
130
 Id. at 213-16. 
131
 See, e.g., Watson v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 207 P.3d 860, 868 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008). 
132
 274 F. Supp. 2d 880 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
188 
 
restricting Lexmark's use of such information can be found here.‖133 BDT tried to 
establish that a subsequent confidentiality agreement, which could not be found, 
superseded the previous agreements and protected the information at issue. However, the 
court found that there was no ―clear and satisfactory‖ proof that the subsequent 
agreement existed and that the plaintiff, at best, could provide only a ―vague uncertain 
recollection‖ of the agreement.134 Thus, these terms were not explicit enough to 
contradict the express agreement. 
Courts would only infer a term of confidentiality between the parties only if it was 
abundantly clear that the parties intended to be bound to confidentiality.
135
 A good 
example of this approach is the case of Bakare v. Pinnacle Health Hospitals,
136
 which 
involved a clam by a physician, Dr. Bakare, against the hospital that employed him. 
Bakare alleged, among other things, breach of an implied obligation of confidentiality 
based on the disclosure of disciplinary and review proceedings against him by a hospital 
review board.
137
 The plaintiff alleged that there was a contract of confidentiality between 
                                                 
133
 Id. at 894 (citations omitted). 
134
 Id. at 895-96. 
135
 See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, LLC v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 1998 WL 46894 (N.D. Ill.) (―PlayWood 
offers a vague assertion that because a confidentiality agreement existed, there was an intention to be 
bound. But PlayWood does not specify what the parties were bound to….Thus, there is no evidence that 
there was a ‗meeting of the minds‘….‖); Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 2000 WL 223833 
(S.D.N.Y.) (denying a claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract for, among other things, confidentiality 
because the agreement between the parties was too vague and lacked essential terms such as payment); 
Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 92 Misc. 2d 764 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1978). 
136
 469 F. Supp. 2d 272 (M.D. Penn. 2006). 
137
 Id. at 269-98. 
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the parties based on a confidentiality policy expressed during the meeting of the 
―credentialing committee‖ or ―MEC‖ that reviewed the allegations against him.138 
Bakare claimed that the breach of confidential contract occurred when a member 
of the MEC communicated the existence and substance of the proceedings against Bakare 
to nurses in an operating room lounge. Bakare claimed another breach occurred when 
another MEC member  told the hospital‘s potential business partner‘s CEO that Bakare 
could no longer serve as supervisor of a joint business operation. Bakare also claimed a 
breach of confidentiality when another member of the MEC wrote letters to two 
midwives informing them that Bakare no longer had privileges at the hospital.
139
 The 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania did not support these claims. 
First, the court recognized that ―there is no express term of confidentiality in the Medical 
Staff Bylaws, the only written understanding between [defendant] Pinnacle and Dr. 
Bakare.‖140 The court went on to state: 
To the extent that Dr. Bakare contends that Pinnacle breached an implied 
obligation of confidentiality based upon of Pinnacle's policy of 
confidentiality regarding MEC proceedings or the relationship between 
Pinnacle as a health care provider and Dr. Bakare as a staff physician, the 
court is unpersuaded. Under the doctrine of necessary implication in 
Pennsylvania, ―[a] court may imply a missing term in a parties' contract 
only when it is necessary to prevent injustice and it is abundantly clear 
that the parties intended to be bound by such term.‖141 
                                                 
138
 Id. According to the court, the ―MEC is a committee of [the defendant‘s] medical staff charged, in part, 
with ensuring competent clinical performance for all members with clinical privileges.‖ Id. at 281 n.7. The 
court did not specify what the letters in the acronym MEC stand for. 
139
 Id. at 297 n.52. 
140
 Id. at 297. 
141
 Id. (quoting Glassmere Fuel Service, Inc. v. Clear, 900 A.2d 398, 403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)); see also In 
re IT Group, Inc., 448 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 2006) (―[The doctrine of necessary implication] is only 
employed to imply an agreement by the parties to a contract to do and perform those things that according 
to reason and justice they should do in order to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made and 
to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the 
contract.‖ (emphasis removed)). 
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The court found that no clear evidence of an implied confidentiality 
agreement..
142
 The court found that it was erroneous for Bakare to rely upon the 
confidentiality policy expressed during MEC proceedings by MEC members. The court 
found that this ―reliance is misplaced because no such policy is identified in or implicated 
by Dr. Bakare's contract with Pinnacle. MEC's confidentiality policy is irrelevant to Dr. 
Bakare's contract claim. Accordingly, the court finds that the parties did not clearly 
intend to be bound by a confidentiality term.‖143  
As a result, the court did not imply confidentiality into the parties' contract. This 
case demonstrates that terms of confidentiality must not only be specific with respect to 
what information is to be kept confidential, but the term must also have a close nexus to 
the party asserting confidentiality. Otherwise, the term is potentially too vague to be seen 
as a recipient‘s expression of an intention to be bound by an implied obligation of 
confidentiality.  
Vagueness of terms was not always a bar to an implied obligation of 
confidentiality, however. A good example of this is the case of Copley Press v. Superior 
Court,
144
 which involved a request by a newspaper publishing company for access to 
confidential jury questionnaires completed by prospective jurors in a capital murder case. 
The court had informed the jurors that their responses to the questions would be 
distributed only to trial participants.
145
 Specifically, a California Court of Appeal noted 
                                                 
142
 Id. 
143
 Id. 
144
 228 Cal. App. 3d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
145
 Id. 
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that ―each prospective juror was informed [that] the questionnaire he or she filled out 
would become part of the court's permanent record.... [Another representation was made] 
that the questionnaires they filled out would ‗not be distributed to anyone except [the 
judge], [the judge's] staff, and the attorneys in the case while it is pending.‘‖146 The court 
held:  
Despite the vagueness of this implied assurance of confidentiality, we 
have no doubt that the venirepersons inferred that the questionnaires they 
filled out were going to be permanently confidential. In our view, under 
the circumstances presented here, it does not matter that this 
representation was more of an implied promise of confidentiality than an 
explicit one.
147
 
 
Thus, according to this court, a certain amount of vagueness is tolerated so long as the 
obligations and expectations of the parties can be ascertained.
148
 The court ultimately 
held that ―general principles of estoppel should bar release of the questionnaires used in 
this case‖ and did not order their release.149 This supports Nissenbaum‘s holistic 
approach, which incorporates other factors besides the terms of disclosure in implied 
obligations of confidentiality.  
CONCLUSION 
The terms that in some way restrict the flow of information in a given context are 
arguably the most significant to courts in implied obligations of confidentiality. However, 
the cases revealed that these terms are only significant to the extent that they are or 
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 Id. at 89. 
147
 Id. at 89 n.9. 
148
 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 156 (Md. 2011) (―Detective Schrott's words, ‗This is between you 
and me bud. Only me and you are here, all right? All right?,‘ on their face imply confidentiality…. No 
reasonable lay person would have understood those words to mean anything other than that the 
conversation, at that moment and thereafter, even if not before, was ‗between‘ only Detective Schrott and 
Petitioner.‖). 
149
 Id. at 90. 
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should be perceived by one or all of the parties to a disclosure of information. This desire 
to locate what was known or should have been known by the parties is consistent with the 
courts‘ analysis of the three other factors in Nissenbaum‘s theory of contextual integrity.  
 The most common terms explicitly recognized by courts were those indicating 
either a desire for confidentiality or that confidentiality of information would be 
respected. If perceived, these terms could justify reliance by the parties, which can be the 
basis of contract or promissory estoppel. These types of terms, referred to here as 
―confidentiality indicators,‖ were perhaps the most significant to courts. Courts were 
more likely to find an implied obligation of confidentiality if confidentiality indicators 
were present. Courts applied this logic even if subsequent terms conflicted with previous 
terms, unless an explicit contract prohibited implied terms of confidentiality. 
Courts also looked to the clarity of terms. Terms that purportedly create implied 
obligations of confidentiality must be clear and definite enough for the promises and 
performances of each party to be reasonably certain. Finally, courts looked to external 
terms, e.g., terms like external laws, organizational codes, policies, and external 
arrangements and agreements that might impact an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Courts typically found external terms significant in implied confidentiality disputes only 
if the discloser or recipient either knew or should have known about the terms. 
. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND A DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to provide a clear picture of how 
courts determine whether an implied obligation of confidentiality exists and how such 
obligations are established when information is self-disclosed in various contexts. 
Unsurprisingly, the discloser and recipient‘s perception of confidentiality was considered 
paramount by courts deciding cases involving implied obligations of confidentiality. The 
cases revealed that a number of factors can affect the perceptions of the parties, including 
industry customs, unequal bargaining power, the sensitivity of information, the relative 
vulnerability or sophistication of the parties, and indications of a desire for confidentiality 
or indications that confidentiality will be kept. These factors have not been synthesized in 
the case law. Instead, the cases revealed these factors were considered by the courts 
without reference to a larger framework. 
A second purpose of this research was to contribute to the existing scholarship on 
Nissenbaum‘s theory of privacy as contextual integrity.  The theory of privacy as 
contextual integrity is the theory that privacy violations occur when the context in which 
information is disclosed is not respected when one person shares another‘s personal 
information. According to Nissenbaum, privacy and confidentiality cannot be adequately 
analyzed without looking at the informational norms within a given context.
1
 Nissenbaum 
                                                 
1
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identified four factors relevant to informational norms: 1) context, 2) the nature of the 
information, 3) actors, and 4) terms of disclosure.  
The cases revealed that all four of Nissenbaum‘s factors were important to courts 
in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. The context of the disclosure and 
terms of disclosure were the most significant factors to courts. However, the nature of the 
information and the attributes of the actors also had significant effects on the creation of 
an implied obligation of confidentiality. Thus, the theory of contextual integrity seems to 
be a good basis for a framework for analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. 
Indeed, virtually every fact considered important by the courts could fall within the ambit 
of at least one or more of the four factors.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of this dissertation. First, 
this chapter presents a brief summary of the findings by answering the research questions 
posed in Chapter I. This summary includes a discussion of the themes arising out of the 
cases. Next, this chapter synthesizes the findings into a decision-making framework for 
courts in the digital era. This chapter concludes by suggesting areas of future research. 
FINDINGS 
The goal of this dissertation was to ascertain what courts consider important in 
disputes involving implied obligations of confidentiality.  To accomplish this goal, this 
dissertation explored four primary research questions: 
* What factors have courts considered important in analyzing alleged implied obligations 
of confidentiality?   
* Are these variables considered differently in online and offline cases?  If so, how?   
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* How does this analysis contribute to Nissenbaum‘s theory of privacy as contextual 
integrity?  
* How can these factors best form a decision-making framework for courts to use in 
analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality? 
These research questions were addressed as follows: 
The first research question of this dissertation, what factors have courts 
considered important in analyzing alleged implied obligations of confidentiality, 
specifically asked: 
 How have courts considered the context in which information was disclosed? 
 How have courts considered the roles played by the senders, recipients, and 
subjects of disclosed information? 
 How have courts considered the nature of the information disclosed? 
 How have courts considered the terms of disclosure? 
This dissertation reviewed 132 cases involving implied obligations of 
confidentiality to determine how courts consider contextual informational norms in these 
disputes.  The charts below summarize the number of cases in which courts expressly 
found each of Nissenbaum‘s factors either contributed to or detracted from a finding of 
an implied obligation of confidentiality: 
Figure 1: Factors Considered Important in Analyzing Implied Obligations of 
Confidentiality 
Factor Number of cases 
Context 88 
Nature of the information  44 
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Actor attributes 28 
Terms of disclosure 66 
 
In the cases analyzed for this dissertation, courts gave the most attention to 
context and the terms of disclosure. However, all four factors were relevant to courts. 
These numbers reflect only cases in which a court expressly considered one of the factors 
and where the court‘s consideration was significant. In a number of excluded cases, it 
was possible that one of the four factors influenced the judge‘s opinion, but because that 
consideration was not apparent, it was not included in the analysis. Additionally, in other 
excluded cases, courts expressly mentioned one or more of the four factors, but the 
factors did not appear to play a significant role in the legal analysis. For example, courts 
often would describe the job title of actors in disputes where the jobs held by the actors 
were largely immaterial to the implied confidentiality analysis. These cases also were not 
included in this dissertation. 
Each factor considered by the courts consisted of numerous smaller 
considerations. In aggregate, these considerations reflected trends in judicial decision-
making. For example, courts seemed to be looking for inequalities between the parties 
when they considered the relationship between the parties and the vulnerability or 
sophistication of the actors. Implied obligations of confidentiality were much more likely 
when the discloser of information was inherently vulnerable or not on equal footing with 
the recipient of information. Courts looked to factors outside of the relationship that 
could have shaped the actual perception of confidentiality by the parties when 
considering contextual factors such as industry customs and external terms of disclosure 
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such as professional codes of conduct. Thus, after the factors are considered individually, 
then as a group, themes of inequality and perceptions of the parties arise. 
Figure 2: Context 
 
Contextual Factor Number of Cases 
Relationship between the parties 44 
Custom 23 
Negotiation 22 
Timing of the disclosure 15 
Purpose of the disclosure 12 
Solicitation 8 
Public policy 5 
 
Context was one of the two most important factors for courts in analyzing implied 
obligations of confidentiality. Many different contexts could contribute to or detract from 
a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality.  Courts looked to business and 
industry custom, the presence and nature of negotiations, the nature of the relationship 
between the parties, the purpose of the disclosure, whether and how the information was 
solicited, the timing of the disclosure, and public policy when determining whether an 
implied obligation of confidentiality existed. While no one factor seemed to dominate the 
analysis, it is clear that courts considered developed relationships, the ability to negotiate, 
unequal bargaining power, and entrenched normative expectations of confidentiality as 
key components of implied obligations of confidentiality.  
198 
 
All of these factors seemed to reveal two things important to courts: mutual 
agreement between the parties and one party being more vulnerable to harm or coercion 
than the other. The courts‘ search for mutuality is reflected in the courts‘ attempts to 
locate and support the shared goals and expectations of the parties. Some factors, such as 
custom and negotiation, were seen as evidence of a knowing and voluntary acceptance of 
implied obligations of confidentiality. For example, if confidentiality was a widely 
accepted custom between inventors and investors in certain industries, then courts were 
likely to find that the parties in a dispute understood and relied upon implied 
confidentiality. 
Other factors, such as the purpose of the disclosure, were seen as supporting an 
implied obligation of confidentiality when the mutual goals of the parties could not be 
fulfilled without such an obligation. For example, physicians could not properly diagnose 
a patient without full disclosure of the patient‘s medical history.  Given the sensitive 
nature of a person‘s medical history, implied confidentiality was seen as necessary for the 
physician-patient relationship to properly function.   
Evidence that the parties to a disclosure had a developed relationship increased 
the likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality. The courts‘ logic seemed to be 
that as relationships develop, the need to explicitly request confidentiality decreases 
because the expectations between the parties become implicit through a course of 
dealing. Courts also consistently looked to whether one party in a relationship was more 
vulnerable to harm or coercion than the other. Contexts that left the disclosing party 
vulnerable to harm were seen as evidence of a voluntary assumption of confidentiality by 
the less vulnerable party as well as justification for building implied confidentiality into 
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certain relationships. Courts recognized that vulnerable parties were more likely to need, 
but be unable to request, confidentiality than parties on equal footing. Thus, it was 
reasonable and likely that the recipients of information knew or should have known 
confidentiality was implied in their relationships with vulnerable parties. 
Figure 3: Type of the Information 
 
Type of information Number of Cases 
Secret information 20 
Highly personal information 16 
Proprietary or useful information 15 
Information Exposing Discloser or Subject to Physical Harm 8 
Information that is likely to be shared 5 
 
Courts used the vulnerabilities of the parties to justify their reliance on the type of 
information in analyzing implied obligations of confidentiality. Courts tended to find 
implied obligations of confidentiality in situations involving information that, if 
disclosed, could harm the discloser of information.  Four types of information increased 
the likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality. These kinds of information are 
related and are often the same, but they are discreet enough to be considered separately. 
Secret information, highly personal information, proprietary or useful information, and 
information exposing the discloser or subject to physical harm all increased the likelihood 
of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
One kind of information decreased the likelihood of a finding of confidentiality. If 
courts found that information was inherently the kind that would be shared with others, 
200 
 
then an implied obligation of confidentiality was unlikely. This determination was highly 
contextual and usually depended on the relationship between the parties. Only highly 
―viral‖ information eroded the likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Courts clearly believed that some types of information served as cues to the 
recipient that the information was confidential. Secrets, sensitive health information, and 
valuable proprietary information were the kinds of information that, by their nature, 
would or should be seen by the recipient as confidential. Courts seemed to recognize that 
an inference of confidentiality was much more reasonable in these circumstances because 
the average person should have been on notice to treat the disclosed information more 
discreetly than other kinds of information. 
Figure 4: Actor Attributes 
 
Actor Attribute Number of Cases 
Vulnerability or sophistication 22 
Resources 8 
Bad-faith 3 
 
Courts considered the attributes of the actors in the fewest number of cases of any 
factor. Even with such a small number, the cases revealed courts‘ tendency to look to 
party inequality when finding an implied obligation of confidentiality. The cases revealed 
that vulnerability and an imbalance of power or sophistication were the most significant 
actor-related factors for courts analyzing obligations of confidentiality.  To courts, some 
actors who disclosed information were seen as inherently vulnerable, such as the infirm 
and elderly, while others were vulnerable because they were less sophisticated than the 
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recipient of information. Courts also looked to whether there was an imbalance of 
resources between the parties, which in a few cases resulted in a de facto distinction 
between individual disclosers and corporate or group recipients of information.   
Finally, several courts considered whether the recipient of information acted in 
bad faith in receiving information. Bad-faith actors were more likely to be bound by an 
implied obligation of confidentiality than good-faith actors. Here, courts sought to 
discourage recipients of information from acting in bad faith to gain the confidence of the 
discloser by preventing them from disclosing their unjustly received information. 
Additionally, actions made in bad faith served as evidence to courts that the recipient 
knew that the received information was disclosed in confidence. Otherwise, according to 
the logic of the courts, acting in bad faith would not have been necessary to gain the 
information. 
Figure 5: Terms of Disclosure 
 
Kinds of Terms Number of Cases 
Confidentiality indicators 38 
          Terms indicating a desire for confidentiality 24 
          Terms indicating confidence will be kept 14 
External Terms 15 
  
Term-related Considerations  
Conflicting terms 22 
Explicitness 17 
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Of Nissenbaum‘s four factors of context-relative informational norms, terms were 
perhaps the most significant to courts in in analyzing implied obligations of 
confidentiality. Terms are defined as stipulations or conditions under which transfers of 
information ought (or ought not) to occur.  Terms of disclosure can be explicit in or 
inferred from a virtually limitless number of contexts. Unsurprisingly, courts placed the 
most emphasis on any term that would have been apparent to the other party. Thus, the 
perception of terms seemed to be the most justification for courts relying on terms to 
analyze implied obligations of confidentiality. The most common terms explicitly 
recognized by courts were those indicating either a desire for confidentiality or that the 
confidentiality of information would be respected. If perceived, these terms could justify 
reliance by the parties. These types of terms, referred to here as ―confidentiality 
indicators,‖ were persuasive to courts in finding an implied obligation of confidentiality.  
Courts also looked to external terms, e.g., terms like laws, organizational codes, 
policies, and external arrangements and agreements that might shape an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. For example, in cases involving a physician‘s implied 
obligation of confidentiality to his or her client, courts looked to external laws such as a 
state‘s professional licensing requirements, statutes, and the Hippocratic Oath to affirm 
the implied obligation. Courts typically found that external terms were significant in 
implied confidentiality disputes if the discloser or recipient either knew or should have 
known about the terms. 
Courts found confidentiality indicators persuasive even if they conflicted with 
previous terms. The only time confidentiality indicators seemed to have no significance 
to courts was when a written agreement explicitly prohibited implied terms of 
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confidentiality. Courts also found that clear and specific terms contributed to an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. Courts held that terms that purportedly create implied 
obligations of confidentiality must be clear and definite enough for the promises and 
expected performances of each party to be reasonably certain.  
THEMES FROM THE CASE LAW 
A few themes dominated the cases. First, the cases made it clear that the parties‘ 
perceptions of confidentiality were paramount in implied obligations of confidentiality. 
This could be seen most prominently in the courts‘ focus on industry customs, sensitive 
information, confidentiality indicators, and external terms. Courts found that the presence 
of all of these factors contributed to a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality 
because their presence made it likely that such an obligation was or should have been 
perceived by the parties.  
Additionally, after the perception of confidentiality, the most important factor for 
courts in finding an implied obligation of confidentiality was the inequalities between the 
parties. A disclosure involving parties that had similar resources, sophistication, or 
bargaining power was unlikely to be subject to an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
However, if the discloser of information was either inherently vulnerable, had fewer 
resources, had less bargaining power, or was less sophisticated than the recipient, then an 
implied obligation of confidentiality was more likely than with similarly situated parties.  
The Importance of Perception. Courts found that the parties‘ perception of 
confidentiality was paramount in implying an obligation of confidentiality. With the 
exception of duties of confidentiality that are implied-in-law, courts consistently looked 
to the facts to determine if the parties knew or should have known that the information 
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was disclosed in confidence.
2
 The importance of perception can be seen in the factors of 
context, the nature of the information, and the terms of disclosure.  
Regarding context, courts found that parties in developed relationships are more 
likely to be aware of implicit expectations of confidentiality than strangers.
3
 Additionally, 
courts looked to whether an industry or other entity maintained a custom of 
confidentiality.
4
 A discloser‘s reliance upon custom was reasonable because the common 
knowledge of a custom made it likely that the recipient of the information was aware of 
an expectation of confidentiality before the information was disclosed, or, in any event, 
should have known to keep the information confidential. 
Courts found that certain kinds of sensitive information were significant in the 
formation of implied obligations of confidentiality. The sensitive nature of disclosed 
information, according to the courts, should have signaled to the recipient that the 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 2010 WL 3503427 at *21 (E.D. Wis.) (―None of the letters 
or data…bared any symbol denoting that the information contained therein was confidential. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that FS even told AOS that the Colorado company considered the information in 
question confidential.‖); Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Flotec v. Southern 
Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 
F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1991); Furr's Inc. v. United Specialty Adver. Co., 385 S.W.2d 456, 459-60 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1964) (―Confidential relationship is a two-way street: if the disclosure is made in confidence, the 
‗disclosee‘ should be aware of it. He must know that the secret is being revealed to him on the condition he 
is under a duty to keep it.‖); Sentinel Products Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 2001 WL 92272 (D. Mass. 
2001). 
3
 See, e.g., Paul v. Aviva Life and Annuity Co., 2010 WL 5105925 (N.D. Tex.); Hogan v. DC Comics, 
1997 WL 570871 at *6 (N.D.N.Y.); Fischer v. Viacom Int‘l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 2000); 
Markogianis v. Burger King Corp., 1997 WL 167113 (S.D.N.Y.). 
4
 See Bergin v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 2000 WL 223833 at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y.); Vantage Point v. 
Parker Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1217-18 (1981); Markogianis v. Burger King Co., 1997 WL 167113 
(S.D.N.Y.) (noting that ―[i]ndustry custom can create an implied-in-fact contract between the parties‖); 
Prescott v. Morton Int‘l, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 404, 410 (1990) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists ―as to whether the parties‘ conduct would lead a reasonable person in the industry to infer that 
Morton promised not to use the information in the design plans without authorization‖); Metrano v. Fox 
Broadcasting Co., 2000 WL 979664 (C.D. Cal.); Moore v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 
1997). 
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information was confidential.
5
 Conversely, courts found that information that was likely 
to be shared should have signaled to the discloser that the information was unlikely to be 
considered confidential.
6
 
The importance of perception was most evident when courts considered 
confidentiality indicators, i.e., signals, statements, or actions that indicate either a desire 
for confidentiality or an assumption or an indication that confidence would be kept.
7
 
Confidentiality indicators serve the evidentiary function of demonstrating that the parties 
knew or should have known that the information was disclosed in confidence.
8
 Courts 
applied this same logic of confidentiality indicators to external terms, i.e., external laws, 
organizational codes, policies, and external arrangements and agreements affecting the 
disclosure of information between the parties.
9
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 See, e.g., Flotec v. Southern Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ind. 1998).  
6
 See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info., LLC, 2010 WL 743878 (D. Or.). 
7
 See, e.g., Grayton v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 327 (Fed. Cl. 2010); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. 
Supp. 664, 679-82  (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that no obligation of confidentiality existed for any disclosure 
not explicitly marked as ―confidential‖ under a pre-existing agreement regarding use of disclosed 
information within a business relationship); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1114 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1984); Rogers v. Desa Int‘l, Inc., 183 F. Supp.2d  955, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that a 
claim of implied confidentiality is without merit where, among other things, the plaintiff  ―did not indicate 
on the video tape he sent [to the defendant], either in the video itself or on an outside label, that information 
contained therein was confidential‖); Daily Int‘l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no implied obligation of confidentiality where, among other things, ―[n]o 
documents were stamped or labeled with the word ‗confidential‘ or like warnings‖); Neimi v. Am. Axle 
Mnfg. & Holding, Inc., 2007 WL 29383 at *4 (Mich. Ct. App.) (finding no implied obligation of 
confidentiality where, among other things, plaintiffs ―did not make any reasonable efforts to preserve the 
confidentiality of the designs provided to the defendants. They did not mark the documents as confidential, 
or require an express agreement of confidentiality.‖). 
8
 See supra note 5. 
9
 See, e.g., Biddle v. Warrant Gen. Hosp., 1998 WL 156997 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998);Overstreet v. TRW 
Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008) (looking to state statutes such as the Patients‘ 
Privacy Protection Act and the Workers‘ Compensation Act that convey a public policy favoring the 
confidentiality of medical information in order to support an implied-in-law covenant of confidentiality 
between a patient and a doctor); Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tenn. 2006) (citing 
multiple sections of the Tennessee Code in finding an implied covenant of confidentiality in medical-care 
contracts between treating physicians and their patients. These statutes, according to the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee, ―are indicative of the General Assembly‘s desire to keep confidential a patient‘s medical 
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 The courts‘ focus on perception seemed to be motivated by a desire for fairness in 
the dealings between the parties. Courts held that in most circumstances a recipient of 
information could not be held to an implied obligation of confidentiality unless the 
recipient was or should have been aware of his or her obligation of confidentiality. 
According to courts, it would be unjust to hold a recipient to an obligation of which the 
recipient had no knowledge. 
 Courts also were hesitant to find an implied obligation of confidentiality when the 
discloser of information was aware or should have been aware that confidentiality was 
not implied. This too was a conclusion based on fairness and equity between the parties. 
To allow disclosers to claim confidentiality notwithstanding the fact that the discloser 
knew otherwise would be opportunistic. This result also would be unfair to recipients 
who were likely under the impression that they were not under an obligation of 
confidentiality. By focusing on the true agreement and expectations of the parties, courts 
attempted to make implied obligations of confidentiality as equitable as possible.  
Party Inequalities. Apart from the perceptions of the parties, the single most 
substantial factor in finding an implied obligation of confidentiality was any significant 
                                                                                                                                                 
records and identifying information.‖); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 
1985) (looking to external sources such as professional regulations to find a physician‘s nonconsensual 
duty of confidentiality to his or her patient); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 
(N.D. Ohio 1965); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 484-46 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982) (citing several 
statutes and regulations requiring physicians to protect the confidentiality of patients‘ information in 
finding that physicians impliedly promise to keep patients‘ information confidential as a matter of, among 
other things, contract); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1977); Givens v. Mullikin ex. Rel. 
Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002) (finding an implied obligation of confidentiality via a 
contract between a patient and physician based on, among other things, statutes requiring the physician to 
respect the patient‘s confidential information); cf Suarez v. Pierard, 663 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ill. Ct. Ap. 
1996) (finding that the state‘s Pharmacy Practice Act does not create an implied contract of confidentiality 
between pharmacists and their patients because, among other reasons, the relevant provision was not in 
effect when the alleged contract was made); Ghayoumi v. McMillan, 2006 WL 1994556 (Tenn. Ct. App.) 
(―[T]here can be no covenant of confidentiality, implied or agreed, because the relationship between 
Plaintiff and Defendant resulted from a court order that necessitated disclosure of Defendant‘s 
communications with Plaintiff and his family members and mandated disclosure of his evaluations, report 
and recommendations to the Court and parties.‖). 
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inequality between the parties. If the discloser of information was significantly 
disadvantaged due to an inequality with the recipient of the information, then an implied 
obligation of confidentiality was more likely than if the parties were on equal footing.  
Courts looked at factors in relation to the other party to a disclosure, such as the 
amount of resources, sophistication, leverage, and ability to negotiate. They also looked 
at inherent vulnerabilities, such as whether the discloser of information was infirm, 
elderly, destitute, or otherwise of such a limited capacity as to justify imposition of an 
implied obligation of confidentiality. This implied confidentiality was justified as a way 
to protect the disclosers of information. 
Party inequalities played a role in obligations of confidentiality both implied-in-
fact and implied-in-law. In some instances, readily apparent inequality between the 
parties served as evidence that the recipient of information should have been more aware 
of a need for confidentiality or of the discloser‘s limited capacity to request 
confidentiality. For example, unsophisticated parties who are not familiar with formal 
confidentiality agreements are likely to trust a seasoned businessperson in business 
negotiations and exercise little scrutiny. These situations increase the likelihood that the 
discloser will assume confidentiality instead of requesting an explicit promise of 
confidentiality from the businessperson. Conversely, parties with equally sufficient 
resources and sophistication in business negotiations are unlikely to rely upon implied 
obligations of confidentiality because they both have significant experience with 
confidentiality agreements.
10
 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., L-3 Comm. v. OSI Sys., 2008 WL 2595176 at *5 (2d Cir.) (―[The defendant] was not 
vulnerable to [the plaintiff] in a way that could give rise to an implied confidential relationship. The parties 
started off on equal footing. Both were sophisticated corporations, experienced in acquisitions, and 
represented by counsel.‖); Fail-Safe LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 744 F.Supp.2d 831, 858 (E.D. Wis. 2010) 
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Courts also found that party inequality could justify the implication of 
confidentiality in absence of an agreement between the parties.
11
 For example, courts 
often were willing to find an implied obligation of confidentiality in relationships 
involving unequal bargaining power.
12
 Unequal bargaining power was seen as a critical 
component in fiduciary relationships.
13
 Because one of the core tenants of fiduciary 
duties is to prohibit one party from taking advantage of a relationship at the expense of 
the vulnerable party, the courts‘ preference seems to be for equity between the parties.  
Several courts specified that certain kinds of relationships, such as joint ventures, 
principal-agent,
14
 physician-patient,
15
 accountant/attorney-client,
16
 employer-employee,
17
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(finding it remarkable the plaintiff failed to obtain a confidentiality agreement because, among other 
reasons, the plaintiff ―was a sophisticated business operative that had entered into confidentiality 
agreements with companies who were doing business with the plaintiff in the past‖); Young Design v. 
Telectronics, 2001 WL 35804500 (E.D. Va.); Omnitech v. Clorox, 11 F.3d 1316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(finding no implied obligation of confidentiality because, among other things, ―the record in this case is 
replete with evidence that Omnitech and Clorox had only an arms-length business relationship, including 
undisputed testimony that…both sides were represented by competent counsel in the drafting and 
consummation of the agreements‖). 
11
 See, e.g., Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006) (―[T]he covenant of 
confidentiality arises not only from the implied understanding of the agreement between a patient and a 
doctor, but also from a policy concern that such private and potentially embarrassing information should be 
protected from public view.‖); Overstreet v. TRW Com. Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 634 (Tenn. 2008); 
Biddle v. Warren General Hosp., 1998 WL 156997 at *12 (Ohio Ct. App.) (finding that in confidential 
relationships between physicians and patients ―there is no indication that patients bargain for 
confidentiality; rather, it is assumed‖); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 
1985). 
12
 See, e.g., Paul v. Aviva Life and Annuity Co., 2010 WL 5105925  at *9 (N.D. Tex.)(citing Martin v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004)). 
13
 Paul v. Aviva Life and Annuity Co., 2010 WL 5105925  at *9 (N.D. Tex.) (citing Martin v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. App. 2004)). 
14
 See, e.g. McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). The court of appeals of 
Texas elaborated on the nature of fiduciary and confidential  relationships, stating: 
There are two types of fiduciary relationships: formal fiduciary relationships that arise as 
a matter of law, such as partnerships and principal-agent relationships, and informal 
fiduciary relationships or ―confidential relationships‖ that may arise from moral, social, 
domestic, or personal relationships. A fiduciary relationship is an extraordinary one and 
will not be created lightly. The mere fact that one party to a relationship subjectively 
trusts the other does not indicate the existence of a fiduciary relationship. A person is 
justified in believing another to be his fiduciary ―only where he or she is accustomed to 
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and those involving trusted advisors, were likely to involve an implied obligation of 
confidentiality.
18
 All of these relationships involved vulnerable parties in that the party 
must disclose confidential information for the relationship to function. It is this disclosure 
of confidential information that leaves the disclosers of information vulnerable to the 
recipient. Courts also protected these relationships with implied obligations of 
confidentiality as a matter of public policy.
19
 Some relationships that required 
confidentiality, such as attorney-client and physician-patient, were seen as beneficial to 
society as a whole and, thus, warranted a legally implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Ultimately, it appears that the perceptions of the parties and party inequality are 
the two most important factors to courts that have analyzed implied obligations of 
confidentiality. In nearly every case, the court either expressly mentioned or implicitly 
suggested that its decision was based on one or both of these factors. Thus, if a decision-
                                                                                                                                                 
being guided by the judgment and advice of the other party, and there exists a long 
association in a business relationship, as well as a personal friendship.‖ 
Id. at 829 (citations omitted). 
15
 See, e.g., Crippen v. Charter Southland Hosp., Inc., 534 So. 2d 286 (Ala. 1988) (finding a duty of 
confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship); Anderson v. Strong Mem‘l Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1988) (finding that ―the physician-patient relationship itself gives rise to an implied 
covenant of confidence and trust when breached‖); Givens v. Mullikin ex rel Estate of McElwaney, 75 
S.W. 3d 383, 407 (Tenn. 2002). 
16
 See, e.g., Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 19 Ohio App. 3d 7, 12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). 
17
 See, e.g., SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing established 
precedent that ―in some circumstances, an agreement not to disclose a former employer‘s trade secrets may 
be implied from the confidential nature of the employment relationship‖) (emphasis in original); Sweetzel, 
Inc. v. Hawk Hill Cookies, Inc., 1995 WL 550585 at *12 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
18
 See, e.g., Omnitceh Intern., Inc., v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a fiduciary 
relationship between business partners, attorneys and their clients, the insured and their insurers, and 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders). 
19
 Metrano v. Fox Broadcasting  Co., Inc., 2000 WL 979664 (C.D. Cal.); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 214 
(N.Y. Gen. Term. 1977); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982); Ghayoumi v. 
McMillan, 2006 WL 1994556 (Tenn. Ct. App.); Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 407 (Tenn. 2002); 
Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006). 
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making framework is to be constructed based on judicial considerations of implied 
obligations of confidentiality, it should be built around these central concerns. 
No Difference Between Online and Offline Cases. The second research 
question was ―Are these variables considered differently in online and offline cases?‖ 
Ultimately, this dissertation found no discernable difference between online and offline 
implied obligations of confidentiality. This finding indicates that the rationale employed 
by courts in offline cases would apply to online cases as well. Almost all of the cases 
analyzed were offline, and of those offline cases, most of them were in the healthcare or 
business negotiations context. Of the 132 cases analyzed for this dissertation, only seven 
dealt with online-related disputes.
20
 Those seven disputes, like the offline cases, were 
largely commercial. 
It is unclear exactly why so few cases of implied obligations of confidentiality 
arose online. The scarcity of case law might be partially due to the fact that the Internet is 
a relatively new technology. The earliest case analyzed in this dissertation dealing with 
an online-related dispute was in 2007.  Additionally, the prevalence of privacy policies 
and terms-of-use agreements, which typically address confidentiality-related agreements, 
might be seen as preempting implied obligations of confidentiality between websites and 
users. Thus, given the presence of these explicit agreements, implied agreements of 
confidentiality might not play a large role in the relationships between websites and 
users. 
                                                 
20
 In re Easysaver Rewards Litigation, 2010 WL 3259752 (S.D. Cal); Google, Inc. v. Traffic Info, LLC, 
2010 WL 743878 (D. Or.); Best Western Int‘l v. Furber, 2008 WL 4182827 (D. Ariz); London v. New 
Alberton‘s, Inc., 2008 WL 4492642 (S.D. Cal.); Watson v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 207 P.3d 860 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2008); Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp., 449 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007); Southwest v. Boardfirst, 
LLC, 2007 WL 4823761 (N.D. Tex.). 
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However, the omnipresence of terms of use and privacy policies is deceptive 
because they are not always enforceable. Additionally, implied confidentiality can exist 
in a number of online contexts. For example, implied confidentiality could exist between 
two Internet users, not just between users and websites. The high cost of litigation along 
with the unwanted publicity litigation can bring might be dissuading many Internet users 
from making claims of implied obligations of confidentiality. 
Additionally, although terms of use are seemingly on every website, it is unlikely 
that they apply to every Internet user.
21
 Many websites on the Internet post their terms of 
use and privacy policy at the bottom of their homepage or otherwise do not make the 
terms very visible. Courts rarely enforce these terms against Internet users because it is 
unlikely the users were on notice that the terms existed.
22
 In instances where no binding 
contract addressing confidentiality exists between the parties, implied obligations of 
confidentiality could play a significant role in the law. Finally, the terms of use and 
privacy policies are often vague. If the term is vague enough, a court‘s analysis would 
likely be similar to analysis of implied terms since both vague and implied terms compel 
courts to look to context to ascertain the intention of the parties. 
Because of the extremely small number of Internet cases and the factually-
contingent nature of the cases, no relevant similarities or distinctions could be drawn 
between online and offline cases. Both online and offline cases were highly contingent on 
the specific facts of each dispute, and the judicial analysis applied was the same. Thus, it 
                                                 
21
 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms 
of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL‘Y 415 (2010) (finding that terms of use are rarely enforced against online 
readers, listeners, or viewers who do not ―click‖ to indicate their agreement to the terms). 
22
 Id.; see also Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006). 
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would appear that the logic and rules of law articulated in the offline cases, the bulk of 
the cases analyzed in this dissertation, remain the same online. 
Theoretical Implications. The third research question was ―How does this 
analysis contribute to Nissenbaum‘s theory of privacy as contextual integrity?‖ This 
dissertation contributes to Nissenbaum‘s theory of contextual integrity by demonstrating 
how Nissenbaum‘s ―context-relative informational norms‖ are considered by courts. This 
study demonstrates which context-relative informational norms are significant enough to 
rise to the level of a legal obligation of confidentiality. It helps validate Nissenbaum‘s 
theory by demonstrating courts‘ implicit, if inconsistent, consideration of context-relative 
informational norms. However, the cases supported a collapse of Nissenbaum‘s four 
factors into two: context and terms. 
Context is a broad enough concept to encompass both actors and the nature of the 
information. While the multiple considerations within the context factor were based on 
both the perceptions of the parties and party inequalities, courts‘ consideration of the 
terms of disclosure seemed motivated almost entirely by concern for the perceptions of 
the parties. Conversely, the courts‘ consideration of the attributes of the actors focused 
almost entirely on the question of party inequalities.  
Virtually every significant consideration by the courts could be categorized into 
one of the four factors, which could be collapsed into the ―context‖ and ―terms‖ factors. 
Because the question of confidentiality is ultimately a relationship-based question, this 
theory, originally designed to conceptualize privacy, is well-suited to frame the analysis 
of disputes involving implied obligations of confidentiality. Contextual integrity, like the 
law of confidentiality, is squarely focused on the conditions surrounding the disclosure 
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and flow of information. Nissenbaum‘s theory provides a good starting point for a 
framework for courts deciding cases involving implied obligations of confidentiality.  
The cases reveal that courts already implicitly rely on Nissenbaum‘s factors, although 
they do so inconsistently. Using a decision-making framework derived from the theory of 
contextual integrity would have the advantage of a clear and consistent application of all 
of the factors deemed important by courts.  Such a framework is proposed below. 
A DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLIED OBLIGATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
The fourth and final research question asked in this dissertation was ―How can 
these factors best form a decision-making framework for courts to use in analyzing 
implied obligations of confidentiality?‖ The cases analyzed in this dissertation provided a 
rich and nuanced picture of the factors considered important by courts in analyzing 
implied obligations of confidentiality. The purpose of this section is to create a decision-
making framework for courts confronted with these disputes both online and offline in 
the future. 
Notwithstanding the myriad of factors to analyze implied obligations of 
confidentiality, no unifying framework has been used by the courts. Instead, courts seem 
to highlight various facts that either contribute to or detract from a finding of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. As previously mentioned, courts implicitly utilize 
considerations that fall within Nissenbaum‘s four factors of context-relative 
informational norms: context, actors, nature of the information, and the terms of 
disclosure. Given this utilization, the theory of contextual integrity can help create a 
much needed decision-making framework for courts analyzing implied obligations of 
confidentiality.  
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This dissertation proposes a framework that is designed as a test with four distinct 
factors. These factors are to first be analyzed independently, then collectively to 
determine if an implied obligation of confidentiality existed in a given dispute. In this 
sense, the envisioned framework is similar to the four-factor test used to establish 
whether use of a copyrighted work is fair.
23
 As in fair-use disputes, courts should engage 
in a case-by-case analysis of the factors, with no explicit preference for any particular 
factor.
24
 This framework is designed to help courts ascertain the two most important 
considerations in implied obligations of confidentiality, according to the themes arising 
from own analysis: party perception and inequalities. To that end, when courts are 
presented with a claim of an implied obligation of confidentiality, they should ask the 
following questions: 
1. What was the context surrounding the disclosure? 
2. What was the nature of the information? 
3. Who were the actors and what was their relationship? 
4. What were the internal and external terms of disclosure? 
Courts would ask each question individually, then analyze their answers as a whole to 
determine if an implied obligation of confidentiality existed. Like the fair use factors, 
each question would include several considerations that may or may not be applicable in 
a given factual scenario. This framework will not completely eliminate uncertainty from 
the law surrounding implied obligations of confidentiality.  The concept of implied 
                                                 
23
 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §107 (1976). 
24
 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (―The task [of deciding whether 
a work is a fair use] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it 
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.‖). It is important to note that the similarity between this 
proposed framework and fair use is in form rather than in substance.  
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confidentiality is too dependent upon specific facts for a completely consistent 
application of the law. However, the adoption of this decision-making framework can 
increase clarity and minimize uncertainty by asking the same questions in every dispute. 
What was the context surrounding the disclosure? Here the court should 
determine a number of things, including the existence of any customs of confidentiality, 
whether the disclosure was made in the process of ongoing negotiations, whether the 
disclosure was solicited by the recipient of the information, and why the information was 
disclosed.  Industry customs of confidentiality and the solicitation of a disclosure would 
support a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. However, according to 
previous case law, the absence of custom or solicitation would not necessarily be seen as 
weakening the likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Rather, the absence 
of such factors would simply transfer the courts‘ focus to other contextual considerations. 
  If the parties are found to be relatively equal in sophistication and resources, then 
the presence of negotiations would weigh against a finding of implied confidentiality. 
Courts typically found that parties in these situations had every opportunity to request 
confidentiality and likely would have done so expressly had they desired it. However, if 
the discloser has significantly fewer resources or is less sophisticated, negotiations 
between the parties should only slightly weigh against a finding of implied confidentiality 
because the opportunity for the discloser of information to explicitly request 
confidentiality is diminished.  
 Finally, courts should ask why the information was disclosed. Disclosures made 
in order to promote a common goal between the parties or to further develop the parties‘ 
relationship would weigh in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality. For 
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example, disclosures made to a physician in order for a patient to receive proper 
treatment would weigh in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality.  The same 
could be said for disclosures made within a business relationship toward a common goal 
such as manufacturing a product together. Inversely, a strictly gratuitous disclosure of 
information that was not made in furtherance of a common goal or to develop a 
relationship would weigh against a finding of implied confidentiality. For example, a 
publicly accessible blog post describing an Internet user‘s frustration over a particular 
topic would not be seen as furthering a common goal in a relationship. 
What was the nature of the information? For this factor, the courts should look 
for specific kinds of information that would either contribute to or detract from the 
likelihood of an implied obligation of confidentiality. If information was highly personal, 
proprietary or useful, or if its disclosure would expose the discloser to physical harm, 
then this factor would weigh in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Consideration of these types of information would reflect the courts‘ attempt to protect 
vulnerable parties as well as the courts‘ observation that recipients would or should 
perceive such information as confidential. 
 Alternatively, if information is the type that is inherently or within a specific 
context likely to be shared with others, then this factor would weigh against an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. For example, information designed to be viewed by third 
parties such as blueprints, resumes, headshot photographs, and most artistic expression 
would weigh against a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. This 
consideration would reflect the courts‘ observation that when such information is 
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disclosed, the discloser would either know or should know that the information would not 
be treated as confidential.  
Who were the actors and what was their relationship? This factor consists of 
two equally important parts, actor attributes and relationships. Courts should first ask 
whether either of the parties was inherently vulnerable and seek to ascertain each party‘s 
level of sophistication and adequacy of resources. Disclosers of information who were 
vulnerable, unsophisticated, or had very few resources such as legal representation would 
weigh in favor of a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. This would 
particularly be true in situations where the recipient of information is sophisticated and 
has adequate resources.  
Courts should also ask whether the recipient of information acted in bad faith. For 
example, if a recipient pretended to be interested in buying a discloser‘s idea in an 
attempt to gain access to confidential information, then this factor would also weigh in 
favor of a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality as a matter of equity. In 
essence, the law would bind the recipient to confidentiality because it is unjust to reward 
recipients acting in bad faith. 
 The court also should ask a critical question in determining an obligation of 
confidentiality: what was the nature of the relationship between the parties? To answer 
this question, courts would look to three different aspects of the relationship: 1) what was 
the history between the parties; 2) was the relationship of a specific kind that involves a 
heighted probability of implied confidentiality; and 3) was there unequal bargaining 
power between the parties? 
218 
 
 Regarding the history between the parties, courts should seek to determine how 
developed a relationship was. Long-standing and developed relationships would weigh in 
favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality because developed relationships likely 
involve trust and customs. Developed relationships have less of a need to express 
expectations of confidentiality, increasing the likelihood of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. Parties in developed relationships can draw upon their history of 
protecting each others‘ information, whereas strangers disclosing information for the first 
time have no such context to shape their expectations. 
 The law has traditionally recognized that certain kinds of relationships are likely 
to involve an implied obligation of confidentiality, such as principal-agent,
25
 physician-
patient,
26
 accountant/attorney-client,
27
 employer-employee,
28
 and those involving trusted 
                                                 
25
 See, e.g. McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). The court of appeals of 
Texas elaborated on the nature of fiduciary and confidential  relationships, stating: 
There are two types of fiduciary relationships: formal fiduciary relationships that arise as 
a matter of law, such as partnerships and principal-agent relationships, and informal 
fiduciary relationships or ―confidential relationships‖ that may arise from moral, social, 
domestic, or personal relationships. A fiduciary relationship is an extraordinary one and 
will not be created lightly. The mere fact that one party to a relationship subjectively 
trusts the other does not indicate the existence of a fiduciary relationship. A person is 
justified in believing another to be his fiduciary ―only where he or she is accustomed to 
being guided by the judgment and advice of the other party, and there exists a long 
association in a business relationship, as well as a personal friendship.‖ 
Id. at 829 (citations omitted). 
26
 See, e.g., Crippen v. Charter Southland Hosp., Inc., 534 So. 2d 286 (Ala. 1988) (finding a duty of 
confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship); Anderson v. Strong Mem‘l Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1988) (finding that ―the physician-patient relationship itself gives rise to an implied 
covenant of confidence and trust when breached‖); Givens v. Mullikin ex rel Estate of McElwaney, 75 
S.W. 3d 383, 407 (Tenn. 2002). 
27
 See, e.g., Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 19 Ohio App. 3d 7, 12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). 
28
 See, e.g., SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing established 
precedent that ―in some circumstances, an agreement not to disclose a former employer‘s trade secrets may 
be implied from the confidential nature of the employment relationship‖) (emphasis in original); Sweetzel, 
Inc. v. Hawk Hill Cookies, Inc., 1995 WL 550585 at *12 (E.D. Pa.). 
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advisors.
29
 Courts should determine if the relationship at issue could be categorized as 
one of these special relationships. Disclosures involving these special relationships would 
weigh in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Otherwise, courts should 
ignore this consideration in determining the weight of this factor. 
 Finally, the courts should examine the parties‘ relative bargaining power. It 
should be noted that to some extent this consideration overlaps with the relative attributes 
of the actors. A discloser of information with significantly less power to bargain for 
confidentiality than the recipient of information would weigh in favor of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. If the parties to a disclosure had relatively equal bargaining 
power, or if the discloser of information had more power to bargain for confidentiality 
than the recipient, then this factor would weigh against an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. In previous similar situations, courts typically found that the discloser‘s 
failure to request confidentiality with ample opportunity to do so served as evidence that 
an obligation of confidentiality was not implied in the disclosure. 
What were the internal and external terms of disclosure? Finally, courts 
should analyze any internal and external terms of disclosure between the parties. 
Regarding internal terms, courts would look for the presence of any ―confidentiality 
indicators,‖ which are signals, statements, or actions that indicate that either a desire for 
confidentiality or that the information would be kept in confidence. Confidentiality 
indicators are internal terms because they take place within the relationship between the 
parties. The presence of confidentiality indicators would weigh in favor of an implied 
                                                 
29
 See, e.g., Omnitceh Intern., Inc., v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a fiduciary 
relationship between business partners, attorneys and their clients, the insured and their insurers, and 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders). 
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obligation of confidentiality. The absence of confidentiality indicators would weigh 
against an implied obligation of confidentiality. Confidentiality indicators help courts 
ascertain the perception of the parties. 
 Additionally, courts should seek to identify any external terms of disclosure. 
External terms are laws, organizational codes, policies, and external arrangements and 
agreements that affect the disclosure of information between the parties. For example, in 
cases involving a physician‘s implied obligation of confidentiality to his or her patient, 
courts could look to external laws such as a state‘s professional licensing requirements, 
statutes, and the Hippocratic Oath to affirm the implied obligation. If the parties knew or 
should have known of external terms that restrict the disclosure of information, then this 
factor would weigh in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality. However, if there 
are no known external terms or if the parties are aware of external terms that diminish the 
possibility of confidential disclosure, then this factor would weigh against an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. For example, if an individual disclosed information to an 
entity that must include that information in public records because of government 
reporting requirements, then an implied obligation of confidentiality would be unlikely. 
 Courts also should address two additional considerations within this factor. In the 
case of conflicting terms of disclosure, courts should seek to identify the most recent term 
as the controlling term in most cases. In determining the relative weight of terms, courts 
also must examine their clarity. Terms that are clear and definite enough for the promises 
and required performances of each party to be reasonably certain would weigh in favor of 
an implied obligation of confidentiality. Meanwhile, vague terms that are subject to 
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numerous credible interpretations would weigh against a finding of implied 
confidentiality.  
Application Offline. This proposed framework could serve as a tool for courts to 
analyze implied obligations of confidentiality in a clear and consistent way. This section 
will apply the framework to an existing offline dispute to demonstrate its utility. Recall 
the case of Faris v. Enberg.
30
 Here, Edgar Faris, a television show developer, pitched an 
idea for a sports quiz show to a sports announcer, Richard Enberg. Sometime after the 
two met, a very similar show appeared on television with Enberg as the master of 
ceremonies. Faris brought a suit against Enberg and the television show‘s producer for 
misappropriation of the sports quiz show idea and for breach of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality. The California Court of Appeal found that in order for a valid 
confidentiality obligation to exist, ―[t]here must exist evidence of the communication of 
the confidentiality of the submission or evidence from which a confidential relationship 
can be inferred.‖31 
Here, the court found that no rational recipient of the information disclosed by 
Faris could be bound to an understanding that a secret was being imparted. The court 
held, ―One could not infer from anything Enberg did or said that he was given the chance 
to reject disclosure in advance or that he voluntarily received the disclosure with an 
understanding that it was not to be given to others.‖32 The court analyzed a number of 
factors: 
                                                 
30
 97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
31
 Id. at 323. 
32
 Id. at 324. 
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Only in plaintiff's response to summary judgment is there reference to his 
own thoughts from which one might infer that he felt there was a 
confidence. But he never, so far as we can tell, communicated these 
thoughts to Enberg, and nothing of an understanding of confidence can be 
inferred from Enberg's conduct. No other special facts exist from which 
the relationship can be inferred: there was no implied-in-fact contract; the 
material was not protectable; and they were not yet partners or joint 
adventurers, and there was no buyer/seller or principal/agent 
relationship.
33
 
 
Applying the decision-making framework proposed here to this same case would clarify 
the court‘s decision-making method and ensure that all the important contextual factors 
are fully considered.  The result might be the same – or it might be better.  
For example, if the court were to use the suggested framework, it would first seek 
to ascertain the context of the disclosure. Here it would appear that the disclosure was 
unsolicited, which weighs against a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Additionally, the disclosure occurred within the context of negotiations. The court could 
follow the lead of other courts and find that this served as evidence that Faris had ample 
opportunity to request an express promise of confidentiality. Additionally, the disclosure 
was made before any request or indication of confidentiality which, as the court in reality 
found, strongly weighed against a finding of implied confidentiality. Finally, while other 
cases discussed a potential industry custom of confidentiality when pitching ideas for 
television shows, no such custom was alleged in this case. Thus, this factor weighs 
against a finding of implied confidentiality. 
 The second factor, the nature of the information, only slightly weighs in favor of a 
finding of implied confidentiality. Here, the information was proprietary and useful in 
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nature, but only minimally so. The idea of a sports quiz show was not novel or concrete 
enough for copyright protection and arguably only minimally valuable to the discloser. 
 The third factor, the attributes of the actors, would likely weigh against a finding 
of implied confidentiality. It would appear that Faris had some experience in the industry 
and understood the protocol for pitching a television idea. Enberg does not appear to have 
acted in bad faith. Finally, while as an employee of a television studio Enberg might have 
more resources than Faris, he did not appear to utilize those resources in his negotiations 
with Faris. Thus, Fairs was not inherently vulnerable and also was not vulnerable relative 
to the power of Enberg. 
 The fourth factor, the terms of disclosure, also weighs against a finding of 
confidentiality. The court was most persuaded by a lack of a confidentiality indicator. 
While Faris told Enberg his idea for the sports quiz show was his ―creation‖ and ―literary 
property,‖ neither of those are equal to a request for confidentiality. Additionally, Enberg 
apparently in no way indicated he would keep Faris‘s ideas confidential. There appear to 
be no external or conflicting terms in this relationship. 
Looking at the factors as a whole, the court correctly concluded that Enberg was 
not bound by an implied obligation of confidentiality. Three of the four factors weigh 
against such a finding, and the sole factor that favored an implied confidentiality did so 
only marginally. However, while the same result was reached under the framework as the 
court‘s actual opinion, this analysis better demonstrates the court‘s justifications for its 
ruling and addresses more of the potential concerns regarding implied confidentiality 
than the court‘s original analysis. 
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Application on the Internet. This decision-making framework is necessary if the 
concept of implied confidentiality is to be clearly and consistently applied where it is 
most needed – on the Internet. The framework should be applied to online cases, the 
cases that originally prompted this research, the same way it should be applied to offline 
cases. Recall the plight of Cynthia Moreno discussed at the beginning of this 
dissertation.
34
 Moreno published her ―Ode to Coalinga‖ on the journal section of her 
personal profile on the social network site myspace.com. Roger Campbell, the principal 
of Coalinga High School, read the Ode before it was removed and forwarded it to the 
local newspaper, the Coalinga Record, which published the Ode in the newspaper‘s 
letters-to-the-editor section. The Coalinga community reacted violently to the publication 
of the Ode, threatening Moreno and her family and ultimately causing the Moreno family 
to close its 20-year-old family business.
35
  Moreno filed suit against Campbell alleging 
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the sake of 
exposition, assume Moreno also alleged breach of an implied obligation of confidentiality 
against Campbell, who originally accessed Moreno‘s post.36  
First, the court would attempt to ascertain the context of the disclosure. There is 
some debate as to whether customs of confidentiality exist in social network sites.
37
 This 
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is a factually specific inquiry, particularly because customs vary by site and user. 
However, given that seemingly no persuasive evidence was introduced at trial to support 
the notion that a custom of confidentiality existed on MySpace, this factor does not favor 
a finding of implied confidentiality.  The disclosure was not made in the process of 
ongoing negotiations, nor was the disclosure solicited by Campbell. Indeed, the Ode was 
simply a gratuitous post for friends to read. Indeed, there was no purpose for the 
disclosure other than to vent. Thus, the context weighs against a finding of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality.  
Next, the court would look to the nature of the information. Here, the information 
was arguably personal. The ode was a confessional that divulged raw emotions and 
personal histories with classmates. Additionally, the information subjected Moreno and 
her family to potential physical harm as bricks were thrown at her house. However, it is 
debatable whether Campbell either knew or should have known this would be the result 
of his disclosure. Unlike revealing the identity of a government informant, it does not 
necessarily follow that disclosing an angry blog post will lead to physical violence 
against the blogger. Thus, this factor only slightly weighs in favor of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. 
Third, the court would identify the attributes of the actors and their relationship to 
each other. Here, there is no evidence Campbell acted in bad faith to access the 
information. There does not appear to be any inequality between the parties. Both 
Moreno and Campbell seem to be relatively sophisticated parties with no advantage of 
resources or bargaining power over another. Additionally, the parties have no history 
                                                                                                                                                 
Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. SCI. TECH. & 
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together. Indeed, it would appear that Moreno and Campbell were strangers. This factor 
weighs against a finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
Finally, courts would seek to identify any internal or external terms of disclosure. 
Internally, there appear to be no confidentiality indicators. Moreno did not utilize privacy 
settings to restrict access to her post, which might have indicated the confidential nature 
of her Ode. Instead, her post was accessible to anyone with an Internet connection.
38
 Nor 
did Campbell give any indication that he was going to keep the information confidential. 
Moreno could have created a small group for disclosure of the Ode and premised 
invitations to the group upon an indication the group members would keep the 
information disclosed within confidential, but she did not.  
However, there was one external term that might weigh in favor of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. The MySpace terms of use prohibit ―publicly post[ing] 
information that poses or creates a privacy or security risk to any person,‖  violating ―the 
privacy rights, publicity rights, [or] copyrights…of any person,‖ or ―using or distributing 
any information obtained from the MySpace Services in order to harass, abuse, or harm 
another person or entity, or attempting to do the same.‖39  Thus, by accessing the Ode 
subject to these terms, Campbell was potentially legally bound to confidence via an 
agreement with MySpace. However, the facts do not indicate that this term was relied 
upon or even known by Moreno. This matters because the courts focus on the perception 
of the parties. Nor do the facts indicate that Campbell intended to harm Moreno by 
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redistributing the post. Ultimately, this factor weighs against a finding of an implied 
obligation of confidentiality. 
Looking at the factors as a whole, a court would likely conclude that Campbell 
was not bound by an implied obligation of confidentiality. Three of the four factors 
weigh against such a finding, and the sole factor that favored an implied confidentiality 
did so only marginally. This analysis demonstrates how the framework might be applied 
online.  
Contrast the Moreno case with a similar dispute that might have a different result 
under the framework: Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group.
40
 In this case, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey was asked to determine the privacy interest 
in information contained on a ―closed‖ webpage on myspace.com.  A waiter at a local 
restaurant called Houston‘s, Brian Pietrylo, created a group for he and his fellow 
employees to vent about their employer ―without any outside eyes spying in on [them]‖41  
Pietrylo stated on the group‘s page that ―[t]his group is entirely private, and can only be 
joined by invitation.‖  The court noted that the icon for the group, which was Houston‘s 
logo, ―would appear only on the MySpace profiles of those who were invited into the 
group and accepted the invitation.‖42   
Because each member accessed her or his own profile by entering in a username 
and password, Pietrylo effectively restricted the website to authorized users in possession 
of an invitation to the group and a password-protected MySpace profile. Under pressure 
at a party one night, a Houston‘s hostess disclosed her password to her managers. Pietrylo 
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was then fired for creating the group, which resulted in a lawsuit alleging that the 
managers violated the group‘s privacy.  The court found that ―[p]laintiffs created an 
invitation-only Internet discussion space.  In this space, they had an expectation that only 
invited users would be able to read the discussion.‖43 Ultimately, a jury found that 
Houston's managers had violated the Stored Communications Act and the New Jersey 
Wire Tapping & Electronic Surveillance Act. However, the jury did not support Pietrylo's 
claim for invasion of privacy. The jury found that Pietrylo had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the MySpace group, presumably because so many people were in the group, 
although it gave no official reasoning.
44
 
Suppose the fired employees brought a claim for breach of an implied obligation 
of confidentiality against the hostess.
45
 The first factor of the framework, context, would 
likely weigh in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality. Like in Moreno, the 
facts do not reveal that access to the group was solicited by the hostess. However, unlike 
in Moreno, these disclosures were made for a specific purpose, to vent ―without any 
outside eyes prying‖ on the members of the group. Thus, confidentiality was seemingly 
necessary to further the purpose of the group.  
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The second factor, the nature of the information, also favors a finding of implied 
confidentiality. Like in Moreno, the information disclosed here was personal in nature 
because it revealed the negative thoughts of the employees toward their manager. While 
the information might not inherently expose the discloser to physical harm, it certainly 
exposes the discloser to some form of retaliation, as evidenced by the fact that Pietrylo 
was fired for creating the group. 
Regarding the third factor, the attributes of the actors and their relationship to 
each other, there is no evidence the hostess acted in bad faith to receive an invitation to 
the group. Additionally, there does not appear to be any inequality between the parties. 
The hostess and the waiters who created the group all were  employees of Houston‘s of 
relatively the same status with no apparent advantage of resources or bargaining power 
over another. Unlike in Moreno, however, the parties likely had at least a partially 
developed relationship. Ostensibly, the parties worked together and got to know each 
other at least slightly before the invitation to join the group was sent out. This factor 
weighs in favor of finding of an implied obligation of confidentiality. 
The final factor – terms of disclosure – is applied the most distinctly from 
Moreno. The website in Pietrylo explicitly stated that ―[t]his group is entirely private, and 
can only be joined by invitation.‖  The website also provided that the icon for the group, 
which was the restaurant‘s trademarked logo, ―would appear only on the MySpace 
profiles of those who were invited into the group and accepted the invitation.‖46  The fact 
that the privacy settings were used to restrict access to the group also served as a 
confidentiality indicator. Although the word confidential was apparently not used, the 
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confidential nature of the group postings was indicated throughout the website and 
invitation. This factor weighs heavily in favor of an implied obligation of confidentiality 
for every member of the group. 
Thus, three of the factors weigh in favor of an implied obligation of 
confidentiality, and one is neutral. Observing the factors as a whole, it is likely that a 
court would find an implied obligation of confidentiality under this framework. The 
Moreno and Pietrylo cases demonstrate the various ways the framework for implied 
obligations of confidentiality could be applied online in the same way it would be applied 
to offline cases. 
Further Implications for Online Disputes. It should be noted that the 
framework proposed here could be applied in disputes involving two distinct recipients of 
information: 1) audience members and 2) intermediaries. The distinction between these 
two parties is simple but important: An audience member is any individual who was 
intended to or did access an individual‘s disclosed information on the Internet. An 
intermediary is a website, Internet service provider, or similar entity that routes or 
displays information on the Internet.  
Both audience members and intermediaries are recipients of information, but their 
implied duties of confidentiality might vary under this decision-making framework. 
Audience members typically have smaller amounts or individual pieces of data, such as a 
friend who has access to a Facebook profile or the recipient of an e-mail. Intermediaries 
typically receive much more data and have more motivation to use these ―big data‖ in a 
commercial way. The merits to and drawbacks from disclosing to both are outside the 
scope of this article, but it is sufficient to say that in many instances a discloser of 
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information could benefit from an implied obligation of confidentiality from one or both 
of these recipients.  
As demonstrated above, this proposed framework could guide judges in online 
disputes and those who disclose and receive information. In order for the concept of 
implied confidentiality to be useful on the Internet, websites would need to provide 
greater transparency in their data collection and use practices. While it might be apparent 
when intended audience members such as recipients of personal e-mails betray the 
confidence of the discloser, it would be more difficult for Internet users to know when 
websites have disclosed their information in breach of their implied obligation of 
confidentiality. A full exploration of this problem is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Perhaps the most significant implication that would arise from the development of 
implied obligations of confidentiality on the Internet is utilitarian: implied confidentiality 
can sometimes serve as a remedy when other privacy remedies, such as the disclosure 
tort, would fail. As previously discussed, the privacy torts are often ineffective in online 
disputes, particularly when personal information is self-disclosed. In some instances a 
claim of an implied obligation of confidentiality might be more appropriate.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation focused exclusively on cases that expressly addressed claims of 
implied obligations of confidentiality. Future research could look at other privacy-related 
disputes where implied confidentiality was ignored when it might have been a viable 
claim. For example, future research could examine claims for the tort of public disclosure 
of private facts that stem from one party distributing information that was originally self-
disclosed.  
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Recall the problem identified at the beginning of this dissertation: The rampant 
self-disclosure of personal information concomitant with an expectation of privacy is a 
problem because courts have struggled to determine whether and to what degree self-
disclosed information is private.
47
  Professor Lior Strahilevitz stated, ―Despite the 
centrality of this issue, the American courts lack a coherent, consistent methodology for 
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular 
fact that has been shared with one or more persons.‖48 Future research could target these 
cases of ambiguity and apply the framework proposed in this dissertation in order to test 
the framework and improve upon it. Particular emphasis could be placed on claims for 
public disclosure of private facts in online contexts, which have been particularly 
problematic.
49
 
Additional research could also empirically explore the considerations important to 
disclosers and recipients of information. For example, research could explore which 
indicators are effective at conveying the implication of confidentiality or which kind of 
relationships give rise to implied expectations of confidentiality. Future research could 
ethnographically explore customs of confidentiality in online social networks and attempt 
to uncover reasons for disclosure of online information. Many disciplines could 
contribute to this research including media effects, human-computer interaction, 
psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics. A number of research methods 
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including experiments, surveys, and in-depth interviews could be utilized to empirically 
explore implied obligations of confidentiality on the Internet. 
In the information age, the law must adapt to protect certain kinds of self-
disclosed information. Given the limited effectiveness of other privacy remedies, the law 
of confidentiality might be one of the few options left for those seeking to protect their 
disclosures. The law of implied obligations of confidentiality must be organized and clear 
in order to effectuate the intentions of parties operating in rapidly changing contexts. 
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